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# **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Al-Asad Involvement in Lebanon Deemed Profitable

44230066A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 4 Dec 89 p 9

[Article by A. Schweitzer: "Lebanese Trap for Syria"]

[Text] It is impossible to know if Yitzhaq Shamir has true admirers, but even if he has them, it is doubtful whether any of them sees in him the embodiment of an outstanding politician who is likely to be remembered in history books, except perhaps for his unique ability to make a mess of Israel's foreign relations.

And here, in our northern vicinity, there is a country whose leader of about 20 years is a national catastrophe of approximately Shamir's proportions. But look at the difference. President al-Asad is viewed as a first-class leader who deserves homage as one who has made Syria a powerful force in the Middle East without which or against which nothing can happen.

The truth is that if al-Asad were to die tomorrow and a true assessment of his accomplishments were carried out, few positive things would be said of him. In the civic realm, he would be leaving his country poor and backward, just as it was when he got it. If there is someone who is likely to bring an end to the hated Zionist presence, it will not be al-Asad. His troops tried and were beaten back in the war and a half that he waged against Israel, in one as the aggressor. And as for strategic balance with the Zionist enemy, which represents his political and defense aspiration, it is still out of reach. The description of unsuccessful, therefore, fits him well.

What are we talking about? One of al-Asad's weaknesses is his excessive appetite. The man who had to settle the Arabs' accounts with Israel many times—a difficult task given the circumstances in the region—has been eying for about a decade the Lebanese objective.

Whoever argues, without considering appearance and common sense, that the two are connected, has to prove the direction of the connection. Would it be easier to conquer the Zionists if he were ruling over Lebanon? In what is called the art of war, there is importance attached to what comes earlier and later. The defeat of Israel as a condition for ruling Lebanon is the logical order of things. The simultaneous occurrence of the two events, or a reversal of the order is, al-Asad realizes, absurd, but he is unwilling to face that fact.

Israeli policy is only intermittently taking advantage of this error in al-Asad's strategic objectives. Israel has not always known how to let Syria become entangled and even shed blood, without needing to step in and sacrifice itself as well. The sharp deviation from the clever system of letting the enemy entangle itself can be seen in the series of events that led to the Lebanon War in 1982. Israel, and not Syria, was the one who intensified its

involvement in a second front, against its own interests. And Israel emerged from that experience weakened from the sacrifice of lives lost, of money and national motivation that it cost.

Now there is another opportunity to let al-Asad get dizzy from his Lebanese fantasy. The presidential elections, following an al-Ta'if agreement, assured that Syria would carry the Lebanese millstone on its back. For it is not enough to find the right candidate. You also have to defend him after he has been elected and you have to establish a minimum of public order which justifies forcing al-Ta'if on resistant Lebanese.

The al-Ta'if compromise is based on the following: The Arab world will make peace with the Syrian administration in Lebanon in exchange for Syrian responsibility for ending the civil war there whose continuation is staining the entire Arab world.

Logical people, if there were any in Damascus, would tell their fellow Arabs in other Arab countries: Accept the bitter reality and let us go home so we can use all our collective national energies to conquer the Arabs' most dangerous enemy, Israel.

If this is what logic dictates, then a wise Israeli policy would have registered relief about al-Asad's involvement in Lebanon. And whoever's ears are sensitive would hear a harsh melody in the declarations of Israeli officials. On the surface, the declarations imply a distance between us and events in Lebanon, including what the Syrians do there. But the emphasis on the existence of the famous red lines, which Syria had better not cross, points in a different direction. Nothing awful would happen to Israel if, for a few days, the IDF [Israel Defense Force] did not fly its regular aerial reconnaissance flights. It would be better to leave the aerial space over Beirut to the Syrians, in order to help them get rid of 'Awn, restore the elected president Elias Haravi to his palace in 'Ovda, make themselves hated by the casualties of the al-Ta'if compromise, and force them to do everything necessary to establish Syrian order in Lebanon.

It must be emphasized again that, just as a rational Arab policy, unlimited by empathetic feelings towards the Palestinians, would allow Shamir and his colleagues to suffer as much as they want with the intifada, and, in a more general way, with the capture of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, so a rational Israeli policy, must let al-Asad fall into the Lebanon trap, if necessary, even by a temporary halt to the usual cautionary tactics.

This may not be appreciated by the commander of the Air Force, General Ben Nun and his followers who, from time to time, cannot control themselves and picture Syria as a direct threat here and now to Israel, but it will fit in with the strategic goals of Israel. We and others like us have no doubt as to which of the two is preferable.

### Military Ties Between Iraq, Jordan Arouses Israeli Concern

44000196 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 11 Feb 90 p 8

[Text] The deepening military ties between Iraq and Jordan has aroused the concern of Israel. Jordan is aware of the gravity with which Israel views Iraqi involvement and has conveyed to Israel through channels outside the area that its intentions are defensive and that it has no desire to disturb the relative quiet along the border. In the recent past Jordan deviated from accepted norms and included the Iraqi Air Force in patrol flights close to the Israeli border. These flights were stopped only after American intervention.

### Jordan Reportedly Allowing PLO Presence in Its Territory

44000197 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 12 Feb 90 p 2

[Text] A senior defense official claims that Jordan has recently been allowing the presence of PLO leaders in its territory and that Israel is carefully monitoring events. The same source emphasized that Israel will do all in its power to ensure that Jordan does not become a base for potential terrorism. Jordan continues to utilize the means at its disposal to prevent infiltration into Israel, but in order to pacify the Palestinians in hope that they will not act against the Jordanian regime, the government is allowing PLO leadership more than in the past with regard to residing in Jordan and acting in various spheres. The PLO has recently transferred funds to Jordan, a fact which has strengthened its status in the kingdom [passage omitted].

### PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

#### 'Suspicious' Advertisements for US Visas Mailed

44000198 Jerusalem AL-FAJR  
in Arabic 25 Jan 90 pp 1, 11

[Text] Jerusalem—The Arab-American Anti-Discrimination League (Jerusalem chapter) issued a statement yesterday warning Palestinian citizens against doing business with suspicious companies claiming that they are able to guarantee U.S. entry visas.

The statement was issued following the distribution of advertisements by mail by anonymous companies claiming to guarantee residency or tourist visas or marriage to Americans for anyone requesting their services.

The league contacted the American consulate in Jerusalem, where the authorities confirmed that there is no party authorized for this sort of activity and regarded this type of advertisement to be illegal and false.

The Arab-American League regarded these types of advertisements to be part of a campaign to tempt the citizens into emigrating. It warned the citizens from doing business with the companies, which were also seeking to cheat and swindle.



The league advised any citizen wishing to travel to the United States to go directly to the American consulate, since it is the only party that can decide whether or not applicants can obtain a visa.

#### [Text of Advertisement]

Do you want to obtain an entry visa or green card for the United States? Do you want to live, work, study, invest, tour, or marry a (female) American citizen in the United States? Contact the entry visa and American green card specialists and travel brokers for the United States. Special, reduced tickets for travel to the USA. Quick, private service with the American consulate. We guarantee you a visa or green card upon immediate receipt of your payment in the event the American consul refuses to give you a visa. If you present this ad, you will receive a \$100 discount in the costs of our services to you. Note: The discount is only valid for a single transaction per person.

### EGYPT

#### Opposition Writer Praises Mubarak Advances

900A0275A Cairo AL-AHRAR  
in Arabic 1 Jan 90 pp 1, 2

[Column by Mustafa Kamil Murad: "Change"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

President Husni Mubarak was wise, smart, and also liberal. He followed al-Sadat's example but rectified his predecessor's mistakes by releasing political prisoners and receiving them at his house. He permitted

impounded opposition papers to republish. He let the freedoms of opinion and expression take their course unbounded.

President Mubarak has been in power for more than eight years during which political parties stabilized. They waged, during his first and second terms, several electoral battles for the People's and Consultative assemblies. Their representatives won more than 90 seats in the People's Assembly, or about 20 percent. That was the second bulwark of democracy and freedom of opinion in Egypt. The parties pursued their parliamentary task of highlighting alternative viewpoints in the halls of parliament. Political parties widely exercised their grassroots operations via seminars and community meetings throughout the country. Their newspapers widely practiced the freedom to express alternative views, even if different from and opposed to those of President Muhammad Husni Mubarak. There were excesses to be sure but the truth must be said that President Mubarak, being inclined towards democracy and the sanctity of expression, tolerated that in utter faith, courage, and patriotism. He took no action against any party even though he used sharp words to criticize the conduct of political parties, which was normal.

Such democratic actions have been practiced in Egypt for nearly nine years since President Mubarak assumed power and it is now time for more corrections and for the removal of obstacles which surfaced as a result of the exercise of political partisanship which must be eliminated before democracy in Egypt can continue on its natural development towards political equilibrium among the various parties. This is the primary base for political stability and is the only major avenue towards development, increased production, and a higher standard of living in Egypt. Those primary concerns are advocated by President Mubarak and by all political parties in Egypt without exception. [passage omitted]

I convey to brother President Muhammad Husni Mubarak that the course of democracy, which grew and blossomed during his regime, needs revision and correction prompted by political, social, cultural, and religious developments in Egypt.

I believe that the first step should be for President Muhammad Husni Mubarak to issue a bold decree proclaiming an end to emergency [martial] law. All freedom-restricting legislation, issued towards the end of al-Sadat's rule, should be referred to the People's and Consultative assemblies for repeal as they have become irrelevant and discordant to the country's political stability.

My advice on the second step is given in the spirit of great love for Egypt and of great esteem and regard for President Mubarak and for his patriotic, unassuming, and unsullied personality. He should proclaim the start of public debate over Egypt's current constitution and the amendments it needs to remain in step with our democratic posture.

I conclude by expressing confidence that President Mubarak will embark on that course, God willing. He will see for himself that those needed changes and amendments will manifest themselves in a tremendous economic initiative needed by Egypt to bolster Arab action and support the Palestinian cause. President Mubarak and the entire world will then see that a free state of Egypt would herald progress in all fields under the banners of democracy, freedom, and stability. This will directly impact the Arab and African worlds in terms of growth, prosperity, freedom, and stability!

#### **Government's Disregard for Public Opinion Criticized**

##### **Public Role in Lawmaking**

*90OA0257A Cairo AL-AHRAM  
in Arabic 18 Dec 89 p 16*

[Article by Dr. Yusuf Idris: "The Response is Civilized"]

[Text] I was pleased that the government backed off changing the weekend to Thursday and Friday, and restored the status quo (Friday and Saturday). This pleased me until I asked, along with foreign broadcasts and daily papers, about the acute circumstance that compelled Dr. 'Atif Sidqi to surprise us like that, a few weeks ago, with such a decision. Moreover, the decision was obligatory and, presumably, not open to discussion after being implemented. However, the discussion occurred, and the decision was found to have many defects (after being promulgated), which spurred the government to go back to the traditional weekend. Why wasn't it possible to "submit" this matter to public opinion, studying it carefully in the press and in radio and television forums, and then crystallizing the viewpoints from all possible angles with regard to the weekend of Thursday and Friday versus Friday and Saturday?

This is the kernel of what I wish to get at: Questions relating to decisionmaking must be submitted to public opinion. I do not find either major or minor consideration being paid to public opinion. A friend asked me, "Is it true that public opinion in Egypt is still a factor? Where is it? To what extent does it affect the government's decisions? Has the government changed its laws because of public opinion? The action regarding the Law of Artisans' Unions happened recently. The government in that situation neither bothered to obtain the views of union members who, presumably, should have prepared the law, with the government approving it, nor exchanged views about amending it. With regard to the laws of Islamic and investment societies, we continued, as public opinion, to warn against them and against leaving them without state supervision or organized accountability, without control over them of any kind. We did this shortly after they were created, when it became very clear that they were suspiciously increasing profits far above the world profit rates, sometimes many times those rates.

Public opinion continued to write and to speak out to no avail, until the years came in which those families and companies had sucked up all the cash liquidity and savings in the market, and then, when money was no longer being deposited, the government began its dilatory actions after "Malta was destroyed" and the cash had fled abroad into God's trust, or rather, it fled from its owners!

There should be public opinion in every country of the world, but not just as an ornament. The multiparty system, and the democracy of the opposition press and the national press cannot do without it. Plurality, party politics, and freedom of opinion have as an ultimate goal the formation of a public opinion. That is, to clothe words and views exchanged among people, which have led to defined complaints or a defined view, in good feelings. This is so that this view or complaint becomes a mass opinion, with a body and scope, capable of compelling the government—in accordance with the constitution and regulations, without a shred of rebellion against the law—to back off its erroneous position, if it indeed made a mistake, or to adopt a new stance in compliance with the demands of public opinion. That is democracy.

It never is a banner raised and boasted about. It is a number of political processes aimed ultimately at achieving the people's true demands, and putting these demands to a truly elected people's assembly, containing a strong opposition, where laws fashioned by the ruling party can be debated, amended, completed, or rejected. Does something like this happen in Egypt?

What happens here is the least effective part of the democratic process, that is, that part pertaining to putting the matter in the newspapers and having a column for or against! This means democracy inside the republic of the press, and it means that it is impossible for the matter to reach the republic of legislation and be promulgated as law.

How many glaring cases have we seen of the people becoming convinced that they have got the government to accept the facts and make way for the proper and enlightened decision, when suddenly the government completely surprises us with something else, with a decision we know nothing about, that has not had any debate. So long as the government has the majority in the People's Assembly, the decision passes easily, is approved, and becomes a draft law, over which no one has had a say.

Yes indeed, there is no public opinion in Egypt or, more precisely, there is no public opinion that the government respects, takes into account, or cannot deviate one iota from its wishes.

Many times the government takes action in the interests of public opinion and the people. However, one can be sure that the government did this without the participation—in the entire process—of public opinion, or those

who represent public opinion, so that the government never becomes a bit submissive to public opinion.

I recall some years ago that the government thought that the stickers that were affixed to the rear and front windows of vehicles, with holy writings that were disparaging of Muslims and Christians, which nearly led to sectarian tensions, might possibly result in, God only knows to what extent, sectarian warfare. At that time, the government issued instructions—mere instructions—to vehicle drivers and pedestrians to remove any sticker on vehicle windows or elsewhere. Like others, I have thought of our people as lazy, people who would try to procrastinate or even, some of them, to outsmart the instructions. However, the remarkable thing was that, at least for 24 hours, I traveled through Cairo, coming and going in my car, not only enjoying vehicle windows free of all that had been plastered on them, but also enjoying the clearest example of the government's ability to act when it wants to act. All the people were subjected to its actions because we are still human within, despite all the problems, crimes, and anarchy that still accumulate around us. Even if a person is an illiterate peasant who cannot read or write, he is very civilized—layers upon layers of civilization—and this civilization compels him to carry out government instructions, whenever their goal is order, or to prevent incidents and epidemics of any kind that threaten his existence, life, or health.

However, this only occurs as exceptions that prove the rule. The government enacts laws, which enable it firstly to rule, and legislation that safeguards its identity as a state. Concerning whether this or that item angers the people or oppresses millions, so long as this anger does not affect the ruling stratum, why bother to do anything about it? Make them live in noise, or the hell of magnified sound, or what is like one goat and three microphones in the noise of traffic anarchy, and the perpetrations of pedestrians and people crossing the streets, in the anarchy of the daily toil to reach the workplace and return from it at night. With regard to stopping the fulfillment of the people's needs, whenever noon comes, the mu'ezzin, with his magnified sound, begins to distribute the ugliness of his voice through three microphones. On the floors of any governmental or public sector agency, the corridors leading to business offices begin to be occupied when he announces the noon prayer. He then makes the second call to prayer, then the period of long repetitions for invocations. Then the prayer rises with a loud noise, which completely prevents an official's hand from reaching a document that solves the problem of a poor harassed citizen, who has come for the seventh time. Unfortunately, he must always come at noon. He comes, moving along at a snail's pace.

No one can open his mouth for a word; no, it is not necessary, not a word of discussion. Noon is his time; at approximately 1200, but delayed for some minutes in winter, and advancing in summer. This means that noon is still present after the completion of business hours at 1230. Wouldn't Islamic law, jurisprudence, religion, and culture prefer that the official satisfy the people's rights,

which are God's rights in the first place? Then, after that, he could pursue the noon prayer with complete satisfaction. This also might lead him to a society, and he would have satisfied his religious duty as well as the people's needs. The people call on him, and he pleases God and, in both cases, he would have satisfied his conscience and, accordingly, pleased God!

All of this is done by those who call us to the true Islamic religion by machine guns and the assassination of people, and by those who shout abuse, and in Islam's name, established Islamic investment societies that bring wonderful things for them. At the hour of reckoning, ethical scandals were discovered, involving women, addiction, and bribery. Everything that invokes the wrath of God. The biggest calamity uncovered was that the company was bankrupt. The company says that its money is abroad. How was that Egyptian money transferred abroad? It was in the billions. God alone knows. How did they secretly change it into gold? Did they speculate in gold and silver? Was the speculation permissible? As for the investment certificates, they bore the signatures of 40 holy, holy Muslims, a license of women's veils, so that madam could take any old dress to the shop, and take a new veiled dress, selected from such and such a model. Then the magnification of sound within the clothesracks by 3000 Egyptian pounds (and it comes from the poor custodian of the mosque)!

I also recall that this phenomena came to us, raising the banner of Islam, as if we were infidels in its path, God forbid! They came to conquer us and compel us to worship God their way. Woe unto us! If the state is opposed, let us shoot at it. If the law opposes it, let it be changed. We say the law (and not the bearded ones) is what squandered the people's money. If the microphones pierce our ears and our grumblings, they say with a strange insolence, "the call to God should not astonish you, nor the invocation of God!" I imagined at the beginning that they were isolated phenomena, unrelated to each other, but then I discovered that the investment societies were financing and trafficking with the organized secret army, as well as financing "places of the veil" and establishing a publishing house named Heritage, which is devoid of heritage. They are books that the true Muslim would not bother with, would not even glance at. Yet, they are distributed and read by the thousands, and the issues in them are of clear intent, to seize power, and wage (ideological) struggle, centering around how to remove the ruler. This struggle ultimately ends with his being killed, because he does not apply the law of Islam. Therefore, it is a vicious attack coming from outside our Islam and our country, injected into the body of Egyptian society, and into the minds of most Egyptian workers and officials who work in the oil countries, because they come here prepared to join the army of conquest, and have power fall into their hands like ripe fruit.

As usual, the government and the state will remain indifferent or pretend to be indifferent. Part of the large state apparatus, such as radio and television, has been

completely penetrated by those organized secret armies. Review with me the religious talks that have been on those two media. How many there have been! What precisely do they want to say? There have also been the imams of mosques, the Ministry of Awqaf, Sufi orders, university students, lawyers, doctors, and numerous other groups from our society.

We, as a society and as a state, should stop this attack and ask: Do you demand the application of Islamic law?

If they say yes, we would say: We are ready; who should apply it?

They will say: "Us."

We would again say to them: On the contrary, aren't there other more correct and appropriate people? We would be happy to have the Mufti of the Egyptian Republic apply Islamic law.

Naturally, they will not agree. Even if we lined up 50 million Egyptians in a row, so that they could choose someone from among them to apply Islamic law, they would select only members of that secret army; that is, they would choose themselves and only themselves. The clear meaning of raising the slogan of applying Islamic law is for them to apply it; we give them power, and they will appoint an amir for us. Naturally, we would not choose him. We could not choose him, because how could we assemble millions of Egyptians at one time, in order to cast their votes to choose a commander of true believers.

I have indulged myself in a purely hypothetical discussion. This debate did not happen, and will not happen. This army was never discussed. It is being done without any debate, and it follows the amir with blind obedience.

However, I wish to repeat that the government—and let me state this clearly—does not want to confront this trend openly. It believes way down deep that at the hour of reckoning it will be much stronger than it.

But we would never ask the government for this confrontation. We would not begrudge it its confidence in itself and in its power. However, we would say to it that we do not see any signs of its power. As for signs of weakness, they are innumerable. All the government wanted—and still wants—is that we believe that the government is in fact the government. If it issues orders and instructions, they are carried out. Isn't this simply the test of power, the same simple test of power that ordered the vehicle owners to remove any stickers? The government proved that it was capable and strong, but that order was given some time ago. As for that happening again, the time has come for the government to prove that the government is still the government, and that the reins have not completely slipped from its hands.

Can't the government take one action to prevent the use of magnified sound, except in a closed place, so that only

people present in that place could hear it, whether it be a funeral, wedding, sermon, engagement party, or a devotional service?

Only one regulation would give us some peace. We would truly feel in the right, if only all of us would complain about these few, sick persons. Our complaints necessarily must reach the ears of the government and the state, and all those who have ears.

As long as this is the case, why can't we take this action now?

Especially since the government has begun to get accustomed—with the decision to define the weekend—to respond to public opinion, and not to oppose it childishly, as it has persisted in doing. Since we are writers, we are afraid that when we write against a bad situation, or against a minister who is not suitable, we are fearful that our writing is the strong support that will in fact cause that situation or that minister to remain. Will this opposition suffice? We are civilized. The civilization of any state is measured by the extent of its response to its people's views, to public opinion.

#### **Emergency Law Effect on Opinion**

*90OA0257B Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 10 Jan 90 p 3*

[Article by Sulayman Jawdah: "Lost Love Between People and Government"]

[Text] To what extent does public opinion in Egypt affect, or participate in, the official decisionmaking process, and plan the future policy that the government produces to deal with problems and conduct its business? There is another part of this question that is tied in with and complements it: Does the government take the attitudes of public opinion into account and give them any weight or consideration when it makes its decisions or draws up its policies? Certain events that have recently occurred on the public scene offer some indicators and evidence to clarify this picture and prepare the way for answers to these two questions. For example, the decision to change the weekend, which caused widespread reactions, both in street speeches and letters to the press. If we consider that these speeches and letters represent public opinion, the majority was opposed to the government's decision that was issued concerning the weekend, forcing the government to abandon that position. There are many other cases which affect the interests and lives of a broad spectrum of citizens. The official initiatives and decisions with regard to these issues are at a complete variance with the attitudes of public opinion, or—at least—do not achieve the people's hopes, nor safeguard their best interests to the desired extent. This happened in the case of the investment companies, and with regard to the difficulties experienced by the Egyptian workers in Iraq. The victims of these two cases are still asking: In whose interests does the government work? Why does it live in one valley, while the people, with their anxieties, concerns, and aspirations, live in another far-off valley? Why does it

always issue decisions "instantaneously," and adopt official actions without considering the opinions of the masses? At this point we go back to the question with which we began: Does public opinion in Egypt have any role to play in making decisions and forming policy?

In AL-AHRAM's issue of December 18, 1989, Dr. Yusuf Idris, in an analysis of the relationship between public opinion and government decisions, wrote that in the majority of the government's decisions and positions, "I do not find either major or minor consideration being paid to public opinion. A friend asked me, 'Is it true that public opinion in Egypt is still a factor? Where is it? To what extent does it affect the government's decisions? Has the government changed its laws because of public opinion?' The action regarding the Law of Artisans' Unions happened recently. The government in that situation did not bother to obtain the views of union members who, presumably, should have prepared the law."

Dr. Yusuf Idris cites, as another example, "...the laws of investment societies. We continued—as public opinion—to warn against them, and against leaving them without state supervision or organized accountability, without control over them of any kind." Dr. Yusuf Idris added that "public opinion continued to write and speak out to no avail, until the years came in which those families and companies, had sucked up all the cash liquidity and savings in the market, and when money was no longer being deposited, the government began its dilatory actions after 'Malta was destroyed.'"

He then said, "There should be public opinion in every country of the world, but not just as an ornament. The multiparty system and the democracy of the opposition press and the national press cannot do without it. Plurality, party politics, and freedom of opinion have as an ultimate goal the formation of a public opinion."

Dr. Yusuf Idris ends on a serious note, that there is no public opinion in Egypt, because public opinion, if it is a part of the democratic process itself, then our democracy is democracy in word only. He says: "It means that it is democracy inside the republic of the press, and it means that it is impossible for the matter to reach the republic of legislation and be promulgated as law. How many glaring cases have we seen of the people becoming convinced that they have got the government to accept the facts and make way for the proper and enlightened decision, when suddenly the government completely surprises us, with a decision we know nothing about, nor that has had any debate. So long as the government has a majority in the People's Assembly, the decision passes easily, is approved and becomes a draft law, over which no one has had a say. Yes indeed, there is no public opinion in Egypt or, more precisely, there is no public opinion that the government respects, takes into account, or cannot deviate one iota from its wishes. Many times the government takes action in the interests of public opinion and the people. However, one can be

sure that the government did this without the participation—in the entire process—of public opinion, or those who represent public opinion, so that the government never becomes a bit submissive to public opinion."

#### Restrictions and Controls

The question to be posed now is: When any decision is made by the government, or any policy formulated by the state, which directly affects the broad spectrum of the people who ultimately constitute public opinion, in such an instance as this, what is the power of Egyptian public opinion? Does the regime take it into account in its policy and decisions? What is the role of the apparatus that measures public opinion in Egypt, when it is compared to its counterparts in other countries?

Dr. Kamal Abu-al-Majd, the former minister of information, when attempting to answer this question, says that in reality it is more subtle and complex than it is expressed above. "The obvious, superficial answer is that public opinion must be respected in its principal attitudes with regard to public issues. However, when applied, the question runs up against several facts. The first is that public opinion in organized societies expresses itself through channels, and the commitment to public opinion should be tantamount to the commitment expressed by public opinion through those channels. This is the constitutional situation existing in every country of the world.

"The second fact is that what we call public opinion might in fact be the opinion that found its way into the newspapers or into some public forums, while the majority, who did not participate in that expression, has some other viewpoint.

"The third fact is that we are in an age in which means of ascertaining public opinion have been produced, and in which specialized organizations have been established to measure it. In the absence of the reports and results that that agency produces, it would be difficult for such governments to claim commitment to whatever public opinion expresses. Above all, governments, with the supposition that they have firm policies based on broad, scientific studies, must first at least pursue those policies, even if only some of them coincide with public wishes. The issuance of the decision is an attempt to reconcile a number of considerations. This reconciliation might require imposing regulations and taking positions contrary to the hasty desires of some popular sectors."

Does that mean that the response or lack of response affects the public's image of the ruling regime?

Dr. Abu-al-Majad replied that, "within the framework of restrictions and controls I referred to, it remains true that the ruling regime, any regime, must keep public opinion happy, and must maintain its credibility, that is to say, its veracity, as well as the majority's confidence in it, or else its political legitimacy will be upset."

#### Fumbling and Improvisation

If the biggest part of this subject revolves around the role of the apparatus that measures public opinion in Egypt, then Dr. Hasan Nafi'ah, professor of political science in the College of Economics, believes that our ambiguity with regard to the issue of public opinion is attributable to the fact that "we in Egypt do not have an agency to measure the attitudes of public opinion, such as exist in the advanced nations. If there is an agency established de jure, either within the framework of the universities or the research centers, these centers are not active in that field. And we have not heard that they have procedures to measure public opinion, with respect to the numerous issues that occupy the public's mind. Consequently, we ascertain the direction of public opinion through what is written in the national and partisan press, which does not give a true idea about the actual position of the various groups in the community regarding a specific issue.

"For example, take the case of the investment companies, which affected hundreds of thousands of depositors. It was clear that the positions of the political parties and the intellectual and cultural leadership were at variance, and differed at times from one extreme to another, either with regard to analysing the phenomenon itself, or with regard to what measures were necessary to confront this situation."

Dr. Nafi'ah continued: "There is one large question mark about how political decisions are made in Egypt; no one exactly knows. The prevailing impression is, in terms of the process, that the decision is made in light of a number of factors and data, of which public opinion knows nothing. By this I mean the extent of these factors' complexity or whether they express reality. However, the certainty is that there is a very large proportion of fumbling and improvisation in the process of decision-making and, indeed, in what concerns domestic issues in Egypt.

"I believe that after President Mubarak assumed office in 1981, hopes were high that the political decision-making process in Egypt would reflect the aspirations and attitudes of broad segments of the Egyptian people. Therefore, it was noted that in the 1984 elections, there was a general movement in society, which expressed itself in various forms, and which wanted, if possible, to make changes according to the aspirations of these groups. However, it was observed that, after the '84 elections, and the events that occurred during them, there was a growing conviction that the desired change in direction was impossible; there was disinclination on the part of a large number of leaders to participate in the subsequent stage. In light of limited participation, what surfaced was only a limited part of the total direction of public opinion, because the majority in this case refused to participate!"

**Security Reports!**

With regard to evaluating the work of an apparatus to measure public opinion in Egypt, Dr. Kamal Abu-al-Majd said: "I don't believe that the work of such an apparatus as this is done in Egypt with the desired precision. Measuring public opinion is being done through the General Board of Inquiries, and in the nature of the situation, there are security reports that deal with certain public issues, and the positions of people with regard to them. There are efforts and ideas of the ruling party regarding public opinion, as well as other reports and studies made by some of the centers and organizations, such as the Board of Statistics, the Center for Strategic Studies in AL-AHRAM, the Center for Political Studies in the College of Economics, and the National Center for Social Research. However, the first kind of report is governmental and lacks depth of examination and objectivity. Many are contaminated by interference with the report's position in order to defend official policy and, therefore I think, in all honesty, that it is impossible to rely on that kind. As regards the other centers and boards, measuring public opinion is not their specialty; their specialty is issuing studies and reports regarding certain subjects. We cannot guarantee their soundness to the extent of relying on their results to make decisions. Therefore, I say that we are in dire need of a specialized agency, scientific and neutral, to measure public opinion. However, after that, it remains to be said that the government, any government, must take the views of public opinion into account, and must strive to respect it, because the government's ultimate responsibility is a constitutional responsibility, before the assembly, in which it is assumed the will of the electorate is being expressed. Every true reform is aimed at closing the gap between public opinion and governmental decisions. This ought to begin with reforming the electoral system, and the methods of operation that link organizations together. I would like to add an important point: governments, while implementing their policies and programs, can issue unpopular decisions in certain cases, but they must strictly control the distance between their decisions and the people's satisfaction with them. Because, if this distance widens, and its occasions multiply, politically the regime loses its popular support, and becomes exposed to the masses' mutiny against its decisions, and their refusal to cooperate in carrying out those decisions."

**Violent Convulsions!**

However, Dr. Asamah al-Ghazali Harb, of the Center of Strategic Studies in AL-AHRAM believes that talking about public opinion in Third World countries is completely different from that in countries of the advanced world. "The first fact here is that one cannot conceive of public opinion, in its pure meaning, as existing, except in a political system in which the citizens enjoy the basic political freedoms, topped by freedom to organize political parties, hold meetings, and the freedom of expression through all the various forms of expression. Moreover, we cannot conceive of the existence of a mature public opinion, except in light of the availability of a minimum of open media, which is informed through the ordinary

citizen of public developments, and the truth about domestic conditions. We also cannot conceive of a true public opinion in a country where illiteracy is in the majority, or where it is burdened with real educational and cultural policies. In this context, one must say that Egyptian public opinion is opinion in a stage of growth and formation. Its power and effectiveness will increase, commensurate with the increase in general freedoms, and the breaking down of existing barriers with regard to freedom of expression. One can say, therefore, that there is a very gradual pace in the state's response to public opinion in Egypt and, in fact, it is beginning. This response has only happened when violent convulsions occur. On the contrary, in most cases, it meets views and attitudes that public opinion contains, with disregard or with mere lip service."

**Action and Reaction**

The question remains: What does the state or government do when public opinion is engrossed with a specific issue?

Dr. Salah al-Uqqad's answer is: "The government's position in this case, in most cases, is to react, not act. Therefore, it avoids confrontation with the masses as much as possible. If it were not for the opposition press delving into and uncovering issues that concern public opinion, the government would attempt to cover up all problems, because it operates on the principle that things could get worse!"

"The issue of the debts, for instance, is an issue that has caused great concern among those who deal with it, or who ask questions about it. But the government tries to downplay its seriousness, and announces various numbers completely out of touch with reality, so that it has become impossible to ascertain the true numbers. What are the military debts, or the civilian? Where are they going? All these matters are unclear to public opinion. The result is a lack of goodwill, and no mutual trust between public opinion and the government!

"However, all that does not deny that the government completely understands the importance of public opinion, but the Emergency Law prevents public opinion from taking any positive form, and it remains only freedom to talk. Authority does not listen to this talk, and does not respond to its reverberations. It is clear that long subjugation to the Emergency Law has killed the masses' spirit of initiative, and has made them take a negative attitude, preferring that out of a predilection for safety!"

**AL-WAFD Voices Concern Over Soviet Jewish Immigration****Arabs Paying for Superpower Rapprochement**  
*90OA0292A Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 1 Feb 90 p 6*

[Article by Lawyer 'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad: "Have All Circles Been Sealed Around Us?"]

[Text] A strong wave of optimism is dominating the world with the onset of the final decade of the century. With rapid developments racing against one another last

year, analysts have observed some indications. Some have seen international detente and peace, the fall of walls and barriers, and the tremors in the alliances on both sides as the end of the last world war and of all its traces. Other analysts have seen in the rapid collapse and fall of the regimes ruling East Europe the end of totalitarianism, the start of the age of political pluralism, and the rise of the banners of democracy in all four corners of the world! With this high wave of optimism, dark clouds have begun to creep into our region and dangers have been increasing around the region. With the escalating Israeli violence and with the Nazi means of oppression which Israel employs to confront the Palestinian people and their brave intifadah [uprising], a deluge of Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union and East Europe has begun to flow into Palestine to devour whatever land remains available and to uproot any people who continue to live on this land. We all stand perplexed in the face of this imminent danger. The Soviet Union disavows its responsibility and says that it has done no more than lift travel and movement restrictions from its citizens and that it is giving these citizens the liberty to go anywhere they want! The United States is also disavowing its responsibility by closing its doors in the face of these immigrants who find nowhere other than Israel to go to. The United States is content with making reluctant statements denouncing and discouraging the settlement of these immigrants in the [West] Bank and the [Gaza] Strip! Israel is talking proudly of its need for this land and the territories surrounding it, and its leaders are proclaiming the beginning of the age of greater Israel! In accordance with the return and citizenship laws whose principles are derived from Nazi laws, Israel grants these immigrants its citizenship as soon as they arrive in the country, even before they set foot on the land! In the face of all of this, we stand dazed, not knowing what to do, how to act, or even what to say! If the United States has supplied and equipped Israel with every weapon throughout three decades, thus transforming it into an arsenal armed to the teeth with missiles and atomic bombs, then the Soviet Union and East Europe, along with the Falasha from Ethiopia, are launching new decades in which Israel will be supplied with a flood of immigrants. The circles have thus been sealed around us! It is a new and more ferocious invasion than all other invasions. Every immigrant is another soldier and every immigrant is countered by another refugee or martyr! All of Palestine will be flooded with these immigrants and expansion beyond Palestine will then come at our expense and the expense of our land. The catastrophe will thus afflict us from every side and we will all turn into refugees and will become American Indians at the end of this amazing century, thus becoming a sight for the 21st century tourists to see!

If we have paid an exorbitant price for the phase of international confrontation, polarization, and cold war between the two blocs in recent decades and if we, all the Arabs with no exception, have divided ourselves between the two blocs to such a degree that we have ended up with contorted thought and tongues, then we are all paying today an even more exorbitant price for the phase of rapprochement and peace between the two blocs. We are paying the price for the age of lifted restrictions and the age of democracies! With this

affliction and this concern, other added and crowded dangers are approaching. The water war is approaching to intensify thirst after starvation. Turkey is blocking the Euphrates River outlets in the north and withholding water from Syria and Iraq to turn the Fertile Crescent land into an arid desert. Ethiopia is shutting off the Blue Nile outlets in the south to turn our fertile valley into a part of the greater and oasisless desert. Amidst this and that, Israel is stealing water from the Jordan River and its tributaries and robbing Lebanon of the al-Litani River! Israel's fingers are also evident in the north and at the sources of the Euphrates River! Despite the Nile River and (Andogo) Organization agreements, Ethiopia is building four dams on the Blue Nile so that it may fully control eight percent of our water. The Southern Sudan war is destroying the rest and obstructing completion of the Jonglei Canal to compel us in Egypt, after all this, to import water also!

If these catastrophes are enough to demolish an entire nation, even a nation extending from the gulf to the ocean, then add to them another catastrophe, namely the catastrophe of the Arab debts—this Arab leukemia and ceaseless hemorrhage! The Arab debts have exceeded \$400 billion and just the annual interest on these debts amounts to \$40 billion! Should we be content with urging our rulers to hold an emergency summit? But how often have these rulers met and produced nothing but communiques and denunciations!

#### Comparison With Balfour Declaration

90OA0292B Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 1 Feb 90 p 7

[Article by Muna Makram 'Ubayd: "Are We Facing a New Balfour Declaration"]

[Text] The Balfour Declaration (1917) is the act that planted the embryonic seeds of a strange body in the region: namely Israel, which has uprooted the Palestinian people from their land and has drained the Arab nation's capabilities and resources throughout the past 40 years.

Consequently, one must pause before what the world press is reporting about the biggest Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel since agreement was reached between the two superpowers in the 1970's! It is expected that Israel will absorb one million Soviet Jews in the next three to five years. U.S. Jewish organizations have pledged to provide \$1 billion annually to cover the costs of this absorption. For example, a main objective of Shamir's latest visit to the United States last December was not only to try to reduce the U.S. official pressure on Israel to negotiate with the Palestinians (the Baker plan), but also to urge U.S. Jews, and even the U.S. administration, to provide \$3 billion to finance the programs for the immigration and resettlement of Soviet Jews.

Israel is trying to (and wagering on) suppressing the Palestinian people's outstanding intifadah [uprising] with all material and moral means. One of the things on

which Israel will be wagering in the next few years is the immigration of one-half million Soviet Jews and their resettlement in the occupied territories. In this regard, Israel is exploiting the opportunity of Soviet openness and Gorbachev's eagerness to appear to be more observant of human rights and public liberties in the Soviet Union. This is why he made his latest decision to permit the Soviet Jews to immigrate and why the United States has banned their entry into its territories in accordance with the new law which places restrictions on immigration to the United States.

In a related development, an Arab magazine published this week an extremely serious report to the effect that Israel is working to deport the Palestinians to the United States! Informed sources have said that this serious step seeks to strip the Palestinian territories of their inhabitants and to replace them with Jewish immigrants in coming years. These sources have linked this step with the recent U.S.-Israeli accord prohibiting the granting of U.S. entry visas to Soviet Jewish immigrants. With these steps, Israel hopes to alter the West Bank's demographic structure. If its deportation and resettlement scheme succeeds, Israel will not lack the pretexts to uproot tens of thousands of Palestinians from their lands and replace them with Soviet Jewish immigrants. In this regard, Israel is preparing to let the Jewish settlers themselves terrorize the Palestinians and spread fear among them so that they may flee their lands and homes as they did in 1947 and 1948. There is a program to arm the settlers and to empower them to use their weapons on the pretext of self-defense. It will thus seem to the public opinion as if the matter is a matter of riots and of conflict between Jewish civilians and Palestinian civilians.

If this scheme, which is no less dangerous than the Balfour Declaration, succeeds, it will open the door for another cycle of violence and blood in the region—a cycle that will make any talk of peaceful settlement a pure mirage. Therefore, the time has come for the Arab governments, parties, human rights organizations, and parliaments to present this issue to the public opinion to avert this second catastrophe of population uprooting.

#### **Study Names 'Zionist Secret Societies'**

*900A0275B Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 17 Jan 90 p 4*

[Article by Samir Siyam: "A Scientific Study: Beware of These Zionist Societies—Rotary, Lions, and Masonic Clubs"]

[Text] A learned study warns of Zionist plans to dominate Islamic countries.

The study, by researcher Mabruk Muhammad 'Abd-al-Sami', graduate assistant at Usul al-Din College, earned him a Master's degree cum laude. It asserts that Zionist strategy depends on the proliferation of Zionist secret societies called Rotary, Lions, Masonic, Donma [as published], and Bahai' clubs.

The learned study points out that the objective of Zionist protocols and organizations is to bring an end to religions, and especially Islam, in preparation for state sovereignty, and to sabotage Islam from within under the guise of such alluring slogans as calls for freedom, brotherhood, equality, justice, and nationalism, and by spreading immorality and social degeneracy; by controlling educational institutions; by deploying women; and by promoting hedonism and inebriation.

The study emphasizes that Islamic advocates should scrutinize those Zionist protocols, study all the sacred books of the Jews and their laws, and be aware of their objectives in order to safeguard ourselves and our society against them, halt their advance, and protect Muslims against their evils.

#### **Central Bank Merges 102 Banks Into Branches**

*900A0275D Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 14 Jan 90 p 2*

[Article by Ibrahim 'Abd-al-'Aziz: "What the Merger of Commercial Banks Signifies"]

[Text] Central bank governor Dr. Salah Hamid announced that smaller banks will be merged together and that some of them will become branches of their parent banks.

Egypt has 102 active banks of which four are public sector commercial banks and 40 are joint and private commercial banks. The latter include 18 national development banks in the governorates, 33 investment banks, and 21 specialized banks of which 17 are development and agricultural credit banks.

A central bank official said the merger of smaller banks will transform national development banks in the governorates into branches of the National Development Bank in Cairo. Banks of development and agricultural credit will become branches of the main bank.

The decree aims at solving the problem of undercapitalization which curtails the activities of those banks, some of which sustained losses because of increased loans and weak deposits.

The merger of small banks will also allow parent banks to draw policies on a more comprehensive scale, enabling them to serve a broad sector of the country through integrated policies where the volume of bank transactions corresponds to the number of branches.

No banks will be closed as a result of this decree—they will merely be turned into branches. Their capitals will be also be merged with those of parent banks in the form of increased capitalization.

### Rise in Transaction Volume

Hasan Fa'iq, counselor for the Arab Investment Bank, explained that turning the banks into branches under the merger would augment the capitalization of parent banks, giving them the advantage of increased volume of activity and operations while solving the problem of banks that wanted to open branches in the governorates. Coordination between bank policies on credit and on attracting deposits to those branches will furthermore be assured since they will be mapped by the same board of directors.

### Two Billion Pounds Deposited in Bank's Islamic Branches

45000080 Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 31 Jan 90 p 8

[Text] A responsible source within the Bank of Egypt's branches for Islamic transactions has stated that the deposit revenue in the Islamic branches is nearly 2 billion Egyptian pounds. The source said that this response affirms the success of the Islamic branch experiment, and also indicates that the people prefer to make nonfixed variable interest transactions rather than dealing with the previous fixed interest, which has been forbidden by Islamic jurisprudence.

He added that this money is invested in housing, industrial, and trade projects by means of *al-musharikah* [copartnership], *al-mudaribah* [limited partnership], and *al-murabihah* [resale with specification of gain]. The yields are distributed according to profit and loss.

It should be noted that there are 36 Islamic branches of the bank in Cairo and the governorates, 12 of which will soon be opened.

### AID, Water Pollution, Corrupt Lake Projects Criticized

90WE0117B Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 27 Dec 89 p 5

[Article: "Alexandria's Dreams Frustrated by Pollution and Contaminated Fish"]

[Excerpt] The struggle has yet to end between Egyptians in all their governorates, and especially Alexandria, and the U.S. Devastation Agency "USAID," supported by governments of the National Party since its creation by al-Sadat. The two sides are battling because of insistence by the Devastation Agency, and acquiescence by the governments, on discharging sewage into the sea with no treatment, not even to reduce risks a little, even though research and studies, as well as academic and grassroots organizations, have denounced that criminal project and are offering the alternative of utilizing treated sewage to irrigate and improve desert soil in order to expand the arable acreage. The government, however, still declares that the aid agency ranks ahead of the people and its interests.

There is much talk of tourism at a time when contamination and toxicity have gripped all Alexandrian beaches

from Abu-Qir to al-Ma'murah and al-Muntazah to the east to al-Firdaws, al-Ahram, and Shahr-al-'Asal to the east.

Maryut Lake has turned into a station for injecting fish with all kinds of toxins. The [lake] fish, according to Ministry of Health laboratories, are contaminated with four types of toxins that cause dozens of stubborn afflictions.

Sewage aqueducts in the back of the Salt and Soda Company near the Muhamarram Bik railroad station are overflowing with tons of grease used in making ghee and soap. When output increased, discharge pipes extending to the onset of the Muhamarram Bik marina volunteered [as published] to transport the fat by-product in order to help reduce pressure on aqueducts near the Salt and Soap Company.

One needs to know how much lard the company receives, its production levels, and the percentage of grease on site in order to calculate the amount of grease produced by the sewer system. The aqueduct may win the trophy for highest output! The answers might also put to rest several rumors of alleged threats against many who attempted to protest that condition.

Mr. President of the Republic: Perhaps you agree with me that you have responsibility for the broad policies that you oppose [as published], but you must also agree with me that the ultimate responsibility rests with state officials and party leaders, especially when they use fish for corruption and [implement] flawed and harmful projects. Responsibility also rests with security and information officials who are supposed to convey to you a true picture of what is happening.

Let us give just two examples to highlight the grassroots veto. Months ago they submitted to you a fish farming project they claimed to be the largest industrial farm that has cost, or would cost, a total of 40 million pounds. You were invited to inaugurate the project and you did.

Officials of all positions and levels naturally portrayed the project to you as a major accomplishment and the person who conceived it as the genius of his generation. At best, they remained silent in order to curry favor or avoid retribution. What they did not tell you, Mr. President, is that the amount expended on the project, had it been deposited at a bank, would have returned in interest several times the value of the lake's projected annual output. They concealed from you that Egypt has a natural lake, or natural farms, with an area of more than 400,000 feddans, excluding Lake Nasir and thousands of kilometers of beach.

While Egypt pursues every drop of water for drinking and irrigation, project managers pump half a million cubic meters of water daily into the farm and that water must be unadulterated if healthy fish is to be produced. They concealed from you that Lake Maryut covers an area of 10,000 feddans which, if shielded from sewage and reclaimed, could produce dozens of times the farm's

output and provide a good living for 30,000 fishermen and their families, rather than a mere 600 university graduates as claimed.

They concealed from you that al-Bardisi has previously squandered millions on his muddled first project to establish a model fish farm at the basin adjacent to the Fishing Club. That was the lake's cleanest and most productive basin. Fishermen were forcibly removed from it, but the project ended in failure. The basin, in order to cover up that failure, was filled and transformed into a city for brides. But the soil could not support construction and the city of brides was turned into a garden called International in order to coverup the lost and purloined millions. Still, the garden keeps sinking because its fill was garbage.

The unscrupulous discovered that by using fish as a pretext, they escaped accountability and even press scrutiny of their failure and corruption. By so doing, they were counting on a statement by you that you don't read opposition papers. They chose, for their own purposes, to build the city on a filled-in section of Lake Maryut adjacent to the Muharram Bik interchange which is heavily traveled by private cars and taxis as well as by light and heavy trucks. Traffic in the area is bound to intensify on completion of the overpass that links the interior of Alexandria customs with the Cairo-Alexandria agricultural and desert roads. The lake is full of sewage and the region is polluted with stench. There is little oxygen at that area of the lake. Do we then build a sports city [there] to ruin the health of athletes and citizens? Shall we host European, African, and Arab athletes in order that they may hasten to depart, having gotten the worst impression about the Egyptians? [passage omitted]

**Mr. President:** You stated once that we live in the age of the people. Developments worldwide are gradually transferring power to the masses and giving them the final word in spite of rulers and their reactions. Will the interests of the people ever be taken into consideration? Will an end be put to the blunders and corruption in order to avoid more disasters?

#### Tests Reveal Waters Free of Chemical, Radioactive Waste

90OA0267B Cairo AL-AKHBAR  
in Arabic 10 Jan 90 p 6

[Article by Muhammad al-Shamma': "Our Waters, Fish, Shores Are Free of Pollution and Radioactivity"]

[Text] AL-AKHBAR has learned that radiological and chemical tests conducted by the Atomic Energy Authority on random water and fish samples collected all along the Egyptian coastline have proven that these samples are free of any suspicion of radioactive or chemical pollution. The tests continued throughout the summer months and until last month. Tests conducted by the Nuclear Materials and Radioactivity Survey

Authority on the Egyptian coastline have also proven that the coastline is free of any increase in radioactivity background.

It has also been decided to prepare a national register to keep track of the radioactivity doses to which workers in radioactive areas, totaling more than 20,000 workers, are exposed by using the latest unit to measure such exposure. The unit will be used to measure the radioactivity background in the Egyptian environment.

Dr. Fawzi Hammad, chairman of the Nuclear Security Agency of the Atomic Energy Authority, has said that these tests are conducted periodically by the Atomic Energy Authority and the Nuclear Materials Authority in full coordination with the Ministry of Health.

The Executive Office has formulated a program to subject all the installations possessing or using radioactive equipment or sources to control through a careful system for reporting and registering work and activities using radioactivity and for registering the various equipment and sources used in such activities. There are 1,500 installations that use sealed radioactive equipment and sources for medical purposes, 76 installations that possess and use sealed radioactive equipment and sources for industrial purposes, and 33 installations that possess and use sealed radioactive equipment and sources for scientific research and varied applications.

The committee formed by Dr. Raghib Duwaydar, the minister of health, has completed the amendments to be introduced into Law No 59 of 1960. The amendments will be presented to the People's Assembly. The new amendments take into account the changes made in the systems to shield and protect the workers, the public, and the environment from the dangers of exposure to radioactivity and the changes made in the licensing and control regulations.

#### Islamic Student Leaders Report Election Activities 90OA0271A Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 17 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by Ahmad 'Abd-al-'Aziz: "The Islamic Tendency in Student Unions"]

[Text] Despite all the challenges that faced them, students of the Islamic tendency won in student union elections in the Egyptian universities and were able to establish their presence on the student scene.

What Islamic activities do these unions offer? Have they been able to implement the programs they announced during their election campaign? To what sort of harassment are they subject on the university campus while carrying on their activity?

AL-NUR interviewed student union leaders and members from the universities of Cairo, 'Ayn Shams, al-Zaqaziq, and al-Minya who won in these elections, so that they might answer these questions.

The student 'Imad Abu-al-Sa'dat, president of the student union of 'Ayn Shams Medical School, said: "We regard the union as a means for spreading the Islamic call among students, not an end in itself. If we had lost the union at the university level, we would not have lacked other means to spread the call at the university. We see the job of the union as spreading the call and serving students. Our slogan in the student elections was, 'Islamic Call—Student Service.' The union's program was organized under this slogan. In the student field, the union sets up exhibits of books and medical instruments. It publishes the academic notes that students need. It sets examination times convenient for the students. For example, when the college administration wanted to hold midyear examinations before the vacation, the union intervened, and we were able to delay them until after the vacation. Donating for GCA students [English language program students] used to be compulsory; the union was able to obtain the approval of the dean of the college to make it voluntary."

#### Cultural Activities

Abu-al-Sa'dat added: "As for cultural activity, there are poetry evenings that will be organized about Palestine. There is also a stage presentation entitled, 'Shalom Arabs.' It consists of a sketch about the heartrending Arab situation. There is an exhibit of photographs, as well as an exhibit entitled, 'God's Wonders in the Universe.' There are also communication channels between the union and students. For example, we have established MAMARR AL-SIHAFAH [Press Corridor], where we publish student opinions."

Tariq 'Abd-al-Halim, vice president of the student union of 'Ayn Shams Medical School, said: "The union also has other activities. There is cultural activity. We have organized a week to support the Palestinian intifadah [uprising], in addition to cultural exhibits, contests, and conferences. A periodical entitled AL-MARAYA [The Mirrors] is published in the name of the union, as well as a biweekly magazine entitled AL-SAHWAH [The Awakening]."

Tariq indicated that there is a recreational program that includes trips and camps. He noted that these trips are no different and are very successful. They aim at serious relaxation unsullied by any sins.

Concerning student services, Tariq 'Abd-al-Halim said: "The union has followed up textbook support, renovated the cafeteria, and organized a bus project serving nearly 3,000 male and female students. The union has also done a complete maintenance of all the toilets at the college."

Concerning possible coordination between the unions of different universities, Tariq said: "It is possible that there may be coordination with other universities, especially on common issues."

#### A Means, Not an End

At al-Minya University, Tariq Muhammad Yusuf, president of the student union of the College of Letters, said: "The union is a means for spreading correct Islamic thought through its various activities. On the cultural side, we set up Islamic book exhibits and specialized conferences of an academic, religious, or cultural nature. We show videos. In addition, there are 'Islamic days' dedicated to certain issues, such as the intifadah, as well as poetry, essay, and short story contests."

Husam-al-Din Wajdi, a member of the union, added: "As for athletic activity, there are contests organized at the level of each college, as well as the universities' round. This includes soccer, basketball, volleyball, and track and field. As regards artistic activity, there are showings of videos, singing groups, and stage shows—which are generally rejected by the university administration—as well as cleanup camps and public service."

Concerning student services, Tariq Yusuf said: "The union has been able to change textbook support into cash support, so that the qualified student can benefit from it. The union is printing and distributing test notes to the students, not to mention college cafeteria services and organizing the process of distributing food vouchers."

Ahmad 'Abd-al-Baqi, a member of the Dar al-'Ulum College student union, said: "The Islamic group won all the committees at the college. The union's activity is clear and felt by the students of the college. The cultural committee is preparing a new issue of the newspaper AL-DAR, which speaks for the student union of Dar al-'Ulum College."

'Abd-al-Majid Sha'ban, secretary of the social committee at Dar al-'Ulum, added: "The Islamic group suffers from the lack of facilities. The college administration alleges that the union formed late and that the funds were exhausted before it finished forming."

"As for activities, we have given a conference on the Palestinian intifadah. Dr Jamal-al-Din 'Abd-al-Hadi gave a lecture at it entitled, 'The Jews Do Not Have a Right to Palestine.' In the last few days, we have set up an exhibit of Islamic books and a charity bazaar to sell Islamic clothing for women and writing materials. Work is now under way on an audio library containing cassettes of Islamic preachers such as Shaykh Kishk, Shaykh al-Ghazali, Shaykh al-Qardawi, and others, as well as academic cassettes to help students learn [classical Arabic] grammar."

#### Islamic Variety Theatre

At the College of Information, 'Abd-al-Mu'min al-Sayyid, a member of the student union, said: "The activities of the Islamic group are visible within the university. For example, there is the holding of conferences and exhibitions, the preparation of direction signs, and work to give support to students—the latter now amounts to about 17 pounds per student."

'Isa Zaydan, president of the student union of the College of Archaeology, said: "The entire student union of the college is from the Islamic group. The union has produced an episode of the program 'Variety Theatre' that was entirely Islamic—it must have been the first of its kind. All of its questions were Islamic. The aim was to make young people and students aware of simple Islamic information."

"A video about the Palestinian intifadah has been shown. A similar film will soon be shown about the Afghan jihad, God willing. We organized an Islamic conference at which Dr. 'Abd-al-Hayy al-Farmawi gave a lecture entitled, 'Islam: Between the Ignorance of My Sons and the Trickery of My Enemies.'"

Ahmad 'Abd-al-'Aziz, a member of the student union of the College of Archaeology, stated: "The security police at the university prevent many Islamic projects. The best example of this was when they prevented Shaykh Yusuf al-Qardawi from entering the university, despite the existence of approval from official bodies at the university. Also banned was His Excellency Shaykh al-Ghazali, who was to give a lecture at the university. The security police have also hindered the holding of many Islamic book exhibits at the university."

Ayman 'Ali Sayyid, secretary of the student union at the university, said: "The union serves all students. It does not discriminate between one student and another. It will work strenuously to serve students and increase their sound awareness of religion through conferences, lectures, and meetings that the groups organize, as well as Islamic book exhibits."

At al-Zaqaziq University, Ahmad Salim, a member of the student union of the College of Education, stated that the Islamic group offers its services to all students, without discriminating between those who stood on its side in the elections and those who stood against it.

He stated that the union suffers from interference by the security police, who hinder its activity. For example, permission is not granted to hold Islamic conferences. However, the union is working to hold Islamic book exhibits and exhibits of Islamic clothing at low prices suited to student budgets.

#### **Editorial Calls for Restructuring Islamic Movement**

*900A0234B Cairo AKHIR SA'AH  
in Arabic 27 Dec 89 p 54*

[Commentary by Hamid Sulayman: "The Islamic Movement Also Needs Perestroika!"]

[Text] Lest the title be misunderstood, by no means does it mean to call for "Islamic perestroika," because the Islamic system itself has an enormous inherent ability to change based on its interpretational tools, namely the Koran, the Sunna [the prophet's statements and actions,

later established as legally binding precedents], analogy, consensus, and principles pertaining to the soundness of transmission authorities, and the selection of the lesser of two evils, especially regarding secular affairs. On this last note, senior *shari'ah* [Islamic law] jurists have called for the continuous replacement of laws regulating secular affairs in deference to changing times and differing locales.

Islam is constant as a religion, or dynamic as a system. It changes with the changing requirements of time and place. It has shielded itself from collapse, as indicated by its survival, for more than 14 centuries. Communism, on the other hand, after 62 years in the Soviet Union and 44 years in the Eastern Bloc, was unable to acquire the same ability to change. Perhaps this inability stems from the strict Stalinist application of Marxism-Leninism. Or, perhaps communism, which saw itself as a historical response to the atrocities of slavery in the era of feudalism and capitalist exploitation, now appears as merely a temporary phase, after the appearance of its fatal, dictatorial, negative aspects, the most dangerous of which lie in the transformation of its rulers into major capitalists who monopolized all of their states' resources and wealth to extend their power at the expense of their people's prosperity and happiness, as happened in Romania and East Germany.

Therefore, Gorbachev's *perestroika* is considered a type of ingenious, historical option sustaining a shrewd vision of a system which was on the verge of collapse owing to its inability to change. Therefore, the man's position in history will supersede that of Lenin and Stalin, because they were mere followers of a theory, whereas he has occupied a position among history's ingenious innovators possessing an outstanding ability to foresee danger, recognize it, and then, most importantly, begin to actually implement what they deem proper.

This is what is now needed by the Islamic movement and the Islamic nation. To be more precise, this is what is needed by several leaders of this movement, especially leaders of narrow-minded groups—who do not recognize Islam's dynamic and inherent ability to change according to the circumstances of time and place—and leaders of the extremist groups that are leveling the course of the Islamic movement with their belief that the restoration of the Islamic identity and system requires no more than promoting several slogans, or exploding several rounds, or filling several cars with explosives!

The problem, gentlemen, requires "a restructuring," in your Islamic movement, of ideas, tactics, and strategies with a view toward pursuing the idea of the enlightened Islamic line, which calls primarily for:

- The movement's renunciation of the inflexibility of the narrowminded and the unruliness of the extremists, so that it can coordinate its steps with the dynamism of Islam and its system, and conform with its Muhammadan path, which is characterized by gradualness and stages.

- A resiting of Islamic history, and agreement on what in the Islamic system stems from the rightly guided caliphs, such as Abu-Bakr, 'Umar, 'Ali, and 'Umar Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz, and what was merely promoted as the slogan of an Islamic system by the wrongly guided caliphs, who are represented by most of the rulers of the Ummayad, Abbasid, and Ottoman caliphates.
- The derivation of benefit from the failures of extremist Islamic movements of the past, such as the Karmathians and the Assassins, and of the present, such as the Khomeyni and Numayri movements, to avoid falling into the abyss of bottomless wells covered with the forged Islamic slogans of several movements foisted into Islamic thought and the Islamic system.
- The reform of Islamic juristic legislation and regulations, which were appropriate for earlier times, and the addition of new regulations corresponding to contemporary changes, especially regarding daily, mundane affairs, economic regulations, the system of government, and the method of parliamentary representation.

I emphasize that the leaders of the Islamic movement, especially the narrowminded and the extremists, require an openness (*glasnost*) about their errors and a change in thinking, tactics, and strategy. In other words, they need to embark upon "perestroika" to change the course of their movement.

If some see this borrowing as a type of "apostasy," because we are borrowing means or wisdom from a disbelieving system, this is apostasy itself according to Islam, because Islam is a religion of reason and openness. It commands us to borrow anything which propels the Islamic nation toward progress and movement from backwardness to a better reality. The prophet himself says, "The believer should search for wisdom, and if he finds it, he is the most worthy of it." The writer of these lines is a Muslim who adheres to the correct Islam and to enlightened Islamic thinking. Perhaps this was his only fault [kht'uaah emended to khit'uhu?] in the opinion of the narrow-minded and the extremists. In addition, the Gorbachev regime is no longer a disbelieving regime, inasmuch as church bells are again ringing in every quarter of the communist states thanks to him. History has gone beyond these remarks, which I hope will not go beyond you, as they went beyond the narrowminded in the Eastern Bloc.

#### Columnist Compares Egyptian, East European Democracy

90OA275C Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH  
in Arabic 23 Jan 90 p 5

[Column by Muhammad al-Hayawan: "A Word of Love"]

[Text] There are those who make an analogy between developments in Eastern Europe and those that should be taking place here. Some say that things could not be

better, that democracy in Egypt is well, and that there is no need for change. Others see the necessity for change and believe it should be instituted via the polls and not by decrees from above.

It is true that we have a free press that articulates what it wishes to say without censorship. Opposition organs publish what the national press refuses to print. The press crisis is a function of journalists themselves because the exchange of insults has turned readers off newspapers and more towards rumors.

Readers do not know whom to believe. They are told by the national press that the government is doing the impossible for the people, and by opposition papers that it pursues a communist course, falsifies elections, and refuses to amend the constitution.

We accuse Islamic groupings of extremism but the press is even more extremist and dogmatic about expressing its beliefs. Life is rosy to the national press but black to opposition papers. There is no middle ground. We are a moderate nation that believes in reason but there is no logic or reason to what the press says. I believe that this is a natural outcome of democratic instability in Egypt. Certain journalists, writing as if it their last chance to do so, overstate their applause or criticism. They would have moderated had they been confident that there was full democracy in Egypt and that they would still be writing in the morrow.

In general, freedom of the press is guaranteed merely by a personal ruling. Laws restrict the freedom of the press and publications. That freedom should be guaranteed by law because it is stronger and more enduring than individuals. Egypt's multiplicity of parties could not be found in Eastern Europe but the ruling party considers government to be its absolute right and that opposition parties must not infringe on its domain of power. In other words, the National party is like a house while the opposition plays in the street and must do so politely in order not to disturb the house inhabitants. This is not democratic.

Certain East European nations recognized minor parties but, constitutionally, the Communist party was the leading and ruling entity. In other words, they had an explicit monopoly of government while we have an implicit monopoly of power. We have repeatedly amended election laws in order to ensure the National Party's control of the People's Assembly. As if amending the laws was not enough, we also tampered with the vote. During recent Consultative Assembly elections, several polling stations reported 80 percent attendance even when I witnessed first hand that they did not receive a single voter.

It is true that democracy in Egypt and in Eastern Europe differ as to stated principles, but their applications are quite similar. The ruling party monopolizes authority and selects the Consultative Assembly to suit its purposes. It owns the media but leaves a small margin for the opposition.

A change is needed then. Preferably, that change should be instituted by the populace via free elections unfettered by restrictions, conditions, or interference. A free People's Assembly would then be able to weave the future as charged by the people. I would probably heed an Assembly freely elected by me if it dictated that I tighten the belt, produce, work, or even give up my life for Egypt.

### **Editorial Urges Removing Regulations Harmful to Investors**

*90OA0265A Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH  
in Arabic 20 Jan 90 p 5*

[Muhammad al-Hayawan Editorial]

[Text] There are endeavors to mitigate the harmful effects [of bureaucratic redtape] on the economic and investment climate. Counselor 'Abd-al-Salam Hamid has been able to reduce the harmful impact of the socialist prosecutor. But the socialist prosecutor's presence still means that there is custodianship, confiscation, and nationalization at a time when we tell investment projects that there is no custodianship, no confiscation, and no nationalization. The Administrative Control is training its personnel on banking activities so that there may be no place for error. However, it is better to confine banking activity control to the Central Bank alone. Attempts are made by minor officials to blackmail businessmen. The simplification of the procedures and laws is capable of eliminating corruption among minor civil servants.

There remains a dangerous weapon that must be eliminated with an explicit and decisive decree because this weapon poses a threat to the economic climate, because it is a haphazard weapon that hits irrationally, and because it is a weapon that parades government muscle against individuals who possess no means to repel or defuse this tyrannical weapon. This weapon is the weapon of demolition and bulldozing decrees.

Demolition decrees are issued by a government supported by security and police forces that move in a show of force. Some demolition decrees are hasty, unstudied, and similar to an execution whose consequences can never be obviated. What good is a "not guilty" sentence to one already executed!

Demolition decrees are issued at times because of disagreement between two ministries with which the businessman has nothing to do. They are issued at times in conflict with preceding decrees, at times just because of disagreement in opinion, at times out of obstinacy and arrogance, and at times to discipline a businessman who has not capitulated and paid [graft money]. A demolition decree is supposed to be a contestable administrative decree. However, such decrees are issued suddenly and implemented without any preludes so that no opportunity may be given for complaining against or appealing them.

Demolition is carried out against existing projects on which people have spent thousands of pounds and which represent a revenue for the economy and an employment opportunity. Even government projects and inhabited houses are demolished at times. In all cases, a demolition decree represents a national loss because it constitutes a material loss for the national economy. It also represents a treacherous act by the government against businessmen. A demolition decree evokes fear and terror. We urge the establishment of tourist projects and the reclamation of desert lands, and then the bulldozer arrives to demolish everything irrationally! Can any investor feel safe if the bulldozer weapon continues to be raised in the face of any project?

Nobody objects to the law or to the elimination of violations. But this should be done in a civilized manner and without any show of force. A decree can be issued and a grace period can be given for implementation or for appeal. If the government seizes projects built in violation of the law, then why does it demolish them? Why doesn't it seize such projects and utilize them, if they can be possibly utilized? It is the right of a project owner to appeal. If he loses his appeal before the judiciary, then his encroachment should be eliminated. Instead of losing everything, the owner thus loses only a part of the project.

Any loss incurred by any citizen is a loss for Egypt in its entirety. Respect for the law is required to eliminate the demolition weapon. Some people in authority continue to believe that the law is on vacation!

### **Editorial Urges Capitalizing on Private Sector's Appeal**

*90OA0267A Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH  
in Arabic 14 Jan 90 p 5*

[Muhammad al-Hayawan Editorial]

[Text] Yusuf Wali's statements to the Businessmen Association are serious statements that bode well. They say that there is a serious development in government thinking. Yusuf Wali said that the government will leave the tourism, contracting, and real estate segments to the private sector. These are rational, fair, and logical statements that have been needed for sometime. Generally, expanding the horizons for the private sector has also been needed for sometime because this sector is more capable and efficient than the public sector.

But we should still ask: Did Dr. Wali make these statements to Egyptian and U.S. businessmen just to please them or is there a clear plan approved by the Council of Ministers, considering that some ministers totally reject the private sector, that other ministers do not want to relinquish the public sector, and that a third group of ministers puts obstacles before the private sector? It is certain that Dr. Yusuf Wali is fully aware of these facts which are incompatible with his statements.

The fact is that the government thinks of foreign aid for the public sector alone and shoves the private sector to get it out of the way. This means that the government thinks of cash aid for the government, of projects implemented by the government, or of joint projects with the government. A review of the statements made in the wake of the Egyptian talks with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE [United Arab Emirates] shows that the government negotiates for the public sector whereas these countries are interested in the private sector. The United States also allocates the major part of its aid for the Egyptian private sector.

The fact is that other governments no longer have the surplus that allows them to offer aid. Some of them are even experiencing budget deficits whereas the businessmen in these countries are the ones who possess the surplus and who are looking for a place to invest it. It is their view that Egypt is the best place for investment. But foreign businessmen look at the Egyptian private sector's conditions and vacillate. They all make the same unchanging statement: When the Egyptian private sector feels comfortable, we will come to cooperate with it. The number one problem facing investment is a feeling of comfort in the Egyptian private sector because this comfort is the yardstick. If this sector gets the opportunity to breathe, it will revive and raise its head and foreign businessmen will see it and contact it. This sector's current condition is a condition of death, vacillation, fear, and shivers. The National Party government's program is for openness but the government is implementing the Grouping Party program.

The government agencies that pursue the banks and businessmen and that act at times in violation of the law, as when intelligence men enter the free zones, for example—these agencies are the same agencies that supply the press with reports of imaginary cases against the private sector which has been brought to a halt for sometime and which has been experiencing numerous problems. The government has not made a single decision to boost the market and to revive the private sector.

Yusuf Wali's statements require executive measures or a declared plan because they are new statements. We have not heard them from him before and we want to make sure of them as a step to revive the market.

## ISRAEL

### Shamir Denies Stalling

44230076B Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR  
in Hebrew 26 Dec 89 p 7

[Article by 'Avner Regev: "Postponing for the Purpose of Advancing"]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State James Baker is now considering postponing the meeting of U.S., Israeli, and Egyptian foreign ministers in Washington for a later date—later by 3 to 4 months. The intention behind the

postponement is to do everything possible to preclude the breaking off of the political process.

The U.S. Government is not in the least willing to accept a failure in foreign affairs at the moment, given the military intervention in Panama, the events in Romania and East Europe, and the agreements reached by Bush and Gorbachev at the Malta summit meeting.

The position of the PLO, which is requesting primary right of decision on the composition of the Palestinian representation at the Cairo talks, and the position of Egypt, which is reiterating its being merely the go-between, create difficulties for continued Israeli-U.S. contacts, something that was felt at the talks held in Washington by Cabinet Secretary 'Elyaqim Rubinstein.

The cabinet secretary's report is an essential factor in the decision whether and when to hold the foreign ministers' meeting in Washington. The Americans find themselves rather in a tough spot, between the Egyptian-PLO hammer and the Israeli anvil. The prime minister is determined not to make concessions already at the beginning of the negotiations, and he believes that the factors involved in the process, i.e., the Americans, Egyptians, and Palestinians from the territories, will have no choice but to proceed toward the elections plan as it was presented in the Israeli political initiative.

In Shamir's view, "Israel is not playing in the Middle Eastern bazaar." Israel offered a "fair price" and is not about to haggle over it now. The Israeli initiative was not up to bargaining. According to him, it reflects a genuine willingness to start a process that will lead to understanding among hawkish factors in the area. So far, Begin managed to target the defense minister, too, who is in principle prepared to show considerable flexibility in tactical, and even strategic matters, but the PLO's attempts and Egypt's stance do not help, in his view, to advance the initiative. They will once again restore the Shamir-Rabin axis.

The prime minister stated that it was not his intention to gain time and stall the process, as he has been publicly accused of doing. Shamir's moves may be described as a constructive attempt to gain time. He believes that it is generally agreed that any significant political achievement will be welcomed by all political currents in the country, doves and hawks as one.

In this way Shamir is endeavoring to obtain the endorsement of Likud Central Committee members for certain changes in the political agenda. The prime minister, who considers himself "tied to the peace process," will attempt to persuade the Central Committee, which will be convened soon, of the need to continue the political process while preserving Likud principles, but also while taking into consideration Israel's needs. As a central party, Likud must also consider the key topics of the political debate. Shamir believes that he will be able to prevail over the constraints ministers, whose objective is to remove him, without any connection to any process. Shamir's attempts to involve and draw closer some of

the constraints ministers failed, and he will have to decide what he wants to do from now on.

Postponement of the foreign ministers' meeting in Washington will give Shamir more time to persuade the Likud Central Committee of the correctness of his policies. He hopes that most Likud ministers will support his steps and the certain changes he envisages. The Likud and Labor ministers can advance all sorts of ideas concerning the political process, but Shamir sees himself as having the last word. His every statement must be well considered, because they are received as the government's official stance.

Shamir was stunned to hear about the meetings of Yona Ba'umel, the father of the missing soldier from the Lebanon War, with PLO and other officials in Arab countries. He has trouble accepting that things said at close cabinet meetings should be made public. The forum of the four indeed allowed Ba'umel his meetings in Tunis and other Arab countries, something that was in keeping with the thinking that guided Menahem Begin at the time, when he allowed Lova Eli'av to have talks on prisoners and missing men from the Lebanon war.

Some people think that the disclosure of those contacts gives a certain legitimacy to the PLO as a partner in the process, but Shamir is not among them. The defense minister will find himself on the same side of the fence as Shamir if it turns out that the PLO sees itself as a partner in the Cairo talks. Ba'umel's contacts were publicized for domestic purposes, namely to demonstrate that the State of Israel with all its currents does everything possible to rescue missing men and prisoners and that it will spare no effort to find them.

Shamir's agreement with contacts concerning prisoners reveals another facet to his personality, which can also be detected in discussions on political moves. The publicity given the oil deal with Iran was also part of efforts to retrieve prisoners and hostages, and any and every contact or deal that can produce positive results in that respect must be welcomed.

The PLO, in its stubborn attitude concerning prisoners and its failure to grasp the concealed nuances of the political process, is repeating the same historic mistake that Palestinians have been making for the past 40 years. The processes affecting the top Israeli leadership require conceptual flexibility apt to bring about political flexibility. Every spark must be encouraged and every attempt to advance the process must be supported, even if the timetable doesn't suit many of us. Even the slightest progress in the political process is more important than any narrow government and the wishes of any minister or any party.

In the past few days Knesset Members Darawishah and Mi'ari were abroad for meetings with PLO leaders. The two claimed to have received detailed information on the PLO's position on the political process and they reemphasized the fact that the PLO, particularly Yasir 'Arafat, are now more willing to make concessions than

ever before and that they understand that there is no way to withdraw from the political process. Neither Mi'ari nor Darawishah have coopted into their moves Arab Knesset members from MAPAM [United Workers Party], Labor, or even RAKAH [New Communist List]. They claim that 'Arafat is now ready for an inner PLO challenge. They compare the extremists opposing him to Likud's constraints ministers.

If Mi'ari and Darawishah's statements are founded and if it is true, as has been posited in this article, that some change has occurred in Shamir's position, then we may hope that the political process will continue, notwithstanding all the obstacles in the way, toward understanding and peace.

### Stormy Cabinet Meeting on Budget

*44230077D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT  
in Hebrew 25 Dec 89 p 7*

[Text] Loud shouting yesterday accompanied the first government meeting that dealt with the national budget for the coming year, so much so that twice the prime minister was forced to call the shouters to order and to make it clear that the meeting could not continue in those conditions.

The government will continue its debate today and a vote on the 1990 budget is expected tonight. "Hero of the day" yesterday was Minister Moshe Levi, who had come to the meeting angry as a bull, having looked through the Treasury budget and discovered, according to him, that the finance minister and his aides had defrauded him, had fed him false information, and had seriously harmed the housing budget, "instead of adding to it considerably, so that we can absorb the thousands of immigrants expected next year."

Already at the beginning of the meeting Levi attacked one after the other the prime minister, the finance minister, and Minister Rafi 'Adari, who tried to come to the aid of Shim'on Peres.

Levi to Shamir: "As prime minister, you should have known what was in the budget in social areas before announcing that you supported it. It's a shame that didn't happen."

Before Shamir had time to reply, Levi turned to Peres: "Only last Wednesday we had a joint working meeting. There you didn't say one word about the drastic cuts I found in the draft budget today. You truly swindled me in this matter. Pure swindling. Housing renovation will be scrapped, housing construction in development towns will be halted, young couples' needs will be abandoned, immigrant housing...."

Shamir unsuccessfully tried to calm Levi down, and the latter continued on a high octave: "And what about immigration? There's been a lot of high-flown talk, but so far I see nothing about a budget for it. And what's more, housing for the poor will be frozen and settlement

actions will be paralyzed. This is nothing but destruction of the system and the ministry. This is not economics. You have decided, for political reasons, to destroy my ministry, but I want to inform you today that you won't get away with it."

Seething with fury, Levi once again turned to Shamir: "And you, the prime minister, are you going to be a party to this destruction? As prime minister you bear as much responsibility as the finance minister, if not more."

Rafi 'Adari: "I ask that Minister Levi apologize for insulting Shim'on Peres."

Levi: "Who are you, anyway? I will not retract one word."

'Adari: "You're a windbag!"

Levi: "Where do you get off interfering in things that don't concern you at all? Who's asked you to open your mouth here?"

'Adari: "Once again, I demand that you retract."

Levi: "Now I know what your role is in this government and your contribution. You're the stooge."

'Adari: "You're the stooge. What has the Housing Ministry done until now?"

Levi: "If Shikun 'Ovdim had been a government firm there would have been an investigatory commission by now to investigate what you did there."

Shamir: "We can't continue the discussion like this. Enough!"

Peres to Levi: "The 40 million shekels that we want to cut now from the housing budget are from the additional budget allocated for immigrant housing."

Levi: "What's that? Some spontaneous invention of yours? What is the budget for immigrant housing? Do you know? Am I entitled to know? I still don't know why you didn't present this at our working meeting?"

Peres: "I didn't have to."

Levi: "And now you do? I can't remember such working methods."

Peres: "You could have called me."

Levi: "Why, was it a secret? You had to hide it? Did you decide to take it out on my ministry?"

Levi then said: "I warn you, you are abandoning young couples and neglecting new immigrants."

Peres: "I was told there was poverty in Israel. There is no poverty in Israel, but you keep lecturing about it."

Levi: "You go to the people and you'll see what's going on. You are cut off from them. You say there's no poverty. That's as good as ignoring the problem. Are those the values of the Labor Party?"

When the finance minister explained that 40 percent of this year's budget will be allocated to repaying debts, former Finance Minister Moshe Nisim suddenly broke out: "That's not true. Give precise figures."

This time, Peres became furious: "This is the frustration of everyone who was once finance minister. It's unacceptable that these people will continually grumble and be offensive. What's this? A different government? Yitzhaq Moda'i warns against growing inflation. How does Moda'i know what the rate of inflation will be? How?"

Debates will continue this morning.

#### Negotiations With Iran To Free Prisoner

44230073D Tel Aviv HADASHOT  
in Hebrew 22 Dec 89 p 15

[Article by Alex Fishman]

[Text] Before Tamar Arad, the wife of Ron Arad, the navigator captured in Lebanon, left for Paris, it was already sensed in Israel that Fred Francis of NBC was harboring a big story. Initially, the subject of the story was not precisely known, but when Francis began to pose questions to Israeli experts, the picture became clear.

In an investigative report nurtured by intelligence sources in the United States, Francis was about to uncover negotiations conducted by Uri Lubrani, of Israel's Defense Ministry, with Iranians in Switzerland over weapons spare parts, oil deals, and a prisoner exchange. In Israel, there was concern about the reaction of the American public, which had still not recovered entirely from the trauma of Irangate.

In order to soften the blow, it was decided in Israel to preempt Francis in going public, and to focus public relations efforts on the humanitarian aspect of contacts with Iran. Tamar Arad set off a bombshell in Paris, announcing that her husband is a prisoner in Iranian hands. This was apparently already known in Israel. The day after Tamar Arad's appearance in Paris, the defense minister disclosed that there are no limits regarding prisoners; we even permit their parents to meet with PLO members. That same evening, as if by means of a magic wand, Yona Baumel was thrown to the media, and he told of his meetings early this year with a PLO representative in Tunisia.

When NBC released the story, the public was already prepared to absorb the humanitarian aspect of Lubrani's contacts, as long as these contacts also dealt with American hostages, at least according to NBC. In the meantime, the softening operation had succeeded. Beyond this, nothing is known. For seven and one-half years, there has been no information on the fate of the missing persons of Sultan Ya'qub. Nor has there been any information on Hizballah's captives for four and one-half years, or on Ron Arad since his capture three years

ago. Everything is of course enshrouded in secrecy for the welfare of the missing and the abducted.

The U.S. Government cannot complain about Israel's contacts with Iran. According to news items from abroad, the administration is itself currently holding contacts with Iran with the goal of obtaining political quid pro quo. The topic of the missing persons and hostages is also on the table.

According to foreign publications, Lubrani met with Iranian representatives in Switzerland, in what is actually the third act of a play that began in the early 1980s, when, also according to foreign publications, Lubrani held contacts with Khomeyni's people in London. The Iranians, pressured by the Gulf War, needed spare parts, and the Jewish community in Iran was in distress. There was thus something to talk about. Ultimately, the Iranians obtained what they wanted; they paid money, but there was no political quid pro quo or relations.

In the mid-1980s, the second act began with a big bang—Irangate. This time, the Iranians received weapons, released individuals, kidnapped new hostages, and exploded the episode in the faces of Israel and the United States, entangling them in the Contras affair.

In the summer of 1989, the Iranians were again in distress. They want to rebuild the army, and their economy is in shambles. They claim that Israel owes them \$800 million and that the United States owes them \$4.5 billion.

When the mechanism on a bomb on the Phantom exploded on 16 October 1986 in the skies of Sidon, no one guessed that the navigator who was not rescued would become a tool in a game of strategic interests between countries and between and within different organizations in Lebanon. Arad's transmigrations in Lebanon in recent years have created an unprecedented situation for Israel: Suddenly, it discovers that someone else is holding him.

Arad was captured by the Amal organization. According to foreign publications, the first Israeli response was to apply military pressure on the organization, and to block Sidon Port and al-Awazi Port. In February 1987, in Damascus, Amal's leader, Nabih Berri, presented the first offer, a package deal, which would include four Americans kidnaped by the Islamic Jihad in January 1987. He repeated his offer in March and September. At the time, the Arab press reported that Amal was demanding the release of 810 captives, whereas Israel was willing to release only 320. In November 1987, the BBC reported that secret negotiations to win the navigator's release had been going on for a year between Israel and Amal. In public, Berri demanded the release of all Shi'ite and Palestinian prisoners in Israel's custody. Until July 1988, Israel continued to regard Amal as responsible for Arad's fate, even though, according to foreign publications, Amal no longer held him as of May.

During fighting between Hizballah and Amal in Beirut in May 1988, members of the "Believing Opposition," who are close to Hizballah and Iran, captured Amal headquarters in Hariq, in southern Beirut, where, according to publications, the navigator was being held. Arad was transferred to Hizballah and later to Iran.

In September 1988, the Hizballah organization announced that it held the navigator, that his health was fragile, and that he was being transferred to Iran's embassy in Beirut. Meanwhile, Israel continues to state that Amal, in its view, is responsible for the navigator's fate, even though, according to Tamar Arad's current testimony, Ron Arad's fate is no longer connected with Amal.

Israel responded to this development somewhat belatedly. On 15 December 1988, four Shi'ites were captured near Tibnin, north of the security strip. Two were leaders of the Believing Opposition, including Juhad Kasafi, who has since been in an Israeli prison. On 31 July 1989, Kasafi's name was mentioned in the foreign press in connection with an agreement which Israel proposed for the exchange of prisoners held in its custody.

On 29 December 1988, the Air Force attacked the village of Sultaniyah, north of the security zone, which is a stronghold of the Believing Opposition. Meanwhile, the Iranian opposition group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq, broke into Iran's embassy in Geneva and stole documents, including documents indicating that the six Israelis captured in Lebanon are being held by pro-Iranian groups. According to foreign publications, it can be learned from the meeting in late 1988 between Yehuda Katz' parents and Iranian elements that official Israel continued to search for the navigator in the right organization, but somewhat belatedly.

The key to the entire affair of the prisoners and persons missing in Lebanon was, and is, Iran. It is not clear why the Iranians took the navigator into their custody, thereby making themselves a target for pressure, when they could have continued to use sympathetic Lebanese organizations.

A possible answer to the riddle lies in the negotiations which Israel began with Iran. Iran needs Israeli weaponry and prefers to hold onto the Arad card, inasmuch as nothing in Lebanon is certain. Iran experts in Israel are placing many hopes on a change in power in Iran. They claim that there are negotiators and something to talk about—a strategic option.

According to publications, it seems that the Iranians are willing to conduct negotiations because they need weapons. An item published on 14 August 1989 in the Lebanese newspaper AL-'ARAB details Iranian demands in the new negotiations with Israel and the United States.

The demands range from payment of a ransom to the Hizballah organization to the release of \$2 billion worth of American weapons shipments purchased in the Shah's

day, and the unfreezing of Iranian accounts in American banks. Iran is also seeking the lifting of the economic and military embargo imposed on it by the West, and recognition of it as a central power in the Persian Gulf. The Hizballah organization adds to these conditions the release of a number of Palestinian prisoners, including the leaders of Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] in Gaza, and the release of 300 Lebanese Shi'ites confined in Israeli prisons. In exchange, Iran will hand over two Israeli soldiers and a pilot.

On 30 October 1989, the AL-MUHARRAR newspaper, which is published in Paris, reported that Israel had established a committee to negotiate with Iran. The committee is headed by Uri Lubrani and includes the Head of the Manpower Branch, Ron Goren, and lawyer Uri Slonim. It is acting in coordination with the U.S. embassy in Beirut. Before the committee was formed, contact was established with the kidnappers through a mediator from Tripoli. In the first stage, they would have to release five American hostages and one Israeli soldier in exchange for a ransom sum of \$50 million to be delivered next to a roadblock of the Syrian Army in Lebanon's Biqa' Valley. For this purpose, the Americans would have to reach an agreement with Syria. The mediator did not return to the Americans, and it emerged that he had had a difference of opinion with the kidnappers over his commission. Based on past experience, we will obtain nothing from the Iranians. We must only pray that Ron Arad will not fall between the cracks again.

#### Contacts With Iran Criticized

44230077B Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR  
in Hebrew 25 Dec 89 p 11

[Article by Pinhas Yinbari]

[Text] When Yitzhaq Shamir said that he was willing to talk to Satan, but not the PLO, those were not empty words, but a very specific statement which has now become clear, albeit somewhat earlier than Shamir perhaps intended. The Satan in question is the ayatollahs of Tehran and Shamir, according to rumors, is ready to make a deal with them in order to thwart the political process centering around the PLO.

We must remember that Shamir was also including a few other new elements in his pronouncement, and it is only now that we understand what he was talking about. Shamir said he was opposed to the PLO not because it is a terrorist organization, but because negotiations with it imply agreement with a Palestinian state. Shamir hoped that the Americans would leak word of the contacts with Iran, and prepared an "alibi," namely that Israel is prepared to talk to terrorists, too, provided they don't ask for a Palestinian state. Shamir is also open to negotiations with the PLO, and an attentive ear could hear it that very week at the "Jordan is Palestine" meeting recently held in Jerusalem (a keen eye could also have noticed the colors of the Palestinian flag, the "PLO

flag" in Likud parlance, surrounding the slogans of that rightist convention), but negotiations with the PLO were possible only on the issue of Palestinian sovereignty east of the Jordan river.

This is also a way of renewing relations with Tehran. The Palestinian problem is pressing on Israel now more than ever, and if there was ever a time to realize the rightist theories of Jordan-is-Palestine, this is it.

The explanations that renewed ties with Iran was designed to rally strength against the "common enemy," Iraq, are correct. Shamir's office views Iraq as an enemy, not so much because of its ballistic experiments or its military power, but because of its support for the Hashemite regime and its willingness to dispatch troops to Jordan and to put its military strength at the service of the Jordan's stability. Crises in Amman cause concern in Baghdad, but foster hope in Jerusalem. The real conflict of interests between Jerusalem and Baghdad is about developments in Jordan.

Shamir's office does not allow facts to interfere with its theories, and all the analyses stating that what is occurring in Jordan is not a process of Palestinization but of strengthening Islam, and that Islamic fundamentalism, rather than Palestinian nationalists, will take over if the Hashemite regime should fall, does not cut the mustard with the originators of the above theories; at the most, the latter may be prepared to consider "not stepping up" the processes in Jordan.

While Jordan's future is the crux of the conflict with Baghdad, it is a common denominator with Iran. It turns out that Israel is willing to help anyone shake up the Hashemites, and the strengthening of the fundamentalist currents in Jordan is one opening to Iran to intensify the export of the Khomeyni revolution. After a sterile groping in the Lebanese Biqa', Iran now sees a chance to hop over to Jordan and expand the export of the revolution from its solitary base in Lebanon to Israel's eastern border, and from there, who knows, perhaps to the Israeli Arabs, too.

Chances that rapprochement with Iran may promote an exchange of prisoners are undoubtedly a considerable motive in favor of contacts with Iran, but with all Israel's sensitivity to the prisoners' welfare, such rapprochement is neither a ransom nor the result of Iranian blackmail, but a whole concept concerning Israel's place in the Middle East and the type of political moves that it wants to develop.

The conflict in Tehran between Rafsanjani and Mohtashemi is well known, but this time it seems that the latter is interested in making a deal with Israel, which can give Israel the justification to resume the alliance with Tehran against the Arabs. The happy event of Ron 'Arad's return home will overshadow the new alliance with the "devil." Israel will help Iran against Iraq to deprive Husayn of an ally if his regime should totter, and may even close an eye to Iranian infiltration into Jordan to topple the king.

While intensified Palestinian radicalization is normally reason for concern, some members of Shamir's office may even discern a blessing in it, because the worst it is the better it gets, and the more extremist the Palestinians become, the easier it is to "suppress" the intifadah and to push the "Jordan is Palestine" formula.

However, fanatical Islam is preferred to secular Palestinian nationalism in more than just Shamir's office. It emerges that Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin, too, supports Israel's new Iran move, including its anti-Jordanian aspects. It is no secret that Rabin is very disappointed with King Husayn and the fact that he abandoned him at the time of the intifadah; however, while the majority of Likud is quite clear on the "punishment" that Husayn deserves, Rabin's picture is more complex. There are many signs that Rabin is interested in talking to the PLO and is interested in opening a new axis, with Cairo at its center, between 'Arafat and Israel; but Rabin has all sorts of difficulties along this line concerning his future relationship with Shamir, which he cannot break. It is easier for Rabin to sit with Shamir and Arens than with Tzaban and Sarid.

The latest developments in Jordan are causing Rabin fresh problems, because the democratization process, the restraint shown in dealing with demonstrations, the release of Palestinian detainees and Jordanian opposition members, and lately the new plague on Rabin's head, the abolishment of the state of emergency in Jordan, stand in complete contrast to Rabin's policies in the territories. The same week that Jordan allowed a Palestinian demonstration in Amman, Rabin issued new abusive and humiliating military orders against the Palestinians, such as the regulations against graffiti and stone throwing. While press restrictions are being lifted in Jordan, in Israel Rabin put on trial three Israeli reporters. Until recently Rabin bragged about the fact that there was no democracy in the Arab world. Now it's becoming clear that at least in Jordan processes are under way that are the reverse of the erosion of democracy in Israel.

The Jordanians first disappointed Rabin by refusing to repress the intifadah. Then they set a "bad example" by not having a blood bath in Amman, and now they're really "going wild" with their democratization, which serves to highlight the Israeli suppression on Jordan's western border. Rabin may not believe that "Jordan is Palestine," but he wouldn't be sorry to see King Husayn abandon his present policy, should the fundamentalist movement intensify in his kingdom.

The new pact with Iran has dealt the final blow to those who believed that the political process should be pursued precisely with Iraq. They viewed as positive the establishment of the Arab Council for Economic Cooperation, the "Club of Four" which included Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and North Yemen. Politicians such as Peres and Shahal viewed that club as a nucleus for regional cooperation, within which the Palestinian problem could be resolved. Israel and the future Palestine could join this club, thus

imparting it territorial continuity and offering Iraq an exit to the Mediterranean in...Haifa! All that would have turned Israel and Palestine into the link between Egypt and Iraq and between Iraq and Europe—but that was too bright a vision for the grim spirits of Rabin and Shamir.

#### Likud MK Namir Discusses Peace Process, Alon Plan

*90OL0223A Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI  
in Arabic 6 Jan 90 p 32*

[Interview With Likud Member of Knesset Ora Namir by Muhammad Darawishah; "In Interview With Member of Knesset Ora Namir: We Are Destined To Live Together in This Country; Establishing Palestinian State Poses Great Danger to Security of State of Israel; I Will Talk to Any Palestinian Who Recognizes State of Israel;" first paragraph is AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI introduction; date, place not given]

[Text] Member of Knesset Ora Namir was born in the country and she now lives in Moshav Kfar Hogla near al-Khudayrah. She received her higher education at Hunter College, New York, and she has been a Knesset member for 16 years, of which she spent five years as chairman of the Education Committee. She has been chairman of the Knesset Labor Committee for the past five years.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] What is your comment on the existing tension between Arabs and Jews?

[Namir] Shaking coexistence between the Israeli Jews and Arabs is the only serious thing that the intifadah [uprising] has produced. Despite the presence of impurities in the Jewish-Arab relations, we were able in previous years to preserve this coexistence because we have been destined to live together in this country. This is why each side tried its utmost to maintain the common life founded on mutual respect and on preservation of the rights of both sides. The intifadah has destroyed all this because the Israeli Arabs have sympathized with their Palestinian brothers. This is identical to the Israeli Jew's sympathy for his Jewish brothers in the diaspora when they experience a political or social crisis. This sympathy has made the Jew realize that there is, in fact, no difference between the Israeli Arabs and their brothers in the territories. This realization has motivated a section of the Jewish people to view the Israeli Arabs as enemies on the basis that there is no difference between them and the territories' Arabs. I do, of course, consider this attitude to be very serious because we will be compelled to live with the Israeli Arabs forever. If mutual respect disappears, our life will be difficult and bitter.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] How do you view the Israeli Arabs?

[Namir] To me, they are Arabs. As any Israeli Jew is a part of the Jewish people, the Palestinians are a part of the greater Arab world.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] How far will the Israeli Government go if it insists on its peace plan?

[Namir] This will not be the option of the Israeli Government alone. The domestic political situation in Israel—and I mean the outcome of the latest Knesset elections which showed that the Israeli people are divided into two equal factions—do not permit either of the two major parties to form the cabinet on its own in the near future. This will give the major powers, especially the United States, the opportunity to pressure Israel to accept the peaceful solution. At present, it is difficult to believe that when the Israeli people cast their vote they will give their confidence to a government that agrees to recognize the PLO and to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Why do the Israelis fear the establishment of an independent Palestinian state?

[Namir] This emanates from the Israelis' fear that the establishment of a Palestinian state will shake the security of the State of Israel. I also emphasize that a great danger will be posed to the security of the State of Israel if a Palestinian state is established. From the time the State of Israel was established to the present, the Arabs have never concealed their intention to destroy this state because the majority of the Palestinian people do not wish the State of Israel to continue to exist.

The Israeli people are currently at a loss as to which of the two following options can insure the security of the State of Israel:

- 1) Withdrawal from the territories or;
- 2) Continued occupation?

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] What are the guarantees Israel will demand in case it withdraws from the occupied Arab territories?

[Namir] No Israeli government can redivide the city of Jerusalem. I believe that Alon's plan for protecting the State of Israel is an acceptable plan.

What is to be noted is that Alon's plan talks of withdrawal from the densely populated Arab territories while saying that most of the unpopulated territories, especially the Jordan Valley area, must remain under Israeli army control.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] What are the effects that the intifadah has had on the State of Israel?

[Namir] The intifadah has affected Israel's economy because it has closed the territories to Israeli products, especially textile products. Add to this the endless appropriations which the Israeli Government makes for the Ministry of Defense so that the latter may be able to cover the big expenses caused by the intifadah (last year's Ministry of Defense budget was adjusted by 250 million shekels only). The army pays these heavy costs at the expense of the social welfare and education budgets.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Will the United States pressure Israel?

[Namir] It is difficult to speculate on this. But President Bush's new administration will put greater pressures than the Reagan administration because it is fed up with the Middle East conflict. At present, there are international issues, especially the developments in East Europe, that attract greater attention from the United States than the Middle East issue.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Who are the Palestinians to whom you prefer to talk?

[Namir] Any Palestinian who recognizes the State of Israel and denounces terrorism. I don't know if 'Arafat is the right man to talk to because I have not yet heard from him any serious statement denouncing terrorism. 'Arafat is a part of the intifadah and it is my belief that numerous aspects of the intifadah are terroristic.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] What future do you expect for the region?

[Namir] I believe that peace is approaching. Israel has no future whatsoever without peace because the existing situation affects several aspects of the Israeli society, causing a decline of values and disregard for human life. Add to this the economic and security effects.

I believe in the necessity of peace and I will do my utmost to establish peace in the region.

**Yugoslav Poll Results on Peace Process Published  
90OL0228A Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI'  
in Arabic 29 Jan 90 pp 8-9**

[Article: "Yugoslav Poll of Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion; Palestinians: PLO Influence Is Very Strong; Israelis: Shamir Does Not Want To Negotiate"]

[Text] Belgrade—AL-YAWM AL-SABI'—A Yugoslav poll reveals clearly the public opinion tendencies among Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied territories. The poll demonstrates clearly the united and firm Palestinian popular position. On the other hand, it demonstrates in figures the state of disunity and division in the Israeli ranks.

With the approach of Christmas and of the new year, a Yugoslav television and press mission went to the occupied Palestinian territories and stayed there for two weeks, from 22 December 1989 to 6 January 1990.

The mission had two objectives: First, produce a documentary film on the Palestinian intifadah [uprising], on the Israeli oppression, and on the acts of settlement at the expense of the Palestinian population and its land. Second, poll the Palestinian and Israeli public opinion on the political issues currently projected as political demands of the Palestinian people.

The mission accomplished its objective within the limits of the resources made available to it. It photographed 160 minutes' worth of raw material which is now being edited in Belgrade to produce a brief documentary film. While photographing the raw material, the mission members were subjected to extensive harassment by the Israeli occupation forces. Parts of their equipment were destroyed during the clashes with the international demonstration which was staged in Jerusalem and was organized by supporters of the Palestinian cause from various parts of Europe.

The poll was conducted by selection of a random sample of Palestinians and Israelis to find out the public opinion tendencies in the territories occupied since 1967 and among the Israelis.

Participants in the poll numbered 988 persons, including 502 Palestinians and 486 Israelis.

The polling lasted from 23-31 December 1989.

The areas covered by the poll included both sections of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron, and Tel Aviv. The mission had also planned to include Nablus and Gaza in the poll but was unable to do so because of the Israeli orders which declared the two cities closed cities as a result of the clashes between the inhabitants and the occupation forces.

The poll was conducted through personal contact in most cases and by telephone in a few cases.

The team conducting the poll consisted of nine individuals.

The samples were selected randomly, taking into consideration social variety and age difference.

The sample was divided into three age groups:

The first group was up to the age of 25 years.

The second group was the 25-45 year age group.

The third group was the 45-75 year age group.

Five questions were addressed to the Palestinians and four questions to the Israelis.

The poll results were as follows:

#### **Palestinians**

The first question addressed to the Palestinians was: How strong is the PLO influence in the occupied territories? Is it very strong, strong, moderate, or weak?

The percentages of the responses were as follows:

|                  |             |
|------------------|-------------|
| Very strong..... | 80 percent. |
| Strong.....      | 17 percent. |
| Moderate.....    | 3 percent.  |
| Weak.....        | 0 percent.  |

Second question: Till when will the intifadah continue? Until it achieves its objectives, for a long time, for sometime, or don't know?

The percentages of the responses were as follows:

|   |               |
|---|---------------|
| Until it accomplishes its objectives..... | 73.5 percent. |
| For a long time.....                      | 15.0 percent. |
| For sometime .....                        | 7.0 percent.  |
| Don't know.....                           | 4.5 percent.  |

Third question: Do you think that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories? Yes, no, don't know?

The percentages of the responses were as follows:

|                 |             |
|-----------------|-------------|
| Yes.....        | 98 percent. |
| No.....         | 2 percent.  |
| Don't know..... | 0 percent.  |

Fourth question: The Palestinian state should be:

A. Independent? B. Confederated with Jordan? C. Confederated with Israel?

The percentages of the responses were as follows:

|                                |             |
|--------------------------------|-------------|
| Independent .....              | 86 percent. |
| Confederated with Jordan ..... | 12 percent. |
| Confederated with Israel.....  | 2 percent.  |

The fifth question was: Who would you elect president of the State of Palestine: Yasir 'Arafat, another individual, don't know?

The percentages of the responses were as follows:

|                          |               |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| Yasir 'Arafat.....       | 80.5 percent. |
| Another Individual ..... | 9.0 percent.  |
| No opinion .....         | 10.5 percent. |

#### **Israelis**

The first question addressed to the Israelis was: Do you believe that Yitzhak Shamir wants to negotiate, even with a delegation of Palestinians from the occupied territories?

The percentages of the responses were as follows:

Yes, I believe that he wants to negotiate .....9 percent.

I don't believe that he wants to negotiate....91 percent.

The second question was: Do you support negotiations with the Palestinians? Yes, no, don't know?

The percentages of the responses to this question were as follows:

Yes, I support negotiations.....30.5 percent.

No, I am opposed to negotiations .....48.0 percent.

Don't know.....21.5 percent.

Third question: Do you support the Palestinian right to self-determination? Yes, no, don't know?

The percentages of the responses were as follows:

Yes, I support the right to self-determination.21 percent.

No, I am opposed to the right to self-determination..61 percent.

Don't know.....18 percent.

Fourth question: Do you support contacts between Israeli officials and PLO representatives: Yes, no, don't know?

The percentages of the responses to this question were as follows:

Yes, I support them .....62 percent.

No, I don't support them.....12 percent.

Don't know.....26 percent.

### Second Reading of Poll

In addition to the poll's general results, there have been interesting detailed results in the Palestinian side's responses, and particularly in the Israeli side's responses.

Among the East Jerusalem Palestinians, there has been a higher percentage of vacillating or indecisive positions than in the other cities, whereas Hebron's positions are absolutely decisive. Hebron is followed by Bethlehem.

To the first question which concerns the strength of the PLO influence in the occupied territories, the Palestinian responses were as follows, according to city:

Very strong: East Jerusalem, 65 percent; Bethlehem, 70 percent; Hebron 100 percent.

To the second question which asks "till when will the intifadah continue," Palestinian responses were as follows, according to city:

Until it accomplishes its objectives: East Jerusalem, 26 percent; Bethlehem, 87 percent; Hebron, 95 percent.

To the third question which concerns the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, Palestinian responses were as follows, according to city:

Yes: East Jerusalem, 95 percent; Bethlehem, 100 percent; Hebron, 100 percent.

To the fourth question which asks "do you want an independent state or a confederated state," Palestinian responses were as follows, according to city:

Independent state: East Jerusalem, 55 percent; Bethlehem, 95 percent; Hebron, 100 percent.

To the fifth question which asks "would you elect Yasir 'Arafat or somebody else as chairman of the Palestinian state," the Palestinian responses were as follows, according to city:

Yasir 'Arafat: East Jerusalem, 56 percent; Bethlehem, 99 percent; Hebron, 85 percent.

These figures reflect a tense, anxious, and less decisive condition in Jerusalem. This is perhaps due to the concentrated settlement surrounding East Jerusalem and to Israel's decision to unite the two cities and proclaim Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

But this difference in positions between the Palestinian cities is much smaller than the difference in the positions of the inhabitants of the Israeli cities, particularly the differences between the cities and the settlements. By reading the poll's details, we notice that Israeli settlers hold the more radical positions. This radicalism decreases gradually the more distant the city is from the occupied territories.

To the first question which asks whether Shamir wants to negotiate with Palestinians from the occupied territories, the Israeli responses were as follows, according to city:

I don't believe so: Tel Aviv, 82 percent; West Jerusalem: 92.5 percent; settlements in the occupied territories, 100 percent.

To the second question which asks "do you support negotiations with the Palestinians," the Israeli responses were as follows, according to city:

I don't: Tel Aviv, 16.5 percent; West Jerusalem, 34 percent; settlements in the occupied territories, 99.5 percent.

To the third question which asks "do you support the Palestinian right to self-determination," the Israeli responses were divided as follows, according to city:

I oppose it: Tel Aviv, 27 percent; West Jerusalem, 62 percent; settlements in the occupied territories, 98.5 percent.

To the fourth question which asks "do you support contacts with the PLO," the Israeli responses were as follows, according to city:

I support: Tel Aviv, 91 percent; West Jerusalem, 80 percent; settlements in the occupied territories, 12.5 percent.

It is evident from these figures that fanaticism and radicalism are maximal among the inhabitants of the Israeli settlements and that they decrease gradually the farther Israelis live from the Palestinian population centers. The figures also demonstrate that there is a major difference in the positions of the Israeli public

opinion—a difference that reaches the degree of a vertical split in society and that reflects an obvious crack in the national unity and a rift between the political opinions of the inhabitants of Tel Aviv, West Jerusalem, and the settlements.

As the Palestinian inhabitants live in a state of tension and anxiety, the Israeli inhabitants inhabitants live

under the same condition, perhaps because of East Jerusalem's ample share of the intifadah activities, because of the deep Islamic religious sentiments that engulf al-Aqsa Mosque, and because there is concentrated international media activity in East Jerusalem.

#### Palestinian Responses

##### First Question: How Strong Is PLO Influence in Occupied Territories?

|                              | Very Strong       | Strong          | Moderate       | Weak |
|------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------------|------|
| East Jerusalem (151 Persons) | (98) 65 Percent   | (39) 36 Percent | (14) 9 Percent | -    |
| Bethlehem (156 Persons)      | (109) 70 Percent  | (47) 30 Percent | -              | -    |
| Hebron (195 Persons)         | (194) 100 Percent | 1               | -              | -    |

##### Total Percentages

|                |       |            |
|----------------|-------|------------|
| A. Very Strong | (401) | 80 Percent |
| B. Strong      | (87)  | 17 Percent |
| C. Moderate    | (14)  | 3 Percent  |
| D. Weak        | -     | -          |

Footnote: Category C is in 45-75 year age group.

##### Second Question: Till When Will Intifadah Continue?

|                              | Until It Achieves Its Objectives | For A Long Time | For Sometime    | Don't Know      |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| East Jerusalem (151 Persons) | (39) 26 Percent                  | (51) 35 Percent | (38) 26 Percent | (23) 13 Percent |
| Bethlehem (156 Persons)      | (135) 87 Percent                 | (14) 9 Percent  | (5) 3.5 Percent | (1) 0.5 Percent |
| Hebron (195 Persons)         | (186) 95 Percent                 | (9) 5 Percent   | -               | -               |

##### Total Percentages

|                                  |       |              |
|----------------------------------|-------|--------------|
| Until It Achieves Its Objectives | (361) | 73.5 Percent |
| For Long Time                    | (74)  | 15 Percent   |
| For Sometime                     | (43)  | 7 Percent    |
| Don't Know                       | (24)  | 4.5 Percent  |

##### Third Question: Do You Think PLO is the Sole Legitimate Representative of Palestinian People in Occupied Territories?

|                              | Yes               | No            | Don't Know |
|------------------------------|-------------------|---------------|------------|
| East Jerusalem (151 Persons) | (144) 95 Percent  | (7) 5 Percent | -          |
| Bethlehem (156 Persons)      | (155) 100 Percent | 1             | -          |
| Hebron (195 Persons)         | (195) 100 Percent | -             | -          |

  

|                   |     |                          |  |
|-------------------|-----|--------------------------|--|
| Total Percentages |     |                          |  |
| A. Yes            | 494 | Approximately 98 Percent |  |
| B. No             | 8   | Approximately 2 Percent  |  |
| C. Don't Know     | -   |                          |  |

**Fourth Question: Should Palestinian State Be A. Independent; B. Confederated With Jordan; C. Confederated With Israel?**

|                              | Independent      | Confederated With Jordan | Confederated With Israel |
|------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| East Jerusalem (151 Persons) | (83) 55 Percent  | (59) 39 Percent          | (9) 6 Percent            |
| Bethlehem (156 Persons)      | (148) 95 Percent | (7) 5 Percent            | 1                        |
| Hebron (195 Persons)         | (189) 97 Percent | (6) 3 Percent            | -                        |
| <b>Total Percentages</b>     |                  |                          |                          |
| A. Independent State         | 420              | Approximately 86 Percent |                          |
| B. Confederated With Jordan  | 72               | Approximately 12 Percent |                          |
| C. Confederated With Jordan  | 10               | Approximately 2 Percent  |                          |

Footnote: Category B Is Above 25-Year Old Age Group.

**Fifth Question: Who Would You Elect for President of Palestinian State?**

|                              | Yasir 'Arafat    | Another Person             | No Opinion      |
|------------------------------|------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|
| East Jerusalem (151 Persons) | (84) 56 Percent  | (21) 14 Percent            | (46) 30 Percent |
| Bethlehem (156 Persons)      | (154) 99 Percent | -                          | (2) 1 Percent   |
| Hebron (195 Persons)         | (166) 85 Percent | (25) 13 Percent            | (4) 2 Percent   |
| <b>Total Percentages</b>     |                  |                            |                 |
| A. Yasir 'Arafat             | (404)            | Approximately 80.5 Percent |                 |
| B. Another Person            | (46)             | Approximately 9 Percent    |                 |
| C. No Opinion                | (52)             | Approximately 10.5 Percent |                 |

Footnote: Most of Those in Categories B and C Belong to Age Group Above 45 Years.

**Israeli Responses**

**First Question: Do You Believe That Shamir Wants to Negotiate, Even With Palestinian Delegation From Occupied Territories?**

|   | Yes, I Do        | No, I Don't              |
|---|------------------|--------------------------|
| West Jerusalem(161 Persons)               | (12) 7.5 Percent | (149) 92.5 Percent       |
| Tel Aviv (173 Persons)                    | (31) 18 Percent  | (142) 82 Percent         |
| Settlements in Occupied Territories (152) | -                | (152) 100 Percent        |
| <b>Total Percentages</b>                  |                  |                          |
| A. Yes, I Do                              | (43)             | Approximately 9 Percent  |
| B. No, I Don't                            | 443              | Approximately 91 Percent |

**Second Question: Do You Support Negotiations With Palestinians?**

|  | Yes                | No                  | No Opinion      |
|--|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| West Jerusalem (161 Persons)                               | (44) 27 Percent    | (55) 34 Percent     | (62) 39 Percent |
| Tel Aviv (173 Persons)                                     | (103) 59.5 Percent | (39) 16.5 Percent   | (41) 24 Percent |
| Settlements in Occupied Territories (152 Persons)          | (1) 0.5 Percent    | (151) 99.5 Percent  | -               |
| <b>Total Percentages, Including Settlement Inhabitants</b> |                    |                     |                 |
| A. Yes   | (148)              | Nearly 30.5 Percent |                 |
| B. No  | (235)              | Nearly 48 Percent   |                 |
| C. Don't Know  | (103)              | Nearly 21.5 Percent |                 |
| <b>Total Percentages, Excluding Settlement Inhabitants</b> |                    |                     |                 |
| A. Yes   | (147)              | Nearly 44 Percent   |                 |
| B. No  | (84)               | Nearly 25 Percent   |                 |
| C. Don't Know  | (103)              | Nearly 31 Percent   |                 |

**Third Question: Do You Support Palestinian Right to Self-Determination?**

|  | Yes             | No                 | Don't Know      |
|--|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| West Jerusalem (161 Persons)                               | (14) 9 Percent  | (100) 62 Percent   | (47) 29 Percent |
| Tel Aviv (173 Persons)                                     | (86) 50 Percent | (47) 27 Percent    | (40) 23 Percent |
| Settlements in Occupied Territories (153 Persons)          | (1) 0.5 Percent | (148) 98.5 Percent | (3) 1 Percent   |
| <b>Total Percentages, Including Settlement Inhabitants</b> |                 |                    |                 |
| A. Yes   | (101)           | Nearly 21 Percent  |                 |
| B. No  | (295)           | Nearly 61 Percent  |                 |
| C. Don't Know  | (90)            | Nearly 18 Percent  |                 |
| <b>Total Percentages, Excluding Settlement Inhabitants</b> |                 |                    |                 |
| A. Yes   | (100)           | Nearly 30 Percent  |                 |
| B. No  | (147)           | Nearly 44 Percent  |                 |
| C. Don't Know  | (87)            | Nearly 26 Percent  |                 |

**Fourth Question: Do You Support Contacts Between Israeli Officials and PLO Representatives?**

|  | Yes               | No                | Don't Know        |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| West Jerusalem (161 Persons)                               | (129) 80 Percent  | (11) 7 Percent    | (21) 13 Percent   |
| Tel Aviv (173 Persons)                                     | (158) 91 Percent  | (9) 5 Percent     | (6) 4 Percent     |
| Settlements in Occupied Territories (152 Persons)          | (19) 12.5 Percent | (38) 25 Percent   | (95) 62.5 Percent |
| <b>Total Percentages, Including Settlement Inhabitants</b> |                   |                   |                   |
| A. Yes   | (301)             | Nearly 62 Percent |                   |
| B. No  | (58)              | Nearly 12 Percent |                   |
| C. Don't Know  | (122)             | Nearly 26 Percent |                   |
| <b>Total Percentages, Excluding Settlement Inhabitants</b> |                   |                   |                   |
| A. Yes   | (287)             | Nearly 86 Percent |                   |
| B. No  | (20)              | Nearly 6 Percent  |                   |
| C. Don't Know  | (27)              | Nearly 8 Percent  |                   |

**CRM Member Sarid 'Optimistic' About Political Trends**

90OL0179A Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI  
in Arabic 16 Dec 89 p 36

[Interview with Yossi Sarid by Muhammad Darwishah: "Shamir's Initiative Bigger Than Shamir; Palestinian-Israeli Meeting Gate to New Era"; first paragraph is AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI introduction; date and place not specified]

[Text] Knesset member Yossi Sarid was elected to the Knesset in 1973. At that time, he was the youngest Labor Party members. Today, he is a member of the Knesset Security and Foreign Affairs Committee and is serving his fifth term in the Knesset. It is noteworthy that Yossi Sarid quit the Labor Party and joined RATZ [Citizens' Rights Movement] in 1984 when the national unity government in Israel was formed.

[AL-BAYADIR] Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the escalation of tension between the Palestinians and Israelis?

[Sarid] I am more optimistic today than I have ever been. In 1987, six months prior to the outbreak of the intifadah [uprising], I wrote an article in HA'ARETZ in which I said "if the Palestinians wanted the occupation to last 1,000 years more, they should keep on acting the way they are acting now," meaning persisting in their terrorist action on the one hand and collaborating with the authorities on the other hand. To this day, the Israeli right has been accusing me that this article encouraged the Palestinians to start the intifadah. Today, I say it again: terrorism must be stopped and also collaboration with the military rule must be stopped.

[AL-BAYADIR] What collaboration are you talking about?

[Sarid] If we had assigned "Levinger" the task of building settlements, not a single settlement would have been set up. The Arab Palestinians are the ones who are doing the building. I have proposed and am proposing now several means for civil disobedience without the need for violence.

[AL-BAYADIR] What developments make you more optimistic today than before?

[Sarid] In the last few years important developments have occurred:

- The PLO's readiness to recognize Israel.
- The state of a dialogue between the PLO and America.
- The Israeli peace initiative. I must say here that even though I do not believe the initiator (Shamir), his initiative has grown bigger than he personally. He himself cannot stop the peace melody.

[AL-BAYADIR] What are your expectations for the future based on these developments?

[Sarid] I expect a tripartite Israeli-American-Egyptian meeting to be held in Washington in the upcoming stage. I am sure that a dialogue on the composition of the Palestinian delegation will be extremely difficult, but an agreement will be reached eventually to hold a Palestinian-Israeli meeting in Egypt. This meeting will be the gate to a new era in the Middle East because it will be the first time that Israelis and Palestinians sit together at the negotiating table.

[AL-BAYADIR] If you were the prime minister of Israel, what would you do?

[Sarid] If I were the prime minister of Israel, I would cut the way short and immediately sit at the discussion table with Yasir 'Arafat to agree with him on an arrangement that would ensure peace through mutual recognition and historic detente. But, since I am not Shamir, and since we have to bring Shamir down from his high horse, the first official meeting ought to be between Israeli Palestinians, mainly from the territories and some from the outside, no matter what they are called: displaced, deportees, or university professors.

[AL-BAYADIR] How far can the government, in its present makeup, go in the peace process?

[Sarid] The government, in its present makeup, does not want the initiative to go anywhere. We must remember that the initiative was forced on them one and a half years ago after the intifadah and international pressure, American in particular, began. We see today that the initiative has boomeranged and has caught Shamir in the trap of negotiations. Shamir can hold up the process but cannot stop it now.

[AL-BAYADIR] Do you predict that Shamir will stay on in the political leader leadership in Israel?

[Sarid] Shamir represents the right and this is his last term in government. He can take us as far as the elections in the territories. And although elections are not sanctioned by the PLO, we must look at them as a first and significant step because the process of elections in the territories will change the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip radically. The elections represent the beginning of the age of freedom, including the freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom to form political parties. One cannot propose elections on one side and continue the occupation on the

other side. Voters will have tangible immunity and authorities will not be able to act freely to restrict their freedom. I believe that as soon as elections get underway, these areas will be transformed into independent sovereign territories in a matter of days or hours.

[AL-BAYADIR] What kind of sovereignty are you talking about?

[Sarid] The matter of sovereignty in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip does not concern me. I want to get out of the territories—for the benefit of Israel—in order to get rid of the harsh impact the occupation has had on Israeli society and not out of loyalty or fairness to the Palestinians. Every compatriot must take care of his people's interests and out of my concern for the Israeli people I say that we should leave the territories as soon as possible. The matter of sovereignty and what will happen in the territories is not one of my concerns. Our assessment, however, is that a Palestinian state confederally linked to its neighbor will be set up, with the approval of the Palestinians and their neighbors, of course.

[AL-BAYADIR] Why are the Israelis afraid to have a dialogue with the PLO and afraid of the Palestinians in Palestinian cities and villages?

[Sarid] There are two kinds of reasons for Israeli fear: pragmatic reasons and imaginary reasons. The PLO, as the representative of the Palestinian people, practiced for a long time and declared its goal was to wipe the slate of Israel off the face of the earth.

This is the reason for Israeli fears. Of course, this has strengthened the hand of the Israeli right, prompting it to portray the Palestinian as a nonperson.

[AL-BAYADIR] But Israel too has engaged in terrorist tactics against the Palestinians. What do you say about that?

[Sarid] To a certain extent, things between the PLO and Israel have been turned around. There was a time when Israel was looking for negotiating partners, but could not find them. Instead of partners it found rejection and radicalism. Today, we find the Palestinians looking for partners for discussion, but Shamir is letting them down with rejection and radicalism. There was a time when the Palestinians distinguished themselves in wasting peace opportunities, but today the Israeli right is competing with them for this honor.

[AL-BAYADIR] What security measures are you asking for in the event a Palestinian state is established?

[Sarid] There have to be realistic expectations. I believe that it will be possible to withdraw to the 1967 boundaries and the Palestinian state will be compelled to accept the idea of disarmament for a certain period of time.

[AL-BAYADIR] What do you think of the issue of making Jerusalem the capital of a Palestinian state as well?

[Sarid] Jerusalem is subject to negotiations as well. However, it is a very sensitive issue to both sides. But it is impossible to think that Jerusalem will not be the capital of Israel. At any rate, there is no reason to partition Jerusalem by putting up fences all over again.

### **Bar-Kokhba Looks at Middle East Battlefield of Future**

*90OL0203A Tel Aviv BAMAHA  
in Hebrew 3 Jan 90 p 9*

[Article by Roni Raviv: "Future Wars May Last Longer"]

[Text] "Over the next decade we will find that the Arab armies have the capability for more rapid concentration of their main efforts and greater flexibility in moving them from sector to sector—which will make the conduct of defensive operations more difficult," say General Moshe Bar-Kokhba (Bril), assistant to the chief of staff for disseminating lessons learned. "The rapid leap in power of Arab armies," adds General Bar-Kokhba, "obliges Israel to organize herself as a 'fighting nation,' meaning that she must squeeze the last drop out of her resources to build the biggest and most sophisticated army possible."

[BAMAHA] General Bar-Kokhba, what changes in strategic concepts were heralded by the last decade?

[Bar-Kokhba] Prolonged modern wars in our region turned armies into professionals, smarter and more efficient in military arts, preparation, and deployment. The transition from infantry to armored and mechanized armies has increased the armies' strike power and their tactical and operational mobility. The development of military air transport, highway infrastructure, and the outfitting of thousands of tank carriers and APC's have added to the strategic mobility of the area's armies. The provision of modern weapons at the tactical level, such as the battalion and the brigade, along with an increase in gun installations, machine guns, mortars, and especially antitank weapons—all of these will provide this echelon with firepower unprecedented in scope, power, and accuracy.

[BAMAHA] In the coming decade will we run up against Arab armies that are quicker and more mobile?

[Bar-Kokhba] I suspect that we find the Arab armies to have the capability for more rapid concentration of its principal efforts and great flexibility in move them from sector to sector—which will make it much harder to manage our defense.

[BAMAHA] Could Israel again find herself taken by surprise by this capability?

[Bar-Kokhba] Certainly, and perhaps in a very serious way. Given adequate preparation we can contain the damage, especially by drilling senior commanders on how to function in unexpected situations.

[BAMAHA] What organizational changes do you see in the Arab armies, and what effect will they have?

[Bar-Kokhba] All of the above-mentioned factors had an effect on the development of strategic concepts. However, for organizing at the corps level, the effect was decisive in consolidating up-to-date modern strategic concepts. Modern strategic defense in our area will bear a very strong flavor of defensive lines and strips dozens of kilometers long and will be based, unlike the past, on mechanized and armored troops. Modern strategic offense will be characterized by large forces projected over narrow sectors.

[BAMAHA] Are the Arab armies set up for a longer war next decade?

[Bar-Kokhba] The multiyear Iran-Iraq war, the duration of the Peace for Galilee campaign, and the cruel confrontation in Lebanon all show that wars may last significantly longer in the future. The development of a weapons manufacturing capability by the countries of the area will mature in the next decade. In combination with acquisitions already signed for and stored depots of ammunition and equipment, this will buy the Arab armies greater and more significant strategic operational breathing time than we have known in the past.

[BAMAHA] You noted earlier that defense will occupy a more important place in the next few years.

[Bar-Kokhba] Because of the development of fire and impediment building power, the value and effectiveness of defense will increase. Even though it will not be decisive, it will be possible to use it to force a cease-fire because of the many losses and heavy damage that will be inflicted on assaulting forces. All of that, of course, on condition that the defense be organized and managed properly and on the basis of modern fighting doctrine.

[BAMAHA] What main trends do you see for armor in the '90's?

[Bar-Kokhba] The armor corps will constitute the backbone of modern defense—an objective and function it did not have previously. The modern powerful armor corps, properly constructed with the right mix of quantity and quality, will be, alongside the air force, the basis for maintaining Israel's deterrent capability and her security.

[BAMAHA] How will nonconventional arms affect the battlefield of the next decade?

[Bar-Kokhba] To the extent that this sort of weaponry increases, so will their self-confidence, their demands, and their readiness to use war to solve problems and conflicts. Certainly the use of ground-to-ground missiles and ABC in warfare will make it crueler, more lethal and more difficult than in the past, but I don't believe these weapons will have a decisive effect on the results. It is important that the State of Israel and the IDF [Israel Defense Force] be in a position to frustrate this threat through defensive means.

In general it should be noted that the process of treaties and concepts among Arab states obligates us to prepare to frustrate not only a military threat from Syria, which claims to have reached strategic parity with Israel, but also to prepare for an effective defense against the aggression of a potential broad coalition.

[BAMAHANE] Will the rapprochement between the superpowers to which we are witness this year affect the Middle East in the coming decade?

[Bar-Kokhba] The rapprochement between the superpowers will have a moderating, positive effect. It will bring about intensive diplomatic activity will greater forbearance and level-headedness. However, beyond that, the superpowers will continue to compete in the sale of sophisticated weaponry of their own manufacture to countries in the Middle East. These arms deals will be larger in scope than in the past, as well as from other countries like China and France.

[BAMAHANE] To sum up, what do you feel will be the effect of the continuation of the uprising on the IDF of the 1990's?

[Bar-Kokhba] Despite the impression people have of increased police activity by the IDF in the territories of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, we can, through proper organization and deployment, contain the damage and prepare the army for its real military objectives.

**Warning Sounded About Iraqi Strength**  
**44230074B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT**  
*in Hebrew 15 Dec 89 p 7*

[Article by Yeshayahu Ben-Porat]

[Text] Last week Iraq sent out a signal, the meaning of which could not be missed. With the successful launch into space of a three-stage rocket of her own manufacture, Baghdad demonstrated a high level of technological capability and presented her candidacy for membership in the rather exclusive international club of those possessing sophisticated rockets.

Anyone capable of designing and manufacturing such a sophisticated missile and launching it without mishap to the desired height could use it tomorrow or the day after, not just for sending up a communications or surveillance spy satellite. When needed, simply by pushing a button, Baghdad will have the ability to send up and land much more attractive toys within a radius that includes us. We don't have to go into detail. Just remember what was written and said all over the world when Israel launched a communications satellite into space a year ago.

From our perspective Baghdad thus sent up a signal last week to match the well-known tune: Anything you can do, we can do, too—perhaps not better, but we aren't far behind you.

One way or another, within a time frame not to be measured in years, we are likely to find ourselves up against a potential threat from an enemy that is still unprepared to compromise with us. Anyone who doesn't understand the importance of the strategic change that follows from that, doesn't know what world he is living in.

In short, we have again been taken by surprise; and that is true even if those who have to deal with the matter twist things around and say that in principle we never lost sight of Iraq's technological potential, except for the last scientific details that allowed Baghdad to launch the missile last week. Unfortunately that is nothing more than an excuse like the excuses heard in various fora at the end of two years of the intifadah, to wit: There was intelligence about the ferment in the territories, but we didn't know the timing.

What was surprising this time was that the Iraqi missile surprise passed in complete silence. Did anyone ask for a commission of inquiry? Did anyone call for the heads of the chief of Aman or Mosad [Central Institute for Intelligence]? Most interesting of all: Why is there silence, too, in our press, which does not lack for certified masochists and has never missed an opportunity to warn about a real or imagined failure? In short, why are they all silent?

This silence, apparently, has two good reasons: One, somehow Iraq, despite the atomic reactor that we destroyed, and despite the lethal poison gas bombs that she dropped on Iran and the Kurds, is still perceived in our consciousness as a distant target, somewhere across the desert. In that sense, unlike Cairo, Rabat 'Amon, and Damascus, Baghdad is not within our immediate field of vision. Were Damascus to launch a missile like that, we would already be turning the world upside down.

The second reason: For a few months now we have been witness in the world-wide intelligence sphere to the greatest failure of the 20th century. Not her royal majesty's James Bond, nor the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]'s spies equipped with the most sophisticated electronics gear, nor even our own guys foresaw what is happening in Central and Eastern Europe. Right in front of our astonished eyes, the Communist empire is crumbling. But no one foresaw it and no one knew. Compared to an intelligence failure of this magnitude, the oversight regarding the Iraqi missile pales into insignificance. At least the CIA had the honesty to admit that the information about the missile was received by them 48 hours late.

The conclusion to be drawn from this is rather dreary and puts all the intelligence services in their rightful place: They, too, don't know everything. So it is with us and so it is with the rest of the world.

We should not deceive ourselves: Baghdad's launch of the missile is but another expression of her military might. As much as we try to repress the fact, Baghdad has at her disposal several dozen armor divisions which

could, in a night or two—even if her ally Husayn doesn't call for them—push across the desert and roll into our eastern border.

Two years after the cease-fire in the Iraq-Iran war, Saddam Husayn, contrary to the forecasts, has not been weakened; rather he has grown unimaginably stronger. Iraq, including its Ba'th party, trembles before him. Iran, which lost the war, is licking its wounds and does not constitute an immediate threat to Iraq. Even the Kurdish rebellion, which so troubled Saddam Husayn to the rear, is meanwhile over, among other things as a result of the death sown there by the Iraqi poison gas bombs. The Iraqi Army, which was tested and perfected in the Iran war, has gotten a supplement of modern weapons, both through imports and its own manufacture.

Saddam Husayn has trouble only with Syria. Therefore he has been tireless in goading it via his aid to the Christians in Lebanon, our former allies. Weapons and ammunition flow from Iraq through the port of Aqaba and the Mediterranean Sea to the Christian port in Junya.

If anyone predicted—and there were those who did so—that Iraq's economy would crumble after the war, that prediction has been turned on its head: Oil exports from Iraq have continuously increased and keep doubling each year. Baghdad's economy is still far from recovery, but it is on the right road.

Despite the above, there is respite from the gloomy forecasts that future clashes between us and Iraq are unavoidable. Even during the course of the Iran war, Baghdad sent some signals that pointed to a readiness to look for a way to a political solution. After the war Baghdad took steps that were interpreted as an attempt to move closer to the pragmatic camp of Egypt and Jordan.

Therefore, even though Baghdad's desire to take vengeance upon us for destroying the nuclear reactor has not yet subsided, and despite her active support for the leadership of the intifadah, our statesmen—Do we have any such beast?—are obliged to ask themselves what can be done to remove Iraq from the circle of violence and wars. The various intelligence agencies will spend additional hours tracking the Iraqi missile industry. But the captains of our ship of state must wink at Saddam Husayn and signal him that we have something to talk about.

So that we aren't taken by surprise yet another time.

#### Iraq Will Reportedly Have Bomb Within Decade

*44230074A Tel Aviv HADASHOT  
in Hebrew 21 Dec 89 p 10*

[Article by Shmu'el Tal]

[Text] The Center for Strategic Studies of the University of Tel Aviv yesterday published its annual military

balance sheet, also containing the strategic political developments in the Middle East.

Iraq: Will develop the atomic bomb within 5-10 years. Stability in her military manpower. The number of divisions grew from 45 to 55, the number of tanks grew from 5,000 to 6,000. The Iraqi stockpile of ground-to-ground missiles grew. The Air Force absorbed new Sukhoi-24's and MIG-29's, and there was a real increase in the number of helicopters.

Syria: Despite her reporting a cut in defense spending, she aims to complete preparations for an independent military option on the Golan Heights by 1990. The number of ground-to-ground missile launchers grew from 54 to 60. All her other launchers are of the SS-21 type. Sukhoi-24 attack planes and new MIG-29's were also delivered.

Jordan: Has exchanged her stationary Hawk missiles for mobile missiles by violating an agreement on this subject with the United States. Jordan's Armed Forces grew by more than 27,000 soldiers. The number of tanks rose by 90, and there was also an increase in the number of Mirage-2000 planes and the number of helicopters.

Territories: No correlation was found between the number of homes destroyed and the number of violent incidents registered in the territories. There is a question as to the deterrent effect of the deportations and destruction of houses on the scope of the intifadah. The intifadah seems to be treading water.

Egypt: Has increased her number of mechanized divisions to seven, and the number of ground-to-ground missile launchers grew from 20 to 24. Egypt has ordered 80 new planes and retired obsolete missile ships and submarines from service. Egypt is developing ground-to-ground missiles with Argentina, Iraq, and experts from Europe.

Iran: Has ordered new weapons to replace the losses she suffered in the war with Iraq. The number of divisions has increased.

Israel: The number of soldiers in the IDF [Israel Defense Force] rose by 60,000, in the reserves. Five new independent infantry brigades were set up, and the number of infantry brigades now stands at 25. The number of tanks is 1,410, after the addition of 170 new ones.

The number of warplanes dropped from 682 to 635. The number of missile ships dropped from 26 to 24.

Kuwait: Has ordered 40 new F-18 warplanes.

Saudi Arabia: Has received additional Tornado planes, and the delivery of such planes and of helicopters continues.

The head of the Center for Strategic Studies, Aharon Yariv, said that despite the tremors and wide-ranging changes in superpower relations on the question of

nonconventional disarmament, and despite the movement now in Europe for the reduction of conventional arms, in the Middle East we have not yet won any revolutionary changes and the picture is rather gloomy.

"We can certainly consider ourselves blessed in that we gave a positive response to the Baker program and came out with a peace initiative, but the diplomatic process has not yet moved off center. The intifadah, which achieved dizzying success in its first year, is now treading water, and the fighting spirit that characterized the Palestinians in the territories has waned. The Palestinian leadership today requires cruel, heavy pressure to revive the intifadah, but the uprising is not over. The IDF has learned to handle the intifadah and has proven that it cannot continue to deal with it over the course of years and confront that burden. Our intelligence services have also found ways to confront the shock groups and have achieved success."

#### The Decisionmakers Are in Tunis

"Even if there should be a meeting of the foreign ministers, we are still far from certain that the peace process is off the ground, and there are still many obstacles along the way. The Palestinians have proven that those who control their affairs don't live in East Jerusalem but in Tunis. I don't believe the Palestinians will take any real step without the concurrence of Tunis.

"Israel's interests in Lebanon were maintained in the past year, and at a low price. We had few casualties and the northern settlements were not hit. Syria made a big military effort and increased her defense expenditures, which emphasizes the offensive option. Syria's objective is 80 MIG-29's, and she has already ordered 48 Sukhoi-24's. This means additional offensive capability for Syria as compared with a drop in the number of Israeli Air Force planes and a decrease of two missile ships in our seas.

"The Soviets have called upon Syria to abandon her effort to reach strategic parity with Israel, and, instead, have urged her to put greater emphasis on defense.

"Iraq today has long-range ground-to-ground missiles and the capability of hitting us. They have also cultivated chemical weapons, and I can state categorically that in the Middle East we have entered the missile age."

#### Relations With UNRWA Deteriorate

44230073A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 22 Dec 89 p 20

[Article by Uri Nir]

[Text] Relations between the Israeli authorities in the territories and the UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East] have never been so tense and troubled. The anger and suspicion that have developed between them since the uprising began in the territories have in recent weeks

reached the point of senior officers in the civil administration accusing UNRWA of impudently deviating from its mandate and even spying on IDF [Israel Defense Force] in the territories.

For their part, UNRWA leaders are accusing Israeli authorities of clear, repeated violations of the immunity to which they are entitled under an agreement with the State of Israel. UNRWA personnel have recently been arrested on several occasions. Some of them were forced to stand for hours facing a wall or sitting on the ground with bowed heads; IDF soldiers have meticulously searched the cars of UNRWA personnel, which were marked with all the UN symbols. And less than two months ago, for the first time since 1967, security forces raided four official UNRWA offices, confiscating printing press items and objects. Sharp letters have recently been sent almost every week from UNRWA headquarters in the West Bank or Gaza to staff officers in the civil administration, or from UNRWA's general staff in Vienna to the Foreign Office in Jerusalem.

The angry statements made by leaders in the security system against UNRWA are no less sharp. This week, a senior security element told us that "what UNRWA has been doing recently borders on spying." A letter sent about two weeks ago from the Foreign Office in Jerusalem to UNRWA's general staff in Vienna charges, in harsh diplomatic language, that the activities of the organization and its personnel in the territories "constitute a serious obstacle to the IDF's execution of security missions in the territories."

The central factor in relations between the authorities in the territories and UNRWA personnel are 16 reconnaissance and supervision teams that UNRWA has been operating in the West Bank and Gaza in recent months. Each team includes a foreign UNRWA employee and a Palestinian of the organization. They travel in white UN cars equipped with communications equipment and large flags of the organization, roving daily in dozens of Palestinian settlements in the territories (not just in the refugee camps). They closely monitor the activity of IDF soldiers, intervene frequently in confrontations between residents and soldiers, submit complaints to the civil administration, and give the Palestinians a feeling that some external element is monitoring what is happening.

In UNRWA, it is said that the entire aim of these teams, called "officers for refugee affairs," is to be concerned with the orderly administration of UNRWA facilities and activities. Incidentally, an UNRWA spokesman in Jerusalem told us that these officers also "keep an eye on what is happening," in order to help mediate, or serve as a liaison, between the Army and the local population.

In the civil administration, it is said that the significance of the teams is unequivocal: The teams are an attempt to introduce "through the back door," supervisory forces and international observers, as the Palestinians have sought to do since the uprising erupted.

The activation of "officers for refugee affairs" is no doubt a qualitative change of great significance in UNRWA's policy. It joins a series of changes made since the uprising started in UNRWA's modus operandi. This modus operandi is becoming increasingly distant from the definition of the organization's duties, which have been determined by agreement and custom between it and the Government of Israel.

After the 1967 War, when Israel gained control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, UNRWA ceased coordinating its refugee services in these areas with the Jordanian and Egyptian governments. The organization turned to the Israeli Government, signing with it an agreement to arrange coordination and cooperation. On 14 June 1967, the "Mitchelmoore-Qomey Agreement" was signed between Lawrence Mitchelmoore, then commissioner general of UNRWA, and Mikha'el Qomey, a political advisor to the foreign minister at the time. The agreement did not explicitly define UNRWA's authorities, but it determined that "the Government of Israel shall facilitate UNRWA's functioning to the best of its ability, subject only to the regulations or arrangements likely to be required as a result of military security considerations." The Government of Israel is obliged by the agreement to continue the arrangements that prevailed between the Jordanian and Egyptian governments and UNRWA, to be concerned with the security and defense of workers and property, and to enable UNRWA personnel to move freely in the territories and in Israel.

From 1967 until two years ago, relations between UNRWA and the authorities were correct and sufficiently easygoing. There was a high level of coordination between them, and the relative calm which prevailed in the region for 20 years contributed to quiet relations. The anger directed at the UNRWA administration during that period stemmed ironically from the distress of the Palestinian refugee population over a gradual reduction in UNRWA welfare services owing to budget cuts. When the amount of food distributed to the refugees was limited about four years ago, groups of residents demonstrated in front of UNRWA offices. When the security authorities closed several youth clubs in the refugee camps, Palestinian youths charged that UNRWA was not exerting enough pressure on the authorities to reopen the clubs. The Palestinian accusers claimed that UNRWA was neither efficient nor useful. Others claimed that the services provided by UNRWA encouraged dependency and passivity among the refugee population.

The great change occurred when it became clear that the uprising in the territories was not another passing violent outburst, but an on-going popular movement requiring many resources and as much broad assistance as possible. The new policy was expressed officially in the annual report of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to the Security Council in January 1988: "UNRWA is well placed to offer additional general aid. I believe that the international (foreign) team of UNRWA can currently play an especially important role. Usually, it is

easier for them to approach the Israeli authorities in emergency situations. Their very presence in foci of confrontation exercises a significant influence on the manner in which the security forces relate to the civilian population, and it also helps the civilian population to feel less vulnerable psychologically."

The same report no longer defines UNRWA's mission as providing monetary aid, as was the case in the past. Rather, its function is defined as part of "general aid, in which an external body intervenes with the authorities of the occupying force to help individuals or groups oppose violations of their rights (such as the expropriation of land) and cope with the daily difficulties of life under occupation, such as security restrictions, curfews, oppression, bureaucratic difficulties, and so on." In stating this, the UN secretary general actually gave the signal to begin the politicization of UNRWA, which is supposed to supply only monetary services. Accordingly, UNRWA's administration mobilized quickly to provide a corresponding response in the field.

In February 1988, the organization's administration met in Vienna to discuss ways to apply the new operating policies. An increase in the organization's budget permitted an expansion of its scope of activity. The international community's pressure in favor of UNRWA playing a more active role in the territories (expressed in General Assembly directives) required a new definition of the character of UNRWA's activity. At the end of the same month, UNRWA's committee of contributors held a meeting in Vienna, in which new tones were suddenly heard. UNRWA leaders began to speak in a political language. Among other things, they said that, given the situation in the territories, the United Nations in general, and UNRWA in particular, should consider new means to bring the parties to the conflict closer to a political solution, and to even "lend genuine support to the political initiatives of governments" (from a document presented to participants in an informal meeting in the committee's framework.)

The committee's main, practical message was that the number of international workers in the territories should be increased.

The recommendation was accepted, and the UNRWA administration added 12 new positions to its staff of permanent workers in the West Bank and Gaza. The 12 new workers, UN officers employed on the basis of 6-month contracts, were designated "officers for refugee affairs."

An Irish officer with the rank of major was appointed to lead them. The position was new and its definition is sufficiently flexible. In response to a question by an Italian journalist after the committee meeting in Vienna, UNRWA's Deputy Secretary, Mr Eagleton, stated that this was a matter of 10 teams in the West Bank and another five in Gaza, whose duty would be to "watch, report, and assist in mediating between the authorities and the residents. They are performing an important

activity, but they should not be treated as a 'peacekeeping force.'" They are therefore not formally supposed to separate or mediate between quarrelers.

Last Friday, in Moti Kirschenbaum's report on YOMAN HASHAVUA' regarding the actions of IDF soldiers in Khun Yunus, the entire population of Israel was able to see on television how these officers operate. An UNRWA person, who was observing a confrontation developing between a group of soldiers and residents from the area, set himself against the military commander, insistently demanding explanations for the behavior of IDF soldiers at the site. In making his arguments, he explained that he thought that the IDF soldiers were unnecessarily provoking residents and inciting an unnecessary conflict.

The junior Israeli officer in this encounter, who was in a defensive position, began to explain to the UN person, with the greatest deference, that bottles had been thrown at the soldiers before the confrontation, and that the inciters were actually Palestinians. Israeli commanders are not required by any law or directive to report to UNRWA personnel about their current security activity, and UNRWA's mandate contains no article that authorizes its workers to intervene in current events of this type. The new officers for refugee affairs are interfering in current security action daily, not incidentally, as UNRWA spokesmen attempt to claim. Senior IDF officers state that these teams customarily report to their staff on developments in the field by radio (since October of last year, UNRWA has begun to equip its vehicles in the area with communications apparatus), and they have also become accustomed to photographing the actions of IDF soldiers in the territories in sensitive situations.

The presence of monitoring officers in the field greatly angers IDF forces, who sometimes use immoderate means against them. On 15 August 1989, for example, IDF soldiers arrested one of these monitoring officers and his Palestinian escort in the 'Askar Refugee Camp next to Nablus. They had them both stand for a long time with their faces to a wall. They subsequently forced them to sit on the ground for a long time, refusing to converse with them or listen to their pleading. Finally, they transported them to be investigated at the administration's building in Nablus. In the civil administration and in UNRWA, one often hears that arguments between monitoring officers and IDF officers often come close to an exchange of blows.

The employment of the new monitoring officers is not the only new development in UNRWA's activity in the territories. The new definition of UNRWA's role, which specifies the provision of "general aid" to the residents, including the provision of services to the nonrefugee population, contrasts with that of the past. UNRWA now customarily supplies food to residents of settlements subject to a continuous curfew, even if they lack a refugee population (e.g., during the continuous curfew at Bayt Sahur), despite the authorities' anger. An UNRWA

spokesman acknowledges this, and states that he does not see any problem in an international monetary element coming to the monetary aid of residents confined to their homes coercively for a protracted period.

As in many cases during the intifadah, the authorities are most troubled not by another several thousand Palestinians receiving food parcels, or by several monitoring teams roaming about the territories, but by the symbolic value of these acts and the image which they evoke. The expansion of UNRWA's scope of activity to include nonrefugee populations, and the presence of UN flags and symbols in foci of confrontation, create the image of an international buffer force positioned in a war area. "Lebanonization" or "a Lebanese likeness" are current terms among senior members of the civil administration in this context.

"The motives to expand activity in this direction are political," one stated to us, "and they reflect UNRWA's politicization, by which it is gradually changing into a sort of arm of the PLO. We are afraid of going all the way with them. There is sensitivity when a UN organization is involved."

An UNRWA spokesman in Jerusalem rejects these arguments, stating "we are not managing the local office of the PLO here, and we have no political motives." According to him, most claims made by Israeli elements against UNRWA stem from a lack of information and from misconceptions about the organization's activity.

An expression of one such misconception, according to UNRWA's general spokesman in Vienna, William Lee, is the content of a letter sent recently by Israel's Foreign Office to UNRWA's administration. Its wording, not the most delicate or diplomatic, surprised UNRWA leaders, and will certainly be discussed in depth when the commissioner general of the organization, Giorgio Giacomelli, visits Israel in about three weeks. The coordinator of government activities in the territories, Shmu'el Goren, will certainly tell him, as he told us this week, that the authorities "are interested in continuing relations as they have existed so far, but they will not agree to UNRWA becoming a political factor in the area and deviating from its mandate."

However, while contacts are being held at the diplomatic level, frictions continue in the field. It is difficult for UNRWA personnel to understand why the leaders of the Israeli administration become enraged about a few more UN flags flying here and there. Israeli authorities, on the other hand, find it difficult to understand why UNRWA personnel become enraged when the IDF established a new observation post several weeks ago on the roof of the building used by UNRWA in the 'Aqabat-Jabir Refugee Camp next to Jericho. Right next to the large light blue and white UN flag, IDF soldiers hoisted the blue and white Israeli flag, as is customary at IDF observation positions in the territories. Suddenly, it was somewhat difficult to distinguish between the two flags, which fluttered in the wind, one beside the other.

**Israelis 'Indifferent' to Intifadah**

*44230077A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 26 Dec 89 p 13*

[Article by 'Uri Nir]

[Text] The third year of the intifadah, Faysal al-Husayni said about 2 weeks ago, will be the year of the Palestinian struggle for Israeli public opinion. In the first year, al-Husayni added, the Palestinians mobilized European community support; in the second year, they won considerable diplomatic gains in the American arena. What is left to achieve in the third year of the uprising is the support of Israeli public opinion.

However, every passing day increases the suspicion that the Palestinians have already lost the third struggle. Not only do Israelis tend to express less and less political support for the Palestinian cause, but their human interest in what is occurring in the territories is ebbing. Expressions of Israeli concern about human rights violations in the territories, which had intensified in the first stages of the uprising, are now almost nonexistent. The power of habit is gaining the upper hand over the power of shock and anxiety about continued evil in the territories.

The security authorities and the political branch won their biggest victory in their campaign against the intifadah by turning the struggle in the territories into a war of attrition. The attrition worked to a great extent against Palestinian society, but it had a far greater impact on Israeli society. Many observers, who believed that during the long-lasting intifadah the uprising would rouse the Israeli public against its ramifications on the military and on the rest of society, were proven wrong.

Palestinian intellectuals, who for the past 2 years have been puzzling over the question of why the intifadah message has failed to penetrate Israeli awareness, now understand that the problem does not lie with the transmitting, but with the receiving side. The addressee is simply not interested in listening.

This piece of information is increasingly spreading among the Palestinian leadership, accompanied by great frustration. The Palestinian activists, who organized the peace demonstration scheduled to take place around the Jerusalem walls next Saturday, viewed it as a great achievement that Peace Now agreed to mobilize its supporters for the demonstration. That had not been a bygone conclusion in the least. They decided to hold the event only after it was clear beyond a doubt that several hundred European supporters (mostly from Italy) would come especially in order to participate. They did not rely on massive Israeli participation.

Last week, the Parisian Arab weekly AL-YAWM AL-SABI' carried an interview with Yasir 'Arafat to mark the second intifadah anniversary.

The interviewer, Bilal al-Hasan (brother of prominent PLO figures Khalid and Hani al-Hasan), asked 'Arafat:

"Israel is now behaving as if the intifadah didn't have an effect on Israeli citizens; do you agree with this statement?" 'Arafat, as is his custom, did not answer the question itself but asked the interviewer if he didn't believe that joint prayer by Jewish, Muslim, and Christian clergy in Bayt Sahur had an impact on Israel, and added, "It is not the extreme right in Israel, like Shamir's party, that anger me. Three religious parties—SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim], Agudat Yisra'el, and Degel Hatora—which have 13 seats in Parliament—now support Labor in seeking a peace solution. Together with them, Labor could form a government." That is 'Arafat's hope now, namely a narrow alignment government with the participation of the religious parties.

Dr Sari Nusaybah, who was interviewed for the same issue, suggested hammering out an organized, detailed propaganda program directed at the Israeli public, and examining proposals to use the Israeli media or Jordanian television broadcasts in Hebrew "to appeal, in a frank and moderate manner to the man in the street, with a view to persuading him that the intifadah is not designed to rule over him, as Shamir claims, but that it is a white revolution, a constructive revolution for peace."

It is difficult to see the source of this Palestinian optimism in view of the patent Israeli collective indifference to the ethical corruption of the authorities' policies in the territories, the systematic human rights violations, and the miscarriage of justice in the territories. Not only the political consensus remained in place during these past two years, but also consensus concerning the humanitarian and moral aspects of the situation in the territories. Similarly, the gradual seeping of the procedures and habits guiding Israeli policies in the territories into Israeli society did not create a strong opposition movement within that society. The great majority of the Israeli public does not appear troubled by the fact that in the past two years the authorities issued over 9,000 administrative arrest warrants against Palestinians in the territories, without charges, without trial, and without the opportunity for a proper legal defense; six Palestinians were killed by security forces last week, another detainee died in unclear circumstances in the General Security ward of a Gaza jail, and 31 people were wounded by troop fire over the weekend. All this was dwarfed by the news of the thousands of victims of the revolution in Romania.

The Palestinians in the territories are aware of the growing indifference among the Israeli public. Various factors, especially inside the territories, have been offering suggestions aimed at escalating the struggle. The circle of Palestinians in favor of stepping up the use of violence is increasing, and many in the territories, mostly young people, are urging the leadership to take off their gloves and open a selective armed campaign against Israeli targets: first against military targets, then perhaps against civilian targets, too.

It is difficult to convince those young people that such actions will erase whatever remnant of Israeli public support there may be.

Many of those young activists, not only radical leftists, crazies, or hooligans, are despairing of ever winning such support.

**Security Measures Allegedly Spawn Violent Cells**  
*44230073C Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 22 Dec 89 p 13*

[Article by Dani Rubenstein: "Informers Shall Have No Hope"]

[Text] More than 150 Arabs suspected of "collaboration" (or aiding the authorities, according to the broadcast authority) have been murdered in the territories since the intifadah began. The vast majority, about 130, were murdered in the last two months. In other words, almost no collaborators were murdered for a year and a half, and now three to four are murdered weekly. Such a change does not occur coincidentally. Just as the eruption of the intifadah can be attributed to special political, social, and economic circumstances that developed two years ago, the growing murder rate of collaborators can be attributed to a special situation that began to take shape in the field seven to eight months ago.

There were, and are, manifestations of spontaneity in the intifadah. It erupted spontaneously, without mechanisms or commands (the PLO has been attempting to provoke a popular uprising in the territories since Israeli rule began). Many elements of spontaneity—i.e., a lack of advance planning and organization—also characterize the murder of "collaborators." In recent months, matters have developed to the extent that the PLO published a series of reservations about these murders. Some of the murder victims, whom the security system claims are unknown to it, are indeed not "collaborators." The victims also include criminals, such as drug dealers, thieves, fences, and fraudulent real estate brokers. In other words, not all of the victims are "collaborators" in the sense of informers, and some fell victim to religious fanatics, members of the "strike committees," and other hoodlums who volunteer to substitute for the police who resigned in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, among the 150 murdered, there are many informers or persons considered informers. Such persons constitute the majority of the victims in recent months.

In order to understand how the wave of homicides began, one must go back to April-May 1989. In that period, the IDF [Israel Defense Force] initiated extensive operations to arrest intifadah activists in villages, and in the neighborhoods of cities and refugee camps in the territories ("Operation Burning the Hametz" [operation purge] was the military designation of this comprehensive military operation). Of course, prior to that, intifadah activists had been arrested. However, the youths who organize the different popular committees only began to become prominent after more than a year of continuous disturbances. It is these youths whom the

IDF and the security services have been attempting to apprehend. Lists of several hundred "wanted persons" were compiled and updated, and methods were developed in the security system to capture them. The operations were not simple then or now. When army and security units approach villages or surround neighborhoods or refugee camps, most of the youths flee, including those who are sought. The pressure on the wanted youths has increased as a function of the security system's use of sophisticated methods (units in civilian dress, in Arab vehicles, disguised as journalists, tourists, etc.). These youths have fled their homes and hidden alone or in groups in the homes of friends and relatives, and in hiding places, such as ruins, abandoned houses, and even in caves.

The IDF and the security system see a certain advantage in pursuing the "wanted" constantly and persistently. In so doing, they do not act against the entire population participating in the intifadah, but rather only against the youths leading it. They do not arrest every youth who throws rocks, but only the youths who organize other youths. In this way, they are attempting, sometimes successfully, to separate the activists and leaders from the broad public. Thus, there is a chance (as slim as it might be) of separating the intifadah activists from the general population.

However, this method has a major shortcoming. For a long time, most youthful intifadah activists participated only "part time" in incidents. They went to work, a few went to school (almost nonexistent in the territories), and they lived at home. Occasionally, they went out to throw rocks, organize strikes and demonstrations, and distribute leaflets. When they were wanted by the authorities and consequently forced to flee their homes, they made the transition to "full time." Obviously, they have no opportunity to go to work or school, and, instead of living at home, they cluster together with their friends. In this way, groups such as "Red Eagle" or "Black Panther" have arisen, becoming a typical phenomenon only in recent months.

Thus, paradoxically, the pressure exerted by the security system is creating the most dangerous cells of the intifadah. From now on, this development is inevitable. Groups of wanted persons are going underground. They are becoming more defined and violent. The security services are recruiting more and more "collaborators" to be able to capture them. In such a struggle, firearms are used to a greater degree. In a series of incidents, when security personnel discerned a wanted person attempting to flee, they shot him, injuring or killing him. The army is also giving firearms to some "collaborators," who are using them. Those being sought are also acquiring rifles and pistols. We will likely see more clashes involving firearms in the scope of the intifadah.

In the meantime, a bloody battle has developed between cells and groups of wanted on the one hand, and collaborators and informers of different types on the other. Whenever those sought by the security authorities feel

the ring tightening around them, they attempt to locate the betrayer in their environment who provided authorities with details to secure their apprehension. Whenever the security system uncovers a hiding place or wanted persons, and attempts to strike them, the latter respond with an act of revenge against persons suspected of "collaboration."

A similar phenomenon existed in Gaza in 1969 and 1970, when cells of wanted persons murdered dozens of suspected collaborators. In that period, the conditions prevailing in Gaza made a military solution possible. In the West Bank and Gaza of the intifadah, it is doubtful whether similar military solutions to the murder of "collaborators" can be found. For the time being, this has become an aspect of the intifadah as it completes its second year.

### New Police Commissioner Profiled

**44230076A Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 19 Dec 89 p 5**

[Article by Natan Ro'i]

[Excerpts] On Monday morning, on his way to the weekly meeting of the senior command staff, Ya'akov Trener, 54, was informed on the telephone that he had been selected to be the next commissioner of Israel's Police Force. He told me: "I am convinced that the positive and professional atmosphere that prevailed in the police in the past few years will continue to prevail in the future." [passage omitted]

Ya'akov Trener was born in 1935 in Kefar Yona. He joined the IDF [Israel Defense Force] in 1953, where he served as a fighter pilot and later as flight instructor and course commander of the school for pilots. The "Uragan" squadron, whose commanding officer he was, reaped great victories in the 6-Day War. During the war of attrition he commanded a bombing squadron of Vautour planes. In 1972 he was appointed commander of the school of pilots with the rank of colonel. By 1976 he was head of the Air Force Training Department; one year later he was appointed commander of the Hatzerim base and promoted to brigadier general. In 1981 he was put in charge of the Air Force Manpower Department.

In 1985 he retired from the IDF and joined the Police Force as head of the Department of Personnel. He became the minister's favorite from the moment he joined the police and received special treatment. He reciprocated to the minister, and was the only commander who supported him against the Police Office Comptroller, Major General (Reserve) Avraham 'Edan, when the latter presented his famous ethics report to the senior police staff. Trener was graduated from the Ben-Gurion University with a degree in behavioral sciences. During the time he served as head of the Personnel Department he was known for his concern for policemen; he acted in behalf of their welfare and built housing for them in Yavne. Also good at public relations, he advertised the fact. Trener is not a man of extremes. He has succeeded in gaining a wide circle of supporters

among the officers. The open-door policy he practiced as head of the Manpower Department brought to his office most of the officers who retired from the National Headquarters for the fraud investigations that took place under Yoram Gonen. Nevertheless, Trener did not manage to prevent the retirement of 46 staff officers and police officials, a mass retirement unprecedented at that or similar units.

Officers who worked with him at the Central District know him as a man willing to learn, willing to listen to everyone, and capable of "getting the best out of what's available," as they put it. There is no doubt that Commander Ya'akov Trener knows how to combine administration with common sense and public relations, otherwise there is no explanation for his meteoric ascent, within five years, to being the No. 1 policeman in the country.

### Military Industries Instructed To Reprofile

**44230072D Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 21 Dec 89 p 3**

[Article by 'On Levi, Military Correspondent for DAVAR]

[Text] The defense establishment has directed the defense industries in Israel to look for new production channels in order to increase efforts at marketing civilian products throughout the world.

In the estimation of the defense establishment, defense industries that do not reprofile to the manufacture of civilian products are likely to be hit with crisis and collapse. This situation results from the world-wide process of arms reduction and IDF [Israel Defense Force] hardship.

"There is already irreparable damage in the industries, and they will now be forced to increase efficiency and fire more workers," said the same sources in the defense establishment.

In the United States and Europe the defense industry is being reduced, and many plants are retooling for the manufacture of civilian products. The reductions in the United States are likely to affect Israel as well, according to defense establishment estimates.

They also say within the defense establishment that thus far about 16,000 workers have been fired in all defense industries over the last five years. The trend of firing and reduction will continue in the coming year, as well.

Within the defense establishment they explain that for every NIS [new Israeli shekels] 100 million that are spent on the uprising and that are not covered by the Treasury, the system will have to fire between 500 and 1,000 workers.

At REFA'EL [Combat Means Development Authority] 250 additional workers will soon be fired. REFA'EL is in very difficult straits and is suffering from a quarter-million dollar deficit.

The number of orders for export is satisfactory and is in the range of more than \$3 billion. Israel exports defense equipment to about 70 countries, and some of those countries have already absorbed their potential. Israel therefore needs to find new channels.

**Military Budget Priorities Examined**  
*44230072A Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR  
in Hebrew 15 Dec 89 p 15*

[Article by Avi Tomkin]

[Text] Up until a few days ago the Treasury and Defense ministries had managed to keep a low profile in everything having to do with the debate surrounding the question of next year's defense budget. The IDF [Israel Defense Force] has asked for an extension in 1990/91 of the NIS [new Israeli shekels] 300 million that it got this year for its activities in the territories. In 89/90 the monies were transferred to the Army on the basis of an agreement for a "one-time" supplement and with the understanding that those monies would not be requested again in the following fiscal year. On the basis of that understanding Treasury officials asked for termination of the supplement in 90/91 and even requested further cuts. The Treasury people made no secret of their feeling that the defense establishment should "absorb" the costs of the intifadah and cover them from its own sources.

But Treasury Minister Shim'on Peres did not warm to the battle and even less so to a fight with Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin. The attempts at persuasion by his deputy Yosi Beilin and by the Bank of Israel director Mikha'el Bruno, who pushed to have Peres confront Rabin and vigorously supported the stance of senior officialdom at Treasury, were to no avail. The budget branch at Treasury moved to the attack and prepared a proposal in which the period of regular military service would be cut by 6 months and discharge from the reserves would be moved up. Peres rejected that proposal, too.

This week the debate broke wide open. Senior officials at Treasury and the Bank of Israel unbuttoned their lips and talked about the minister's hesitation in the face of declarations by the Bank director and senior officialdom at Treasury. Bruno hinted at the debate being waged in a lecture that he gave last Friday in Tel Aviv, in which he called for a defense cut in the wake of global developments and the drop in defense spending in Syria.

On Wednesday of this week Bruno visited Peres, accompanied by some of the most senior officials of the Bank, and they all tried once again to persuade Peres that defense has to be cut. A deficit of 3 billion in the budget planned for next year is simply too big, said Bruno and his entourage. They tried to explain to Peres that they had to cut another NIS billion in addition to the 1 and ½ billion that Peres is trying to cut next year.

Bruno warned the minister of a rise in inflation and quoted to him the results of research about to be published in the next few weeks showing that in the neighboring Arab states over the last few years there has been a real drop in defense spending, with the leader in that process being none other than Syria.

Those who are familiar with the research claim that its writers, Victor Laviv and Eli'ezer Shefer, came to the conclusion that the cuts in the Arab countries were actually relatively small, and the level of military expenditure in Syria, Jordan, and Egypt is still close to and even a bit higher than in 1982. But Israel can encourage the process of additional reduction in armament expenses by cutting her own defense spending. If the results of the research are correct, then the crumbling Arab economies are crying out for an opportunity to lower their level of military expenditures.

The initial results of the research were transmitted a few months ago to Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir and to the defense establishment. There they say that the data emphasized the difficult economic circumstances, but presented no conclusions as to cuts in defense spending in Israel. Bruno, despite that, derived precisely the opposite impression—that it is now possible to begin such cuts.

A few minutes after Bruno left Peres' office, he was visited by the Chief of Staff Dan Shomron, Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin and the general director of his ministry David 'Ivri. To the consternation of the Treasury officials, Peres did not even mention the demand for a cut in defense spending and made do simply listening to Shomron's demands for additional budgets of NIS 300 million next year to finance actions against the intifadah.

In light of the past attempt, there is a strong impression that Treasury officialdom has brought the debate out into the open and the demand for a large cut in the defense establishment as a way to pressure the military. At Treasury they are simply asking that the defense establishment not bring up a request for additional budgets, and Treasury, for its part, will not raise a demand for budget cuts. Treasury is asking, thus, that the military absorb the costs of the intifadah. From that point of view Tzvi Shur, former financial advisor to the chief of staff, was correct when he claimed that it is very difficult to achieve true cuts on the basis of a hasty decision just months after the government authorized the IDF's multiyear program.

It should be pointed out that joining the debate this time are the senior officials at Treasury, headed by Peres' deputy and favorite, Yosi Beilin. For several weeks Beilin has been trying to persuade Peres of the need to deal with the problem of defense spending. Beilin has different priorities. This week he aired his views publicly during the course of a study day at the budget branch

held in Jerusalem. Beilin spoke up for defense cuts, but not as a peripheral or one-time process, rather as part of a multiyear process.

The deputy Treasury Minister in fact thereby joined a long list of personages from all political camps who argue that there is need for a new set of priorities in the military. Even in the preceding term, that was the opinion of a special committee of the Foreign and Defense Committee, headed by Dan Meridor, a member of Likud. Beilin did not hide his support for implementing the recommendations of the Meridor committee. He claimed that there is simply no running away from the process of cuts and the reorganization of the IDF and a fresh look at the order of battle. The deputy Minister stressed that there is simply no other way to bring about true recovery in the economy.

Proof of the fact that Beilin criticism is shared not only by the doves is the opposition among several members of the Knesset finance, foreign, and defense committees to automatic approval of a NIS 150 million budget supplement to finance the intifadah. The monies were transferred to the budget of the current fiscal year and authorized finally in a joint session of the two committees. Some of the MK's [Knesset member] voted against, arguing that they did not know what the money was intended for and that the military had not bothered to update them on details of the multiyear program. Among the objectors was none other than MK Benny Begin, the close friend of Justice Minister Dan Meridor and someone far removed in his politics from Yosi Beilin.

For the defense establishment this is the real threat and not the hasty one-time request from Treasury officials for immediate cuts. The military can still deal with demands of this latter sort, but long-term demands connected with what is happening in the world, with the need for "smart" systems and with the need to cut the order of battle in a planned fashion will be hard for Rabin and Shomron to swallow.

The defense establishment needs to understand that within the next few years there will be talks in the U.S. on wide-scale cuts in U.S. defense spending. What that means in practice for Israel is a cut in military assistance, which today stands at \$1.8 billion a year. Only an establishment that knows how to adjust to a possible cut of several hundred million dollars over several years will be able to deal with the missions of providing for Israel's defense in the circumstances that will be created in the future.

#### **Demographic Plan Not Implemented**

*44230077E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 25 Dec 89 p 6*

[Text] During the years 1988-89 the northern and southern districts lost about 23,000 Jewish inhabitants to internal emigration. The Haifa and Tel Aviv districts, too, lost population for the same reason. The two districts that gained Jewish inhabitants as a result of

internal moves were the central region and areas in Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. These are the findings of a new study by Dr Eliyahu Borokhov of the Tel Aviv University School of Economics. The topic of the study was "Trends in Population Distribution."

Dr Borokhov noted that the picture emerging from his study is that "trends in population distribution, as they occur in practice, are considerably different from the trends targeted by the government in its relevant plan."

Dr Borokhov examined the data in relation to a national plan adopted by the government in 1972. The plan established objectives for the distribution of a population of 5 million people by 1992, the year in which, according to forecasts, the Israeli population will reach that figure.

Prominent deviations from the plan's expectations include a far lower rate of population growth in northern and southern districts, especially since 1982, when the drop in the Jewish population in those areas was noted, and on the other hand, a far greater growth in the central region.

In 1988 the Jewish population in the central region was larger by about 170,000 people than the 1972 demographic plan envisaged.

The 1988 figures show that the Jewish population in the northern region makes up less than 50 percent of the overall population.

Among the reasons that Dr Borokhov found for the nonimplementation of the governmental demographic plan is paucity of resources: "In the past decade there was a considerable fall in the growth rate of the Jewish population. In point of fact, during 4 of the last 10 years the net population influx was negative. That is, the number of people coming in was lower than the number of people leaving. Similarly, in the same period there was a considerable drop in economic growth. The 6- to 7-percent growth rate of the 1960's and early 1970's dropped to 1 to 2 percent annually. When resources are few and the population growth rate is low, it is difficult to steer people to development areas," the researcher concluded.

Another reason he cited for the sharp deviation from the plan's objectives was the fact that resources were diverted to development in the territories: "In recent years, especially since 1977, the government concentrated on settling Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. This means that advantages were granted to industrial investors in development areas, to plants erected in Judaea and Samaria; advantages were also granted to people settling in Judaea and Samaria in areas close to the center of the country, and they were far more attractive than the ones obtainable in the Negev and in the Galilee," Dr Borokhov noted.

To that the researcher also added the construction plan approved by the government in the past decade in the

central region, which permitted extensive construction in areas like Rishon LeZiyyon, Ra'anana, Kefar Saba, Natanya, and Yavne. Recently, additional construction projects were approved in Modi'in and Rosh Ha'Ayin.

"Those projects run counter to the national demographic plan, and the fact that they were approved demonstrates that the government doesn't feel responsible for implementing the population distribution plan," the researcher stressed in his conclusion.

**'Amos Gilbo'a Analyzes 'Aliya, Demographic Balances**

*90OL0184B Tel Aviv MA'ARIV  
in Hebrew 21 Dec 89 p 14*

[Article: "The Arabs and Jewish Immigration"]

[Text] "The demographic factor is a source of power that the Zionist entity aspires to strengthen among Jews and neutralize completely among the Arabs. Simultaneously, the Arab-Palestinian side is striving to reduce the Zionist entity's demographic power source so as to weaken and even drown it in an Arab or Palestinian human sea. In other words, given the disturbance—to the Arab side's advantage—in the demographic balance in the conflict between the Zionist settlement invasion and the Arab region, one can assume that Israel's most extreme goal is to prevent the Arab side from maximally exploiting its human power in the confrontation with it. If the Arab side succeeds in exploiting the demographic power source, it could besiege the Zionist presence in Palestine and transform it, in the relatively distant future, into a small, almost nonexistent point on the demographic map of the Arab region."

This excerpt is taken from a wide-ranging article appearing in the PLO's official monthly published in Cyprus. One can find everything in it: How the other side views and characterizes us, and how it sees the hoped-for end—a small point, a speck of dust, which could be erased from the face of the earth with a light punch and a wave of the hand, thereby wiping clean the Middle East slate.

Above all, the article expresses the fundamental Arab concept that the Arabs will ultimately triumph, that Palestine will be redeemed in a demographic trial, and that the refugees returning to it will redeem it with their historical merit. One school in the Arab world maintains that history, with a kind of incontestable divine judgment, will act in favor of the Arabs and do the work of their righteous; therefore, it is necessary to let history play out freely and bounce along independently, and to wait for results. Such a view is similar to the joke about the man with a diseased limb. All the doctors advise amputation, until finally, a doctor is found who sets him at ease by saying that amputation is unnecessary, because it will fall off by itself!

Another, more current school maintains that the historical trend indeed favors the Arabs, but that this trend must be aided, coaxed, and hastened, for example:

- By taking a series of measures to quicken natural increase among the Palestinians in the "territories" and inside the "Green Line," and to prevent their immigration;
- By acting politically and diplomatically in the United Nations and among its members to prevent Jewish immigration to Israel.
- By filling Israeli society with despair, splitting it, undermining its belief in the merit of Zionism, and promoting Jewish immigration from Israel. (It is interesting that Israeli society's two political extremes are satisfying the Arabs in this respect: The extreme left with its pious support of "Palestinian rightness," and the extreme right with its messianic dreams. The work of the wicked is being done by others).
- By using all means to take advantage of the deep-seated Jewish fear of the Arabs (Shaykh 'Abdallah, the leader of the Islamic movement in Israel, once told me: "'Amos, you fear the Arab masses. You are afraid!'), our excessive sensitivity to loss, and our stubborn adherence (except regarding traffic accidents apparently) to the supreme value of human life, which we view as the basis of our moral force, and which the Arabs view as our weakness. When the Arabs carefully consider, for example, what we are willing to do for the sake of our prisoners, they rub their eyes in disbelief and their hands in glee, as believers in the abundant wells of extortion which have been carved out for them. (Incidentally, anything published recently to the effect that we supplied arms and spare parts to Iran is simply erroneous nonsense!).
- By adhering, of course, to the sacred "right of return" of the 1 million plus persons who became refugees in 1948. The PLO consoles the anxious among us by saying that not all, only some, of the refugees will return! Indeed, enough to drown us in an Arab sea inside the "Green Line," as the article states.

It seems that within the darkness of our problems and situation, history has begun to smile upon us and to act in our favor with the opening of the doors of mass immigration from the Soviet Union. The Arabs view this as a deviation from history's normal course as they see it. They see it as a disaster, a holocaust, which is liable to nullify, in the foreseeable future, all their efforts and hopes. In their view, this development changes, to their disadvantage, the balance of forces between Israel and the Arab states and between Israel and the Palestinians vis-a-vis the oscillating intifadah. They will do everything in their political power to slow, stop, and torpedo immigration.

What is the stand of Israeli society in the face of this historical challenge? This is the question. Is history slipping away from us? Is it proving that it favors the Arabs?

**Update on Settlers' Activities, Plans**

**44230072E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ**  
*in Hebrew 22 Dec 89 p 2B*

[Article by Nadav Shragai]

[Text] A thousand Jews have been added to the Jewish population of the territories during the two years of the intifadah, and at the end of 1989 they numbered about 85,000. In terminology borrowed from the world of sports we might say that had someone suggested that outcome at the end of two years of the intifadah to the people of the territories, they would have signed up for it on the spot. Their forecasts at the beginning of the uprising were pessimistic. In an internal document by one of the heads of the territories it was expected in 1988 that about 10 percent of the Jewish settlers would leave Judaea and Samaria, and that there would be a wave of cancellations for purchase contracts from contractors who had built apartments in the settlements. But that pessimistic outlook proved mistaken.

Two thousand housing units are now in various stages of construction in the territories. Most of them are in municipal areas. Three hundred are in the new town of Betar, which the Housing Ministry is erecting for an Orthodox population from Southwest Jerusalem on the road to Gush 'Etzion. The additional population assumed by the Judaea-Samaria-Gaza council by the end of 1990 will number about 10,000 settlers; by this reckoning the overall total will therefore be about 95,000. Demand is now outstripping supply, and the expected wave of immigration is adding to the optimism of the heads of Gush Emunim and the Judaea-Samaria-Gaza council.

Today, after 24 months of the intifadah, the Gush Emunim people can smile. In contrast to the professional forecasts, which expected a waning of ideological settlement, the percentage of ideological settlers among the residents in the new settlements has again increased, and the profit-motivated settlers (those who are seeking quality living, the "five minutes from Kfar Saba" people") continue to arrive, despite the intifadah, though at a lower rate. According to one of the accepted codes for deciphering the motives of the new participants in the past year, we might speculate that it has to do, in fact, with a wider circle of settlement sympathizers, who, until now, have resided within the borders of the Green Line. According to this viewpoint, the intifadah simply aroused a feeling of responsibility in these people, and they decided to realize their faith at precisely this time.

The people of Judaea-Samaria-Gaza feel that the immigrants will be the story of 1990 even where they are, and, perhaps, precisely there. Approximately 25 percent of all the settlers in the territories are immigrants from the USSR. On this basis the Judaea-Samaria-Gaza council is now building an absorption system: 500 vacant housing units have already been prepared to absorb immigrants, especially temporary structures that served

settlers who have moved to permanent housing. Hundreds of families have vacated one or two rooms in their homes and agreed to accept new immigrants in them. For the somewhat longer term, the plans within the Judaea-Samaria-Gaza council are to bring another 2,000 structures, apparently wood houses, that would be imported from Europe at relatively low cost. Ari'el Sharon and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry expressed their readiness to help in everything having to do with the creation of work places and the establishment of new plants. Settlement representatives have set up mobile offices outside the airport, and they approach the immigrants during their first hours in Israel. Emisaries of the Bney Aqiba' movement went to the USSR to bring the "good news of Israeli settlement to our brothers in the diaspora." In Gush Emunim they talk about half a million immigrants over the next three years. Their numbers are a lot higher than the 100,000 that Uri Gordon predicts for that same timeframe. The goal indicated there is 100,000 immigrants to Judaea-Samaria-Gaza within three years.

The numbers speak for themselves, but, on another plane, at the psychological level, the reality of the intifadah weighs heavily on day-to-day life. Anyone who converses with the settlers these days on the future of the territorial settlements can sense the nervousness and fear that the future in this corner of the world is nonetheless insecure.

It is the feeling of many that they can struggle with the burdensome security reality, what exists on the roads and at home. But what is more difficult for the tens of thousands of settlers in the territories is their isolation from other parts of the country and other sectors of the population, even a certain sense of alienation. The settlement establishment is not sufficiently aware of that. The daily contact that it has with ministers, MK's [Knesset members] and general directors provides them with a buffer against this sense of alienation that seems to be deepening in broad sectors of the public.

"Only when I got back from Lebanon for a vacation at home, a year after the war, and got off the bus at the central station in Tel Aviv did I feel what I sometimes feel now when I arrive there from Ari'el: two different countries. At times I feel like someone crossing the border and landing in a fools' paradise. I feel betrayed," says A. A. from Ari'el.

In the settlements they are still searching for legitimacy, any kind of belonging to a vanished consensus, a permit at least, and not a retroactive one, from their political rivals. The anger over what seems to them blind hatred is translated there as a burning insult. The feeling of abandonment and alienation is also fed by the cessation of visits by their families, friends, and colleagues from the other side of the Green Line. Weddings, circumcisions, and Bar Mitzvahs are performed in Jerusalem, the Shfela, and the coastal plain, but only in special cases in

the settlements. Only the settlers and the Army travel the short distances on the axes between the settlements and Israeli territory.

This feeling of a cloudy future can also find support among the settler radicals. The State of Judaea [as published] would not have arisen, one of the organization's founders admitted this week, but for the heavy fears about the continuation of the Israeli administration here.

Elyaqim Ha'etzni and Rabbi Moshe Levinger, more than others, have formulated the positions expressed by the Judaea-Samaria-Gaza council and Gush Emunim, two bodies whose dividing line has become very blurred recently. The settler leadership came to recognize, says Ha'etzni, that they would not play the Judaea-Samaria-Gaza game with the tools of Sinai. No more evacuation. No more destruction of settlements. No one would fish in the swimming pool. They would only remove the water.

"Even if they wanted a Jew," asks Ha'etzni, "how could he live within hostile Palestinian territory with the IDF [Israel Defense Force] removed and his permanent status, including his personal status, unclear?"

The implementation of the election program and the subsequent steps would apparently not be as traumatic as the evacuation of Yamit, but the agreement to be signed might well sweep the ground from under the settlers' feet, no pun intended. "How do you react to a gas that has no smell and no color? How can you get along with a government that circumvents clear black and white situations and creates some interim twilight out of them?" asks Ha'etzni, summing up the feeling of many others.

### The Jewish Intifadah

Along the scale of reactions used thus far to measure the steps of the Jewish community in the territories, the months of May and June of the second year of the intifadah will be noted as a turning point. During that period one of the heads of the territories described what was happening as the Wild West. What has changed since then? Not much, it seems. The Jewish intifadah, like the Arab one, has become institutionalized. The media, that had stopped reporting in depth on every demonstration and casualty in Nablus or Janin, lost interest in and stopped tracking all of the clashes between the settlers and the Arabs.

The reactions of the settlers in the territories today are divided into several categories. The large majority still hold their fire, are law-abiding and obey orders despite provocations and incidents on the roads. By the same token a not-so-small minority continues to react in different ways. The most common way, particularly in the last six months, is that of immediate response. Settlers who are stoned get out of their vehicles and react to the incident by causing damage to the nearest property—windows, buildings, cars, solar water heaters, etc.

The response is so quick that the Army, with a rather thin presence in the territory in any case, cannot get there before the attackers disappear.

Another kind of reaction is one which is planned. In the middle of last year dozens of local councils responded regularly to attacks on the Jewish population. There was almost no contact or coordination between the councils. The objective was the adjacent Arab villages, from which, it was conjectured, the attackers had come. Jews who felt that their blood was fair game took the law into their own hands and made the blood of others fair game. The targets were homes, vehicles, stores, restaurants, and water heaters. To this day you can see peasants in the Halhul area uprooting their vineyards that had been sprayed with poison by Kakh [Meir Kahana's Party] people.

These activities are continuing at a similar pace, but the number of perpetrators has dropped to just a few individuals, perhaps a few dozen at most, instead of the hundreds who were active about six months ago. By the same token the rather widespread public backing that planned activities of this sort had mustered during their peak has disappeared, and they have gone back underground.

Many of the planned activities are carried out in the Hebron area. Hardly a night goes by that people from Kakh and the Committee for Safety on the Highways don't leave Qiryat Arba' to sabotage property. The picture is much the same in the Nablus area. These activities are not without effect. The settlers are now attacked less than in the past, and most of the attacks are now directed at army forces.

In most cases the Arab residents do not file a complaint. In the few cases where complaints have been filed, they have been handled very poorly. Police manpower in the territories is limited. The resignation of Arab policemen at the beginning of the intifadah reduced it even more. The Army is disinclined to tangle with the settlers.

According to testimony of participants in the activities, the Army knows about some of them but ignores them. The relative quiet that the settlers have achieved thanks to their retaliation activities is most striking in Hebron. A delegation of Arabs that suffered nightly from repeated attacks by Qiryat Arba' people arrived at the town gate and asked to meet with council chairman Shalom Wakh. Wakh refused and the people from the delegation appealed to the general of the Command, 'Amram Mitzna', and asked him to mediate. Some groundwork was laid for a compromise, and things have, in fact, cooled down a bit.

At the beginning of the intifadah it was precisely the secular settlers, the people from Ari'el and the "5 minutes from Kfar Saba" types that carried out independent activities. Settlers in the territories with an ideological background restrained themselves from independent initiatives. The Land of Israel is acquired through suffering, they would tell their children, and

these daily sufferings are the price of redemption. The ideological point of view has become more practical, less rationalized. The heads of the local committees, who used to apologize during that period that they had lost control of their people, stopped their activity, which was also a sign of change. The settler establishment was careful not to be identified with the actions. It condemned them as immoral but, even more, was fearful that the deeds of the radicals might endanger the whole settlement process.

"Defending one's life does not mean that everything is permissible," they wrote in NEQUDAH; "we are not at the end of our rope. If we act according to the Scriptural precept: 'Every man shall do what is right in his eyes,' we run the risk, God forbid, of descending into a moral abyss, the end of which we cannot see. The idea of some, that we will replace the IDF or that 'we will do the big jobs in its place,' is a dangerous idea, not only from the moral and legal aspect. It provides a prescription for the end of Jewish settlement in Judaea-Samaria-Gaza."

The diplomatic hard times and the political isolation that have sharpened during the second year of the intifadah have given rise to serious controversy within the settler camp. It has suddenly turned out that Rabbi Menahem Forman from Teko'a and Yo'el ben Nun from 'Ofra are not voices in the desert. At a congress of "Ma'ala," the center for Orthodox Zionism, dozens of people participated, demanding that the administration of Judaea-Samaria-Gaza be integrated into the diplomatic process "so as to save the little and not lose the greater part," as one of the participants defined it.

These voices have had their effect, and in the last few weeks, under the auspices of the Judaea-Samaria-Gaza council, a diplomatic forum has begun to operate, which, for the first time, has been joined by those who are not identified with the traditional leadership of Gush Emunim and the Judaea-Samaria-Gaza council. Among them can be found Dr. Simha Yagel, a moderate "Ma'ala" type, as well as Elyaqim Ha'etzni. Further events like the Fruman-Husayni meeting are not expected, but the change with respect to the activity of the diplomatic forum might engender talks with the ministers charged with the negotiations. In those talks, the Judaea-Samaria-Gaza council would transmit to the Israeli negotiators—and there are already those who demand it—practical suggestions for making the lives of the settlers easier during the period of autonomy, federation, or any other solution.

### Attempts To Resettle Bedouins Fail

44230076D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 26 Dec 89 p 15

[Article by Yerah Tal]

[Text] The meticulously arranged pile of blocks covered with tarpaulin in front of the tent of Hamid Abu-Kif, 38, of the Abu-Kif Bedouin tribe in the Negev, was a home until less than 1 month ago. It was a stone building that

housed nine people. On 6 December, Interior Ministry inspectors demolished the house, which had been built without a permit. Abu-Kif, his wife, and their seven children crowded back into the "structure," a combination tent-hut. The only "room" in it serves as kitchen, dining room, and bathroom during the day and as collective bedroom at night.

There are no beds, just mattresses, which in the morning are piled up at one end of the hut to allow room for daytime activities. Hamid, a caretaker at the local school, is not giving up. He still believes that the pile of blocks left in his yard after the demolition of his building will one day return to being a permanent home for his family. Bedouins, he says, have a lot of patience.

Hamid's house was one of 11 houses demolished in one day in the Negev by inspectors of the Interior Ministry and the Israeli Land Administration, within a campaign carried out in military fashion. Some 120 policemen with helicopter support demolished structures built without a permit in the Bedouin settlements of Hura, Lagiya, Ar'ur, and in the Ramat Hovev area, inhabited by the tribes al-Sayid, al-Nasasrah, al-Azazmah, al-Talalqah, Abu-Kif, and Tarbin al-Tsin'ah.

More than 100 buildings erected by Bedouins without a permit were pulled down in the Negev in the past two years under administrative and court orders for demolition. About 6,000 buildings were declared illegal in the Negev.

Ibrahim Abu-Kif, 24, father of two and a third on the way, is a first grade teacher. He suffered the painful experience of having his house destroyed last year. He has not yet removed the rubble. He leads me to the ruins and sadly points to remnants of sinks and colorful tile that were once his bathroom. The demolition of the house destroyed his family, too. Before the wedding he had promised his fiancee and her family that he will build her a house. When the house was demolished, he became involved in a serious quarrel with his in-laws. It came to blows, and Ibrahim was even put in jail. Today he is sharing a two-room hut with his father, his wife, and his children.

Hamid, Ibrahim, and others whose houses were demolished, as well as some 8,000 Bedouin families in the Negev who live in what is known as "spontaneous settlements," have been offered a solution: Move to the Bedouin towns that the State built in the Negev, seven centers so far. However, out of some 80,000 Bedouins in the Negev, more than half live in illegal buildings and concentrations that are not recognized by the state. "I have here 60 dunam of family land. The government has offered me NIS [new Israeli shekel] 80 a dunam. The money I could get would hardly be enough for 1 dunam in Tel-Sheva," Ibrahim said.

The demolitions have caused collective protests among Negev Bedouins. This is the first time that Negev Bedouins, who live in tribes and apart, organized for public action. The power behind this organization is an

educated young man, Ali al-Asad, 32, principal of the intermediary school in Lagiyah.

He initiated the establishment of the "Organization of Young Bedouins" which ran in the elections for the Be'er Sheva' Workers Council within MAPAM [United Workers Party] and managed to put three of its members on the council.

According to al-Asad, the organization, which has 35 members all together, received about 25 percent of the Bedouin vote in the Negev. The new body joined the struggle against what is described as attempts to deprive Negev Bedouins of their land. This is not the only organization established for the same purpose. Others are the "Committees of Unrecognized Villages," and the "Association for Aid and Defense of Bedouin Rights." All of these got together and composed a pamphlet which is now circulated among Knesset members, ministers, public figures, and the media.

"The demolition of 11 houses on 6 December 1989 in Bedouin villages in the Negev was only the tip of the iceberg. The Israeli Government intends to destroy thousands of houses in the Negev. According to the plan, more than 8,000 houses will be demolished, in which whole families live, most of them with many children, and thus whole villages will be uprooted and thousands of homeless Bedouins will be forced to live in the open in the harsh Negev weather," the pamphlet stated.

AL-Asad has serious complaints against the government. "In the 42 years of the State's existence none of its governments offered a real solution to the problem of the Negev Bedouins. The land problem was ignored and land settlements have been frozen for years. About 20 years ago, somebody up there hit on a simplistic solution calling for concentrating the Bedouins in seven settlements in the Negev, which lack any economic and employment infrastructure, and thought in that way to force a whole population to change its lifestyle and abandon its livelihood—farming and livestock."

Al-Asad compares the government's endeavors to concentrate the Bedouins in a limited number of settlements to the concentration of Indians in bankrupt reservations.

What ministry officials view as a resounding success, many other factors, including non-Bedouins, view as a crushing defeat, namely the attempt to settle Bedouins in urban environments. In a study published on Bedouin settlements, Dr Yosef Ben-Dror concludes that the program failed. Since 1983 the population of the planned settlements stopped increasing, and some of the reasons for that stem from the settlements themselves.

In spite of the promises given Bedouins before resettlement, no jobs were created in any of the settlements, not even in Rahat, which has 1,650 houses and a population of 20,000. Promises to develop farming opportunities for the evacuees of Tel-Malhata remained only on paper. The municipal infrastructure is shaky. No one thought to put sewage in Rahat and Kasifa. No thought was given to

social tensions among various tribes, either. The researcher's conclusion was that there was no other solution but to change the policy concerning the resettlement of Bedouins in the Negev. The only possible solution is to accept the principle of granting alternative land plots and establishing villages. That is also the solution preferred by the Organization of Young Bedouins.

Al-Asad feels that the Bedouins should not be forced into any one settlement solution. Farming settlements should be established alongside urban ones, so as to meet the needs of Bedouins who want to continue farming while living near services. Al-Asad and his friends request a program which will permit the overwhelming majority of Negev Bedouins to remain and live in their houses.

Dodiq Shoshani from Kibbutz Lahav, who has followed the Bedouins for years, was the head of the team assigned by the government to conduct negotiations for the Tel-Malhata evacuation, which was needed to build the Nevatim airfield. Approximately 6,000 Bedouins were evacuated and resettled in Ar'ur, Kasifa, and Rahat. That evacuation, too, began with the old methods of land confiscation and forcible evacuation, which failed.

At the initiative of Shoshani and his team the government enacted the Negev Land Purchase Bill in 1980. The bill, which was opposed by many Bedouins, contained a refreshing novelty: for the first time, the Bedouins' right to alternative land was recognized. In addition to a lot on which to build a house and a grant to help finance it, the bill promised each Tel-Malhata Bedouin to earmark 100 dunams of desert land—5 dunams for agricultural land with water, or 20 dunams of agricultural land without water. Shoshani believes that this bill should be applied to all Negev Bedouins; that is the only way to make them move to urban settlements. For that, the government must recognize the Bedouins' right to the land on which they live.

Shoshani thinks it would be a mistake to establish a slew of small settlements for Bedouins in the Negev, without an infrastructure, and expensive to the Treasury. He believes that the solution lies in large concentrations and in taking into account the Bedouin mentality: for example, space out the housing more so as to separate between families and clans.

Agricultural land should be ensured next to the settlements, while at the same time recognizing the fact that in the future farming will be merely an auxiliary employment and that the government must provide alternative jobs and an employment infrastructure. Currently, only 10 percent of the Negev Bedouins work in agriculture. Unemployment among them is higher than the national average, some say 35 percent.

Shoshani says that the compensation that the government currently offers Bedouins to join settlements is ridiculous. Any amount that it invests today in solving the problem is likely to cost 10 times as much in the future. The Bedouins have a high birth rate; about 2,000

babies are born every year. That is to say, in another few years there will be thousands of new families. In the absence of a decent governmental solution, spontaneous settlements will continue to crop up, which the government will eventually have to recognize and provide services for. The cost will thus be higher than if appropriate compensation were paid today to Bedouins to persuade them to move to planned settlements. The Negev Bedouins sit on approximately 400,000 dunams of land, about 3 percent of the entire Negev area, while their population makes up 22 percent of the Negev population. "We are as many as the kibbutz population, and how much land do the kibbutzim have?" asks Ali al-Asad. He rejects the claim that Bedouins are taking over State land: They have been living on that land since ancient times, and what's more, the state has no plans for developing and settling the land from which it wants to evacuate Bedouins.

Shalom Danino, the Interior Ministry official in charge of the Southern District, notes that all the houses that were demolished in the past 2 years were newly built. Thousands of houses built before without a permit were not touched. The Marqovitz Committee that studied the issue of illegal construction in the Arab sector decided to photograph the landscape before the date of the study and to have every new building erected illegally after the closing of the study pulled down. This was explained to the Bedouins, but some of them continued to build without a permit, Danino pointed out.

Finding alternative solutions that will dispense with the need to build illegally does not interest his office. He directed me to the directorate that was established at the time to deal with the issue of Negev Bedouins. Eliyahu Baba'i, deputy director general of the Israel Land Administration, is the head of that directorate. He agreed that the sums offered to Bedouins in compensation were not "sufficient" and reported that discussions were under way with the participation of the Ministries of Finance, Justice, Agriculture, and Arab Affairs with a view to working out a more realistic compensation schedule. He added that lessons were learned from the failed attempts to resettle Bedouins in urban settlements; plans were changed and 750 new areas were earmarked, the first of which have already been sold to Bedouins in the region.

Since 1985, the government has settled no more than 1,300 families in urban concentrations. Baba'i believes that increased compensations and new planning will speed up the resettlement process. He stressed that the government will not give in to pressure brought to bear by Bedouin groups to recognize their settlements as official. That would compel the state to make enormous investments in vital infrastructure on a vast area, which it cannot afford.

The Bedouins, who were left without Knesset representation since the assassination of Knesset member [MK] Abu-Rabi'a, nevertheless won parliamentary support from MK Hayim Oron. Oron participated in a protest

march organized in the Negev at early this month in the wake of the demolition of the 11 houses, and sent protest telegrams to the interior and agriculture ministers. When he appealed to the Ministry for Minorities Affairs in a last-ditch effort to avert the demolitions, he was told that the houses were pulled down without the knowledge of the ministry. "The strength of the coalition government begins and ends with demolitions. When it comes to finding solutions, the government is divided and lacks guidance," Oron said.

While public figures are swapping accusations, Isma'il Judah, 41 and a father of 10 from 'Ar'ur, saw his home pulled down this week. He said: "They destroyed our house and in winter we freeze." There has been a suggestion to enact a bill to interdict house demolitions and evacuations in winter. To that Danino responded: "When we pull down houses in summer, people complain about the heat. Our timing is not according to the seasons."

#### Youth Reportedly Hate Arabs

44230076C Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 26 Dec 89 p 3

[Text] About 40 percent of Israeli youth harbor great hatred for Arabs, while about 60 percent feel a great desire for revenge. These figures are higher than the ones measured 14 years ago. This finding comes from a study carried out among more than 5,000 students throughout the country by the Israeli Institute for Military Research.

The study, which is the most comprehensive so far among high school students, was carried out by Dr 'Ofra Meisels and Dr Re'uven Gal in January 1988, and resembled in structure a previous study done in 1976. Thus, it allows us to check not only young people's attitude toward Arabs today, but also the changes that have occurred over the years.

The study revealed stereotypical hatred directed at all or most Arabs, without discrimination, and that the hatred felt by Israeli youth for Arabs is now 10 percent more intensive than in the past. While in 1974 42 percent said they hated all or most Arabs, in 1988 39 percent answered the same. In 1974 39 percent said they didn't hate Arabs at all, or only a few among them. In 1988 only 27 percent gave the same reply. Hatred of Arabs and a desire to take revenge on them was particularly prominent among youth of Sephardi origin (in comparison with Ashkenazis), and was more intense among religious youth (as compared to secular) whose parents' level of education was relatively lower, and among youth in development and average-size towns. Students of vocational schools or in vocational tracks in general high schools showed more intense hatred than regular high school students. On the other hand, no difference was found between boys and girls.

The authors of the study agree that in the present political situation in Israel, this trend toward a more

intense generalized hatred of Arabs has ramifications for the image of the country and its future relations with its neighbors.

**Raising Age of Minors in Territories Considered**

**44000195 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 11 Feb 90 p 3**

[Text] Senior army officials revealed yesterday that the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] is considering raising the official age of minors in the territories from 14 to 18 in order to improve the efficiency of the battle against stone throwers. It was revealed that this is a staff plan taking shape among legal advisers in the territories which will need the chief of staff's approval. According to the plan parents of minors under 18 caught throwing stones will be fined up to NIS [new Israeli shekels] 5000. At present the procedure regarding parents of minors who throw stones, who refuse to pay fines, is to confiscate property. Fines are considered to be an efficient means of punishment and the phenomenon of stone throwing among minors under 14 has indeed lessened.

**Per Capita Productivity at Its Lowest**

**44230072C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT  
in Hebrew 18 Dec 89 p 22**

[Article by Edna Eis]

[Text] Per capita productivity in Israel dropped in 1988 by 2 percent and came to just \$27,300—the lowest of all industrialized Western countries. That, according to a report on job and manufacturing productivity in Israel, as compared to other countries, released in a news conference yesterday by the Institute for Job and Manufacturing Productivity.

The data show that while Israel's worker productivity declined, in all other Western countries apart from Britain it went up.

Thus, for example, it reached \$27,300 here last year, \$38,000 in Italy, \$41,700 in the United States, \$47,500 in Japan, and \$55,700 in Switzerland.

The report also shows that if output is calculated on a per capita basis, Israel's situation is even more serious.

According to Yosef Duri'el, general manager of the Institute for Job and Manufacturing Productivity, the gap in per capita productivity between Israel and Western countries is even larger: While Israel last year managed only \$9,400 per capita, Italy achieved \$14,300; the United States, \$19,700; Japan, \$23,300; and Switzerland, \$27,800.

The data that Duri'el presented show clearly that in 1988 there was an absolute freeze in the economy in job productivity after three years of considerable increase in productivity. The freeze was also clearly apparent in the supply of capital per employee, which did not rise in

1988. On the other hand, there was an increase in labor costs per unit product in the business sector of about one percent.

The one encouraging datum presented in the report by the Institute for Job and Manufacturing Productivity had to do with expenses for R & D. It turns out that the national rate of expenditure for R & D in Israel is higher than in most of the developed countries. Nevertheless, R & D in Israel is not sufficiently applied.

**Hunger Alleged in Negev**

**44230072B Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 18 Dec 89 p 6**

[Article by DAVAR correspondent 'Amir Rozenblit]

[Text] The proportion of new applicants for social services assistance in the Negev now stands at 26 percent of the population in the area, far higher than the national average, and, according to Labor Ministry reports, totals about 220,000 families on welfare. Between April and June of this year about 1,580 new families asked for assistance, an increase of about 18 percent as compared to the same period last year. Over the last few months there has been an additional increase of about 6 percent of those requesting assistance. About half of these new requests result from difficult economic circumstances stemming from the unemployment of one or both members of the couple. The remaining requests are for other reasons such as family violence, crime, drug addiction, old age, severe handicap, mental retardation of one of the family members, etc.

These data were given out yesterday by the General Secretary of the Organization of Social Workers, Eli ben Gera, and the Secretary of the organization's Negev region, 'Ovadya Rabi, in a news conference held in Beersheba.

"In the Negev today there are people hungry for food," the two said; "about half of the needy families in the area cannot supply their children with regular meals of reasonable nutritional value. We know of women abandoned by their husbands, who, until they were issued food stamps, had nothing for themselves or their children to eat."

The head of the welfare branch in one of the settlements in the Negev revealed recently that many families exist on noodles and black bread, and, at the end of the day, collect leftovers from the city market in order to have food for their children. The two reported that, given the economic recession, the incidence of electricity cutoffs is increasing because of the inability of families to meet their payments. "In Dimona there are whole streets that are dark today, either because of the cutoffs or because of mass abandonment," they said.

Ben Gera and Rabi levelled sharp criticism yesterday at the government's welfare policy and accused senior officials in the Labor Ministry of attempting to hide information and of disinformation aimed at the public.

"The upper echelons of the ministry are interested in showing the public, as it were, that there is no social-welfare problem in Israel. There is a deliberate conspiracy of silence and silencing. The number of unemployed this year increased by 38 percent over last year, the crime rate is on the rise, and the Ministry of Labor and Welfare, which is supposed to be the most important in such a difficult period, still has no minister. The ministry is being administered by mid-level managers and below, who are motivated by narrow political and party considerations. Given this state of affairs, a well-run country would expand welfare services, but in Israel we have a theater of the absurd and complete insanity in our system so that instead of adding to and expanding those services, we cut them," the two said.

Rabi, the former head of the welfare branch in Beersheba, said that, in the wake of the agreement signed recently between the Deputy Minister of the Treasury Yosi Beilin and the former deputy Minister of Labor and Welfare, Rabbi Feldman, over the last three months 12.5 social worker staffs have been cut in the south and transferred to settlements in the center of the country. Within the framework of the agreement, noted Rabi, many of the areas that he was responsible for and which were financed by the Ministry of Labor and Welfare, were transferred to the local authorities, which already suffer from serious liquidity problems. "Beilin is the chief administrator of the transit camps that are being created more and more in the Negev, and he is the enemy of social services in Israel," Beilin said.

He added that over the last three months 34 children were taken out of institutions in the Negev, including some who were in those institutions by a judge's orders because of fear for their lives at home. He claims that this tendency is growing and was told that by 1 April 1990 their number will reach about 70, in addition to about 30 children for whom there are unequivocal recommendations that they be removed from their parents' homes. According to him, in 1990 the number of children among the inhabitants of the Negev who live in their parents' homes and for whom there is fear for their lives, will be about 100. "We are not talking about a 'poverty line,' but about a 'death line,' since a child subjected to a perverted act or intercourse by his father is virtually dead—if not physically, then certainly psychologically. As we know, in most such cases the psychological damage is almost irreparable."

Senior workers connected with the welfare system participated in the press conference, but, according to ben Gera and Rabi, within the confines of that same policy of trying to muffle and hide information, they were not allowed to be interviewed, on orders from the Ministry of Labor and Welfare. "The Ministry of Labor and Welfare made every attempt to keep the conference from happening, and even the data that we submitted came from other sources."

A senior psychologist who was not allowed to be interviewed and who participated in the press conference said yesterday: "We are increasingly coming across suppressive reactions on the part of people when it comes to

problems of unemployment and the inability to deal with their children. One of the consequences is an increasing number of abused children. In the area of mental health there is a real burning problem of people joining the ranks of the unemployed which not infrequently causes psychological problems. But the national health insurance does not cover psychological care. That is, it is preferable, for example, to have a heart attack, which is covered by national health insurance, than to have a nervous breakdown, which is not covered."

The speakers painted a very dismal picture of the allocation of manpower and resources for welfare in the Bedouin sector of the Negev. "The Ministry of Labor allocated about 25,000 shekels for the Bedouin population that numbers about 70,000. Its social situation is extremely serious, and there are only about 5.5 social workers to deal with it."

Rabi related an incident of a retarded Bedouin boy living in a tent, tied to a bed because of his violent tendencies. In this sector, according to him, there is no care for the retarded. "These situations really cry out for help," Rabi and ben Gera said.

"In light of the difficult situation that threatens to destroy the welfare services, the organization of social workers in the Negev cannot simply stand by; if drastic changes do not come about in the form of care, in the allocation of resources and manpower, the organization will act, in concert with the workers' councils, the local authorities, the workers' committees, and the neighborhood committees to change this situation in which there is a lobby of officials that is concerned about itself, that does not allow field work to be carried out and, at the same time, withholds information from the ministers about the barrel of social explosives it is sitting on in the Negev," Rabi warned.

#### **The Reaction of the Labor Ministry**

A spokesman for the Ministry of Labor and Welfare, Tzvi Rozen, reacted yesterday as follows: "The dismal picture painted yesterday by the social workers is composed, of course, of demagogic complaints and an exaggeration of well-known facts of hardship, and is more of a tempest in a teapot than a platform for correcting reality."

The spokesman noted that the Ministry of Labor had not tried to prevent the press conference, nor did it try to disrupt it by not handing over material. According to him, the fact is that a worker in the ministry asked to be interviewed, in accordance with service regulations, and was refused. "Therefore only a fertile imagination could suggest that this has to do with a policy of silencing," he said.

As to the Bedouin, the spokesman reported that the Ministry of Labor is working to add 10 staffs of social workers, and that will happen only after a discussion in the budget branch of Treasury. "As to the question of the retarded, there is an overall budget hardship in Israel, and within the Ministry of Labor and Welfare we hope to get additional budgets and staffs, after the discussion with Treasury," Rozen said.

**Gaza Strip Citrus Production Outlined**

90OL0179B Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI  
in Arabic 16 Dec 89 pp 34-35

[Article: "Citrus Production in Gaza Strip"]

[Excerpts] [passages omitted]

The Gaza Strip produces about 130,000 to 140,000 tons of various vegetable crops from a total area of 50,000 dunums, distributed as follows:

|              |               |              |
|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| Tomato       | 5,550 dunums  | 27,800 tons  |
| Potato       | 8,950 dunums  | 22,400 tons  |
| Cucumber     | 6,570 dunums  | 19,700 tons  |
| Eggplant     | 1,240 dunums  | 6,820 tons   |
| Squash       | 2,530 dunums  | 6,350 tons   |
| Cauliflower  | 1,970 dunums  | 5,000 tons   |
| Cabbage      | 1,570 dunums  | 4,700 tons   |
| Jew's mallow | 4,420 dunums  | 11,000 tons  |
| Chili pepper | 1,620 dunums  | 2,500 tons   |
| Strawberry   | 0,340 dunums  | 0,900 tons   |
| Other        | 15,240 dunums | 30,000 tons  |
| Total        | 50,000        | 137,170 tons |

|                 |                        |                            |
|-----------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| Vegetables      | 87,750,000 new shekels | 43.50 % of farming revenue |
| Citrus          | 49,580,000 new shekels | 34.06 % of farming revenue |
| Assorted Fruits | 17,522,000 new shekels | 8.50 %                     |
| Animal products | 43,493,000 new shekels | 21.10 %                    |
| Fish            | 1,770,000 new shekels  | 0.86 %                     |
| Honey           | 4,107,000 new shekels  | 1.95 %                     |

Vegetable production in the Gaza Strip is a source of labor for a large number of families. In other words, this

production sector provided about 1,470,000 work days a year according to the following date:

| Farming Method            | Area/dunums | Work day per dunum | Total     |
|---------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-----------|
| Green House/High Tunnels  | 3,000       | 130                | 390,000   |
| Covered Areas/Low Tunnels | 7,000       | 40                 | 280,000   |
| Open(Uncovered)           | 40,000      | 20                 | 800,000   |
| Total                     | 50,000      | —                  | 1,470,000 |

This is in addition to a large segment of the population working in this field indirectly, such as marketing, transportation, pharmaceuticals, and other means of production. Hence the great importance of this sector in Gaza Strip production.

**Vegetable Production Problems**

- Difficulty of marketing surplus production for the Gaza Strip produces 50,000 tons more than it needs.
- Stiff competition from products coming in from Israel, notwithstanding the fact that Gaza Strip products are

systematically banned in Israel. Only those products needed in Israeli markets are allowed in.

- The great rise in production costs which often are the main factor in determining the kind of crops to be raised.
- Shortage of irrigation water—and its high salinity—for it has been established that the salt content of irrigation is rising year after year. It is noteworthy that certain vegetables do not grow well in salty water.
- Shortage of farm land in general due to the fact that the population explosion is expanding at the expense of the area under cultivation.

**West Bank Industrial Production Examined**

*90OL0179C Jerusalem AL-USBU' AL-JADID  
in Arabic 15 Dec 89 pp 30-31*

[Article: "Support and Encouragement Important and Decisive Factor; Local Industries Capable of Growth and Flourishing"]

[Text] The West Bank is no more than 5,000 square kilometers in area and is inhabited by close to 1 million persons. Due to its political circumstances under the occupation, the powers that be have sought to turn it into an economic market full of Israeli goods by squeezing out and undercutting national industries. This has been accomplished over a long period of time owing to many factors such as lack of raw materials, an inability to compete with Israeli products, failure to obtain the same facilities accorded Israeli industries, and the ban imposed on these industries in Israeli markets.

This is in addition to the fact that these industries have not always been well received by consumers. Recently, however, a positive radical change of attitude toward the production, sale and consumption of domestic goods has occurred, something we were able to discern in our survey of many dealers and consumers.

**Pharmaceutical Industry**

Pharmacist Nabil 'Adili, head of the Pharmacists' Association in the West Bank and proprietor of Nabil Pharmacy, said: "As an introduction to the pharmaceutical industry in the occupied industries, it must be pointed out that this industry is young. It started two decades ago during which time it has grown and flourished into a major milestone in our domestic industry in the occupied territories.

"The rise of this industry has been dictated by objective circumstances and created by a firm will and strong arms that believed from the very beginning that the physical and mental health of individuals and groups is the key to creating capable and productive communities and that making medicine available with the right ingredients and at suitable prices is an aim that ought to be incarnated. Thus, we now have eight pharmaceutical factories offering many kinds of medicines in a variety of therapeutic formulas to meet the Palestinian people's need for good-quality medicine that can match the highest international standards. The local pharmaceutical industry comprises 50 percent of pharmacy and warehouse inventories of medicines sold in various forms, including capsules, pills, syrups, injections, drops, suppositories, ointments and others. There is no doubt that the local supply of medicines covers a major part the market's pharmaceutical needs. There are reliable substitutes for most non-Arab medicines save for narrow margins in the hormones, intravenous solutions, and medicines that require special technology, which is no wonder because the local pharmaceutical industry is very young compared to pharmaceutical factories in advanced countries.

"I would like to say here that my colleagues and I regret the fact that most Arab factories put out similar pharmaceutical products and we wish that these plants will coordinate among themselves to devise an indepth qualitative and quantitative specialized production plan to attain an integrated pharmaceutical system that can grow horizontally and vertically to meet all the needs of our Palestinian society.

"As for the fact that some people are afraid to use locally-made medicines, this is a misplaced fear because I believe that prior to delivery to warehouses and pharmacies, all local medicines undergo careful laboratory tests at the manufacturing plant itself or at other accredited laboratories. These medicines are not allowed to get to the market before passing the pharmaceutical code requirements to ascertain their wholesomeness and benefits. Regarding the physician's role in promoting the local pharmaceutical industry, physicians play a key part in this regard. The physician's aim in writing medical prescriptions is to choose the proper medicine to help the patient get well. Prescriptions written by the majority of our doctors bespeak their deep belief in the effectiveness and wholesomeness of locally-manufactured medicines and this bolsters the pharmacist's belief and the citizen's trust in them, thus earning them a major spot in the local pharmaceutical market.

"It is noteworthy that, owing to moderate production costs at local factories, on the one hand, and the price freeze that has been in effect for a long time, on the other hand, local medicine prices by and large are lower and, sometimes, a lot less than that of the non-Arab equivalent. I should not neglect to mention that the greatest problems facing the local pharmaceutical industry are a limited market—its products are marketed only in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, thus curbing its growth and development—and the modest capital investments in pharmaceutical factories compared with other countries. I do not misstate the facts when I say that the capital invested in all such factories put together barely equals the capital invested in a single factory in other countries."

**Food Industries**

The food industry has made significant progress over the last two-year period in the marketing and production fields. Mr. Nasir Zahran, a supermarket proprietor, says, "Local food industries have made great progress in improving existing brands and putting out new ones. For example, these industries are now producing canned peas, jam, chicken soup, pickles and olives, and the local market is now selling canned tomato products. There is a tomato factory in Hebron, but its output does not meet the market need and therefore we are forced to turn to the Israeli tomato industry to fulfill our marketing commitments. Bear in mind that tomato products manufactured at the Hebron factory are superior to the Israeli ones. There is also the local meat canning industry,

noting that prices nowadays are almost equal, and that there is a demand for traditional food products such as dried yogurt."

#### Detergent and Paper Products

Mr. Nasir added: "Regarding this brand of the local industry, it had already been on the market, but sales increased considerably during the intifadah [uprising]. By and large, these brands have been improved and developed to suit local consumer tastes. For example, the toilet paper, tissue paper, and diaper industry has been developed and is now offering an excellent product. The same thing goes for the soap, detergent, and bath shampoo industry. Other domestic branch industries—Insecticides and air fresheners—have been developed as well and markets have been inundated with confectionary and soft drink products.

"As a supermarket owner and a market agent, however, there are two observations I must make. First, some people still insist on buying Israeli products and, therefore, dealers feel compelled to stock such products out of a desire to hold on to their customers. Among these products are dish detergents and soaps.

"The second observation is the absence of a domestic matchstick factory. It is surprising that investors have not yet knocked on this door."

#### Shoe Industry

Shoe store proprietor Mr. Mahmud Salih says, "Most stores nowadays carry locally-manufactured shoes. Shoe factories in Hebron and Nablus are putting out goods that rival foreign ones in quality and sell at competitive prices. Due to continued public demand for such goods because of their good quality and low prices, we are able to continue to offer and sell domestic products. Harsh economic conditions do not allow the citizen to look for "Gali" or Italian shoes. But shoe store owners are often compelled to carry these brands because many customers ask for them and are willing to go to Tel-Aviv to buy them. The great and unlimited public demand for locally-manufactured shoes is made quite evident, however, by the fact that the domestic shoe industry commands the greatest share of the market."

#### Garment Industry

Mr. Salih Shawkah says, "Prior to the intifadah, competition between domestic and foreign products used to be extremely fierce and importers used to come out the winners because of quality basically. New circumstances, however, have tipped the scale in favor of local products. Prior to the intifadah, sewing factories and workshops used to work for Israeli firms, but new conditions have created great incentives to switch to local production and to domestic marketing at competitive prices in particular. However, the domestic garment and textile industry is facing two fundamental problems: very poor quality made worse by greater demand, keeping in demand that high-quality and competitive woolen goods

are available; and the unavailability of alternatives to all foreign goods. For example, the entire bed clothing industry is Israeli and all 'ladies hosiery' are imported."

#### Paper Industry

'Ali, proprietor of the University Bookstore, says: "The domestic industry's share in the stationery market is very small and I cannot understand why, since all bookstore owners are willing to market local products. It seems that the domestic industry's share is confined to notebooks and paper. Student notebooks and account books are mostly manufactured in Nablus and Gaza, but there is a difference in quality. Paper manufactured in Nablus is of superior quality even though there is little difference in price."

#### Housewares

Houseware store proprietor Mr. Abu-Jamil says, "Prior to the intifadah, domestic houseware products, glass and plastic alike, used to be quite popular because of their simplicity and low prices. This could be discerned from the great turnouts at domestic industry fairs. The houseware pavilions used to be very popular, but after the intifadah they became even more and more popular. The problem, however, is that our domestic industry has made no attempt to develop itself by creating alternatives to foreign goods."

#### The People Say

Citizen 'Umar Najjar says, "Honorable citizens have a responsibility to support all domestic products and all domestic industries. For there are many domestic products that are every bit as good as the foreign ones. We have the garment industry, we have the furniture industry, and we have the food and canned food industries like Sanyura and the Jundi dairy products. We also have the tobacco, pharmaceutical, and soft drink industries which all rival their foreign counterparts. And even if they don't, support, encouragement, and constructive feedback will help them to advance and grow."

## JORDAN

#### Relations With PLO, Hamas Described

90OL0210A Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI'  
in Arabic 15 Jan 90 pp 10-12

[Interview with lawyer Ibrahim Bakr, PNC member, in Paris; "In Comprehensive Interview With AL-YAWM AL-SABI", Ibrahim Bakr: Palestinian Awareness Contributed to Success of Jordanian Election Experiment; Our Slogan Is: Good Jordanian Is Good Palestinian and Good Palestinian Is Good Jordanian; PLO Did Not Interfere in Jordanian Parliamentary Elections, Thus Refuting Israeli Right's Allegation That Jordan Is Palestinians' Homeland and State; Jordanian Chamber of Deputies Will Strongly Support Intifadah and Palestinian Policy Objectives; PLO Will Find Great Facilities

**Under Canopy of New Democratic Situation; I Expect Jordanian Elections To Have Positive Effects on Neighboring Arab Conditions; Israeli Media Have Dealt Maliciously With Democratic Transformation and With Parliamentary Elections in Jordan Because They Have Been Free and Impartial;**" first four paragraphs are AL-YAWM AL-SABI' introduction; date not given]

[Excerpts] The deeper meanings of the Jordanian elections and of their effects on the domestic situation, on the neighboring Arabs, and on the relations with the Palestinian issue and with the PLO are incorporated in this interview with lawyer Ibrahim Bakr, an ex-chairman of the Jordanian Lawyers Union.

This interview with Ibrahim Bakr gains great significance from the fact that Bakr is a political figure who has his status in Jordan and who, at the same time, is closely connected with the Palestinian circles inside and outside of Jordan.

Ibrahim Bakr does not belong to either a Jordanian party or to a Palestinian fedayeen faction. But he has always had a political presence in the Jordanian political parties and in the Palestinian fedayeen factions. Even though he is now fully devoted to his law practice, he has previously held prominent positions, including the position of the PLO Executive Committee deputy chairman in 1969. He was a member of the Unified Palestinian Command which was formed in Jordan in 1970. In the wake of the September 1970 events, he became the PLO representative in the Higher Arab Committee which was formed under the chairmanship of Bahi Ladgham, a former Tunisian prime minister, to regulate the relations between the PLO and Jordan. Ibrahim Bakr is now a member of the PNC [Palestine National Council]. Previously, he was chairman of the Jordanian Lawyers Union.

AL-YAWM AL-SABI' has interviewed Bakr in Paris on the Jordanian elections and on their impact on the relationship with the Palestinian issue and with the PLO. [passage omitted]

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] What effect did Jordan's decision to disengage from the West Bank have on the election course? Is the effect manifested in the fact that the PLO did not take part in the elections or is it manifested in other ways?

[Bakr] The disengagement decision has been reflected in other ways. The Palestinian circle connected with the PLO has been dominated by political awareness and by eagerness to let the Chamber of Deputies assume a "Trans-Jordan" political character so as to refute the Israeli statement that Trans-Jordan is the Palestinians' homeland and state. The politically-vigilant Palestinian circle has been aware of the importance of preventing the ruling Israeli establishment and the United States from exploiting the elections to bolster this Israeli statement. An intrinsic, voluntary, spontaneous, and unanimous decision was made to exclude any Palestinian deported from the occupied territories since 1967, any Palestinian

who is a PNC member, and any Palestinian who has held or who now holds an executive position in the PLO from running for election.

If we remember that deportees from the West Bank exceed 3,000 in number, not to mention that most, if not all, of the PLO members are political and social leaders who enjoy broad popularity in both Palestine and Jordan, then we can realize the extent of the negative impact they would have left if they had run for election. But Palestinian national and pan-Arab political awareness dictated that these people refrain from running for election. This is perhaps one of the reasons that enabled other factions to achieve their noted successes in the elections.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] But we are aware that some Palestinian organizations (DFLP and PFLP) [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] took part in the elections in one way or another. In what context did they participate?

[Bakr] The DFLP and PFLP did not participate in their capacity as resistance factions. They participated through Jordanian political organizations which did not nominate Palestinians but rather nominated East Jordanians, including Dhib Murji, Bassam Haddadin, and others. We must take into consideration here that the PFLP and DFLP are rooted in the Arab Nationalist Movement—a pan-Arab movement which has its origins and its followers in Jordan and in other Arab countries. However, the elections did produce a profoundly significant manifestation. The third electoral district of Amman has a seat for the Circassians. A number of socially prominent Circassian figures ran for this seat. Mansur Murad, a Circassian youth who was not well known at the popular level, also ran for the seat. But as soon as people learned that he belongs to a fedayeen organization and that he had engaged in armed operations against Israel, a large part of the voters voted for him and he won. This manifestation reflects the true Jordanian public opinion toward armed struggle against Israel. It behooves the ruling Israeli establishment to pause long before this manifestation and to learn a lesson from it so that it may respond to the moderate Palestinian position embodied in the political program endorsed by the PNC at the meeting it held in Algiers in November 1988.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] You have said that the PLO made its decision not to interfere in the Jordanian elections. Was this decision observed in practice?

[Bakr] Yes it was observed. The decision was sound and all the Palestinians whose names are linked to the PLO adhered to it by refraining from running for election. The PLO agencies did not support any candidate, regardless of whether they were sympathetic to him or not. It is beneficial to note here that a number of Palestinians who had been members representing the West Bank governorates in the dissolved Chamber of Deputies and who

live in Amman ran for election in the electoral districts with a Palestinian majority, thinking that the Palestinians would vote for them. But they all lost.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] What position did the candidates take and how did they interact with the Palestinian issue in the election campaign?

[Bakr] If we examine carefully the slogans of the overwhelming majority of the candidates and examine the election statements published in the press, we would find that they underlined the need to support the Palestinian intifadah [uprising], to stand firmly with it, and to give it all forms of material and moral backing so as to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self-determination, to be repatriated, and to establish the independent Palestinian state.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Does the Islamists' success in the Jordanian election have an impact on Hamas' presence in the occupied territories and on its presentation of a certain political line?

[Bakr] One of the reasons for the Muslim Brotherhood's success is its relationship with Hamas and its participation in the intifadah.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Now that the Islamist deputies have succeeded, will their presence in the parliament have an impact on the domestic support for Hamas?

[Bakr] Their presence will definitely have a positive impact on the domestic support for Hamas. But the effects and continuity of this support depend on the Muslim Brotherhood deputies in the Chamber of Deputies and on their making accomplishments at the level of Jordan's domestic conditions, which have already been described.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] In light of the Palestinian decision not to interfere in the elections due to long-range political objectives and in light of the outcome of the elections, has Jordan become a Jordanian state since the disengagement or is it still a Jordanian-Palestinian state?

[Bakr] This is not how the situation is. It is inaccurate to say that Jordan is a Jordanian-Palestinian state. The slogan raised in Jordan is that the affiliation with Palestine is not a geographic affiliation but a struggle affiliation. Consequently, a good Jordanian is a good Palestinian and a good Palestinian is a good Jordanian. What contributed to making the election process successful is the principle that Jordan belongs to the Jordanians, regardless of their geographic origins, and that Palestine belongs to the Palestinians, regardless of their geographic origins.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Will Jordan's democratic climate act as a tributary supporting the intifadah and the PLO at the popular and official levels?

[Bakr] The new Jordanian Chamber of Deputies will act as an extremely important tributary, rather the most important Arab parliamentary tributary supporting the intifadah and the PLO.

After the disengagement decision, the government of Zayd al-Rifa'i adopted a number of declared and undeclared decisions and measures amounting to extreme harassment of the West Bank citizens and of Palestinians generally. Those decisions and measures covered West Bank students wishing to enroll in Jordanian universities and colleges, crops exported to and via Jordan, and even gifts brought by West Bank visitors to their relatives in the East Bank, not to mention the unjustifiable and frustrating security measures, the travel restrictions, the restrictions on acquiring passports, and numerous other harassing measures which were not confined to citizens residing in the West Bank, but included groups in Jordan and abroad.

Mudar Badran's government has begun to abolish those decisions and measures one after the other, especially the harassment connected with passports and with travel for visitation and security harassment. It is expected that the ban on the export of West Bank production to and via the East Bank will be lifted. The cabinet statement dealt with the above issues clearly. Moreover, the Chamber of Deputies' debate on the cabinet statement confirmed all of the above.

It is worth noting here that one of the committees formed by the Chamber of Deputies is the Committee for Palestine and the Occupied Arab Territories. This committee includes deputies from all tendencies.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Some Jordanian political circles are concerned that the democratic experiment will not continue. Is there anything to justify this concern?

[Bakr] The indications are that there is nothing to justify this concern. The supreme Jordanian authority's agreement to hold the elections, the climate of freedom and impartiality which this authority created for the elections, the vigilance the popular circles have displayed in connection with entrenching the democratic experiment, the eagerness to safeguard Jordan's security, and the eagerness to focus the efforts on two fundamental issues, namely dealing with the economic crisis and supporting the intifadah—all of the above are indications that the democratic experiment is not troubled and that it can be strengthened. It must be said here that Jordan's democratic transformation has been a peaceful transformation approved by the ruling regime which has responded to the Jordanian masses who yearn for and insist on a democratic life, especially as a result of the acute economic crisis and its complications. We should keep in mind that this peaceful democratic transformation has its roots in the liberal quality that has distinguished Jordan most of the time. It is perhaps beneficial to reveal here what I had learned a few days before the polling

process, namely that King Husayn said that he is determined that Israel will not continue to be the only democratic state in the Middle East. [passage omitted]

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] In light of the election analysis you have presented, especially in connection with the PLO position on the elections, how would you characterize the PLO presence and the presence of the Palestinian camp in Jordan? Are we facing a new situation or is it a continuation of the past situation?

[Bakr] As I have already said, action for the Palestinian cause in Jordan must not be confined to the Palestinian masses. The Jordanian masses must also participate. The action should proceed on the basis of the slogan that "a good Jordanian is a good Palestinian and a good Palestinian is a good Jordanian." In other words, all the Jordanians living on Jordanian soil are, regardless of their geographic origins, Jordanians for the Jordanian national program and Palestinians for the Palestinian national program.

A tangible manifestation of the soundness of the above-mentioned is reflected in the popular rallies held on occasion of the intifadah's second anniversary. Both Jordanians and Palestinians participated and both have been making constant financial contributions to the Popular Committee for Supporting the Intifadah. The donors are both Jordanians and Palestinians.

Jordan is strongly attached to the Palestinian cause. The Palestinian does not feel alienated in Jordan. This does not mean that he abandons Palestine. I am convinced that the democratic climate prevailing in Jordan at present will allow the PLO presence to be comfortable and politically and informationally effective. This also applies to the conditions in the Palestinian camps in Jordan.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] In light of this understanding, how do you view the PLO's role in Jordan?

[Bakr] I believe that the PLO will find numerous facilities in Jordan under the canopy of the new situation, especially in connection with its political and information activity and with its efforts to strengthen contact with the occupied Palestinian territories. This motivates the PLO to be eager to protect and strengthen Jordan's security because a successful democratic experiment is the greatest support for the PLO generally and for the intifadah in particular.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] A tripartite meeting will be held in Washington shortly and it will include the United States, Egypt, and Israel. Where is Jordan's role in the political settlement?

[Bakr] Since the decision to disengage from the West Bank was made, Jordan has not, to the best of my knowledge, taken any step conflicting with the PLO course. On the other hand, Jordan does have a role in the political settlement because it is tied to Palestine and, consequently, to Israel, by geographic borders that go

beyond Jordan's borders with the West Bank. There are Jordanian territories occupied by Israel, the 1948 truce agreement is still extant, and the state of war between Jordan and Israel continues to exist. Therefore, any settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict must take Jordan into account. Consequently, Jordan will have a role in such a settlement. As for the tripartite meeting in Washington, I don't believe that Jordan will participate in it, especially since the PLO is not invited to participate.

## MOROCCO

### Dam Construction Supports Agriculture

*900A0240A Casablanca MAROC SOIR  
in French 4 Dec 89 pp 1-2*

[Article: "Dam Construction: A Real Success Story"]

[Text] Water levels in the kingdom's dams have returned to normal since the welcome rains the country has received.

Also, the Hassan Addakhil dam on the Oued Ziz in Errachidia province is regulating water flow now for the first time.

It will be recalled that this dam, the first of a series, was built at the initiative of His Majesty Hassan II after the 1965 floods caused by the overflowing of the Oued Ziz in the Tafilalet, notably at Erfoud and Rissani, where flooding up to four meters occurred. The project was carried out in response to the results of the referendum called by the king on the question of whether to lower sugar prices or build new hydraulic installations.

Other dams have also been built throughout the kingdom: Moulay Youssef on the Tassaout, Youssef Ben Tachfine on the Oued Massa, Idriss I on the Inaouen, Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdallah on the Bou-Regreg, Oued El Makhazine on the Loukkos, Ibn Batouta on Oued M'Harhar, Abdelmoumen on Oued Issen, Sidi Driss on Oued Lakhdar, Mohamed Ben Abdelkrim on the Neckor, etc....and of course M'Jaara, now under construction, which, next to Aswan, will be the largest dam in Africa.

When Morocco was a protectorate it had only a few dams with very modest water storage capacity, primarily devoted to production of electricity and provision of potable water; but in the first six years after independence the king launched a major push in dam construction with the object of irrigating a million hectares by the year 2000.

The policy first got under way back in 1967, when the king decided on the immediate construction of six dams.

Thus, in 1967 the king ordered construction of the Hassan Addakhil dam, which has since served as a rampart against desertification. With its storage capacity of 362 million cubic meters, it captures floodwaters so they can be used to irrigate some 21,000 hectares.

In 1969 construction began on the second major dam, the Idriss I, which would have a storage capacity of 1.2 billion cubic meters and irrigate 56,000 hectares. That dam was the first link in a chain of nearly a dozen dams in the Oued Sebou basin, where one-fourth of the kingdom's hydroelectric potential is located.

The Mansour Eddahbi dam, which holds 560 million cubic meters, is another rampart against desertification. Work on this project, intended to safeguard the palm groves in the Draa valley, began in 1970 and was completed in 1972. It has transformed a desolate region into a very rich one.

Another example of the exceptional engineering projects carried out under Hassan is none other than the Al Massira dam, the largest dam in the kingdom, which was started about the time of the Glorious Green March and that (like the March itself) has accomplished all its objectives. With its capacity of 2.8 billion cubic meters, it is a boon to the valiant farmers of the Doukkala region and constitutes a successful example of inter-regional water management cooperation.

In launching the work on that dam, the king declared: "We have launched construction of this dam in order to demonstrate that our Green March cannot distract us from the realization of the other objectives we must pursue to ensure our country's economic takeoff." In that connection the sovereign noted the determination of the Moroccan people to fight both for the country's economic and social development and for the defense of the kingdom's territorial integrity.

To coordinate the activities of the various ministerial departments, a water management authority was created in 1967 to oversee the irrigation of 1 million hectares of land. Great strides have been made toward that goal: some 800,000 hectares are already under irrigation; the water supply for 550,000 hectares out of that total comes from the major dams.

In addition, during the 1973-1977 five-year plan, the water authority carried out the following projects:

- The Ibn Batouta dam on the Oued M'Harhar (Tangiers region), completed in 1977. The purpose of the dam was to supply potable water to the city of Tangiers and irrigate 1,930 hectares.
- The Oued El Makhazine dam, inaugurated on 11 May 1979 by His Majesty King Hassan II, irrigating 35,000 hectares in the Loukkos plain and supplying potable water to the towns of Larache and Ksar Al Kebir, in addition to about 65 million kilowatt-hours of hydroelectric energy per year.
- The Tini-Noutine dam on the Oued Tassaout, built to exploit the water runoff from the hydroelectric plant at the Moulay Youssef dam and supply the region's irrigation needs.

Also, work on raising the level of the embankment at the Lalla Takerkoust dam was completed in 1980, making possible the irrigation of 10,000 hectares of land in the Nfis region.

Then there was the Sidi Idriss dam on the Oued Lakhdar, completed in 1984, with a storage capacity of seven million cubic meters. Construction of the Rakad canal to take the runoff from the Ait Chouarit hydroelectric plant helped to meet the irrigation needs of the central Haouz region.

On 29 January 1983 His Majesty King Hassan II, accompanied by President Mitterrand of France, laid the cornerstone of the Ait Chouarit dam, the 11th dam in the Oum Er-Rabia catchment-basin. With 10 million cubic meters of embankment, it is the largest earthen dam in the kingdom (the next largest is the Moulay Youssef dam at 5 million cubic meters). It is also the highest dam in Morocco (144 meters), even taller than the Bin El Ouidane dam (132 meters). It regulates the flow of some 350 million cubic meters of water, thus irrigating 42,000 hectares in the Haouz, supplying potable water to the city of Marrakech, and producing 115 million kilowatt hours per year.

In 1987 Morocco began a program to build a dam each year through the year 2000 to add to the 34 dams already in existence, as part of the ambitious program mapped out by the king.

His Majesty announced that decision on 10 October 1986, on the occasion of the opening of the first session of the third legislature. "We have decided that starting next year and going to the year 2000 we will build one new dam every 12 months.... Studies pertaining to future dams are already prepared, as well as studies of the sites," the sovereign said.

The royal decision was a very important one for Morocco's future, one which reaffirmed the king's concern for water resources in general and dams in particular, given the importance of mobilizing our water resources for agricultural development.

Also, the king's policy of building hillside dams in rural areas has had a beneficial effect on cereal production.

#### Industrial Production Statistics for 1988

90OA0250C Casablanca *LA VIE ECONOMIQUE*  
in French 17 Nov 89 p 8

[Unattributed article: "Improvement of Integration of Industrial Fabric in 1988"]

[Text] According to the annual survey conducted by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, in 1988 the processing industries experienced a significant expansion that included all the indicators of this sector and was marked, for the third consecutive year, by more rapid growth in added value compared to production, which testifies to a better integration of the industrial fabric.

Industrial activity showed a net improvement in 1988 compared to the previous year. Thus, industrial production in 1988 reached 84 billion dirhams as compared with 71 billion in 1987, and increased by 18 percent in current terms. It was the work of some 5,043 enterprises, a number that in turn grew by nearly six percent over the same period.

This increase in business volume confirms the positive trend observed since 1984 and is accompanied, as it was last year, by a clear qualitative improvement given that the added value has experienced a more accelerated growth rate than production (22 percent), thus also bringing to the fore a non-negligible improvement in the level of integration of the industrial fabric.

This rapid development is due to the particularly dynamic growth experienced by such branches as clothing (19 percent), timber (20 percent), and leather articles and shoes (21 percent), but especially metal work (28 percent), transportation equipment (31 percent), and chemicals and parchemicals (41 percent).

#### **Jobs: Plus 10 Percent**

In the area of employment, the processing industries, through the net creation of 250 new projects and the expansion of 1,197 existing businesses, have made possible the creation of about 14,000 permanent jobs in addition to the hiring of the equivalent of 19,500 permanent and seasonal workers during the year 1988. Thus, the industrial sector currently employs 274,417 permanent people and the equivalent of 80,687 permanent and seasonal workers, which represents more than 355,000 people, or 10 percent more than the preceding year.

The apparent productivity of labor is on the order of an average of 92,891 dirhams, a 16-percent improvement over the past fiscal year. The branches with strong apparent productivity are the liquor and tobacco industries (533,575 dirhams), chemical products and parchemicals (196,207 dirhams), the agricultural food industries (153,960 dirhams), and transportation equipment (103,588 dirhams).

The partially state-owned enterprises contribute up to 32.6 percent of the industrial production, two-thirds of which is derived solely from the agricultural food products industries and the chemical and parchemical industries. When considering the social capital held by the state in the abovementioned industries, this share has been reduced to 22 percent of the national share; that is to say, a regression of three points percent compared to the previous year.

#### **Exports: Plus 35 Percent**

In terms of exports, the processing industry is continuing to consolidate its assets. As a matter of fact, it has achieved a very notable development of its foreign sales (plus 35 percent). These exports have covered industrial imports at the rate of approximately 74 percent.

The share of industrial products sold abroad has experienced an appreciable growth in the global export figures, going from 67 percent in 1987 to nearly 70 percent in 1988, which represents a significant improvement in the value of the exported products. The most dynamic branches in terms of exports are chemical and parchemical products, the clothing industry, food products, and textiles and hosiery whose share in the overall industrial exports figures are 40 percent, 15 percent, 15 percent, and 12 percent, respectively.

These exports are the products of 1,109 enterprises (12 percent more than last year) that have exported nearly 49 percent of their production.

As for enterprises with foreign investment (887), they contributed 32 percent to industrial production and 38 percent to added value. Foreign participation in the social capital of the processing industries represents 15 percent of the capital invested by the end of the fiscal year 1988, or a one percent improvement compared with the previous year.

From the point of view of the creation of wealth, the processing industries have produced 25.4 billion in added value, which represents 14 percent of the gross domestic product as compared with only 11.5 percent two years earlier.

**Evolution of Major Values (1988/87)**

**(Values in millions of Dirhams)**

| <b>NATIONAL</b>       |     |    |        |    |               |                     |                       |                   |                    |                |                    |                    |                    |              |
|-----------------------|-----|----|--------|----|---------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------|
|                       |     |    |        |    | <b>Sector</b> | <b>Number Firms</b> | <b>Total Strength</b> | <b>Production</b> |                    | <b>Exports</b> |                    | <b>Investments</b> |                    |              |
|                       |     |    |        |    |               | <b>Number</b>       | <b>88/<br/>87%</b>    | <b>Number</b>     | <b>88/<br/>87%</b> | <b>Value</b>   | <b>88/<br/>87%</b> | <b>Value</b>       | <b>88/<br/>87%</b> | <b>Value</b> |
| 10.Food Industry      | 929 | 3  | 27,350 | 9  | 10,047        | 3                   | 82                    | 45                | 363                | 62             | 1,693              |                    |                    |              |
| 11.Aut. Food Industry | 451 | 2  | 58,277 | 14 | 11,944        | 12                  | 3,196                 | 18                | 499                | 12             | 3,572              |                    |                    |              |
| 12.Liquor & Tobacco   | 43  | -2 | 10,393 | 6  | 5,657         | 15                  | 73                    | 13                | 200                | 42             | 3,936              |                    |                    |              |
| 13.Textiles & Hosiery | 535 | 8  | 63,767 | 14 | 7,996         | 9                   | 2,507                 | 5                 | 808                | 72             | 2,348              |                    |                    |              |
| 14.Clothing Industry  | 578 | 20 | 52,373 | 19 | 3,713         | 19                  | 3,191                 | 16                | 406                | 78             | 11,116             |                    |                    |              |

**Evolution of Major Values (1988/87) (Continued)**

(Values in millions of Dirhams)

| NATIONAL                   |              |            |  |                |            |            |            |         |            |             |        |
|----------------------------|--------------|------------|--|----------------|------------|------------|------------|---------|------------|-------------|--------|
| Sector                     | Number Firms |            |  | Total Strength |            | Production |            | Exports |            | Investments |        |
|                            | Number       | 88/<br>87% |  | Number         | 88/<br>87% | Value      | 88/<br>87% | Value   | 88/<br>87% | Value       |        |
| 15.Leather & Leather Goods | 270          | 7          |  | 14,812         | 11         | 1,888      | 21         | 869     | 30         | 83          | -2     |
| 16.Timber & Timber Goods   | 202          | 4          |  | 11,114         | 9          | 1,832      | 20         | 370     | 12         | 70          | 51     |
| 17.Paper & Cardboard       | 345          | 2          |  | 12,088         | 1          | 3,383      | 7          | 659     | 53         | 132         | 2      |
| 18.Quarry Ore              | 324          | 3          |  | 23,991         | -6         | 5,062      | 21         | 70      | -2         | 325         | 65     |
| 19.Basic Metal Industry    | 22           | -19        |  | 2,398          | -16        | 2,243      | 3          | 435     | 17         | 26          | -80    |
| 20.Metal Works             | 359          | 5          |  | 18,305         | 10         | 4,303      | 28         | 109     | 122        | 307         | 149    |
| 21.Manufacturing Equip.    | 213          | 4          |  | 5,903          | -11        | 1,087      | 3          | 20      | 405        | 41          | -9     |
| 22.Transportation Equip.   | 102          | 2          |  | 8,388          | 10         | 1,982      | 31         | 319     | 28         | 75          | -7     |
| 23.Electric & Electronics  | 120          | 6          |  | 10,537         | 8          | 2,423      | 20         | 322     | 29         | 106         | -1     |
| 24.Precision Industry      | 26           | 18         |  | 955            | 10         | 141        | 20         | 1       | -90        | 26          | 54     |
| 25.Chemicals & Parachem.   | 279          | 10         |  | 23,188         | 4          | 17,438     | 41         | 8,319   | 76         | 1,072       | 11     |
| 26.Plastics & Rubber       | 207          | 5          |  | 10,628         | 31         | 2,050      | 9          | 124     | 18         | 114         | 25     |
| 27.Other Industries        | 28           | 8          |  | 637            | 46         | 59         | 77         | 5       | 82         | 8           | 463    |
| Total                      | 5,043        | 6          |  | 355,104        | 10         | 84,248     | 18         | 20,671  | 35         | 4,661       | 32     |
|                            |              |            |  |                |            |            |            |         |            |             | 25,482 |

Source: Industry Administration

**Phosphate Price Index Chart**

900A0250A Casablanca *LA VIE ECONOMIQUE*  
in French 1 Dec 89 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Phosphates: Price Increase for the Ore, Drop for TSP and DAP"]

[Text] During the first 10 months of the year, the average sale prices for phosphates on the world market experienced

divergent developments: an increase for the ore, sold at an average price of \$40.9 per ton, and a drop for TSP (\$148.2 per ton) and DAP (\$180.4 per ton).

TSP (trisodium phosphate) and DAP (dibasic ammonium phosphate) are fertilizers marketed by Morocco.

The following table shows the evolution of these prices since 1960 and 1967 (in dollars per ton).

| Year | Phosphate Ore  |                 | TSP            |                 | DAP            |                 |
|------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|
|      | Current Prices | Constant Prices | Current Prices | Constant Prices | Current Prices | Constant Prices |
|      |                |                 | 1985           | 1985            | 1985           | 1985            |
| 1960 | 13.0           | 47.0            |                |                 |                |                 |
| 1961 | 13.0           | 46.5            |                |                 |                |                 |
| 1962 | 11.5           | 40.3            |                |                 |                |                 |
| 1963 | 11.5           | 39.7            |                |                 |                |                 |
| 1965 | 14.0           | 46.4            |                |                 |                |                 |
| 1966 | 13.0           | 41.6            |                |                 |                |                 |
| 1967 | 12.0           | 37.3            | 47.0           | 146.3           | 68.5           | 213.2           |
| 1968 | 11.5           | 34.1            | 38.0           | 112.7           | 65.5           | 194.2           |
| 1969 | 11.3           | 31.8            | 39.0           | 109.7           | 58.0           | 163.2           |
| 1970 | 11.0           | 29.3            | 42.5           | 113.1           | 54.0           | 143.7           |

**Price Evolution of Phosphates (Continued)**

| Year | Phosphate Ore  |                 | TSP            |                 | DAP            |                 |
|------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|
|      | Current Prices | Constant Prices | Current Prices | Constant Prices | Current Prices | Constant Prices |
|      |                | 1985            |                | 1985            |                | 1985            |
| 1971 | 11.3           | 28.5            | 43.3           | 109.2           | 61.8           | 155.8           |
| 1972 | 11.5           | 27.7            | 67.5           | 162.4           | 91.0           | 219.0           |
| 1973 | 13.8           | 31.2            | 99.5           | 224.7           | 118.8          | 268.2           |
| 1974 | 54.5           | 113.0           | 303.6          | 629.4           | 332.6          | 689.5           |
| 1975 | 67.0           | 126.4           | 202.5          | 381.9           | 243.0          | 458.3           |
| 1976 | 36.0           | 63.9            | 90.9           | 161.2           | 120.0          | 212.8           |
| 1977 | 30.5           | 50.7            | 97.9           | 162.8           | 133.0          | 221.1           |
| 1978 | 29.0           | 44.9            | 98.0           | 151.8           | 139.8          | 216.5           |
| 1979 | 33.0           | 47.0            | 142.2          | 202.5           | 193.3          | 275.2           |
| 1980 | 46.7           | 60.9            | 180.3          | 235.1           | 222.2          | 289.8           |
| 1981 | 49.5           | 58.9            | 161.3          | 192.0           | 195.0          | 232.1           |
| 1982 | 42.4           | 47.4            | 138.4          | 154.8           | 182.0          | 204.5           |
| 1983 | 36.9           | 39.7            | 134.7          | 145.1           | 183.5          | 197.6           |
| 1984 | 38.3           | 39.7            | 131.3          | 136.1           | 189.1          | 196.1           |
| 1985 | 33.9           | 33.9            | 121.4          | 121.4           | 169.0          | 169.0           |
| 1986 | 34.0           | 33.5            | 121.2          | 118.4           | 154.2          | 151.2           |
| 1987 | 31.0           | 35.2            | 138.0          | 131.5           | 173.7          | 165.5           |
| 1988 | 36.0           | 32.6            | 158.3          | 143.5           | 196.8          | 178.5           |

**Drop in Tourism Statistics Noted**

*90OA0250B Casablanca MAROC SOIR  
in French 17 Nov 89 p 6*

[Article by M.C.: "Over the First 9 Months—Overall Increase of Tourism Activity—A Worrisome Phenomenon: Drop in European Tourist Arrivals"]

[Text] For the second consecutive year, the evolution of tourism activity over the first nine months was marked by a drop that affected the markets originating in Europe as a whole and a massive increase recorded for Algerian tourist arrivals.

Measured across the board for entries of foreign visiting tourists, the tourism activity appears to be expanding given that nearly 2 million tourists were admitted in at the borders during the first nine months of the year, which represents a historic record. Compared to the same period last year, the progress is nearly 30 percent.

But this apparently positive report must be tempered. The European market has dropped by 4.4 percent; or, at the present time, this happens to be the most significant market in terms of overnight stays and foreign currency sales as well as the impact at the level of economic activity. As a matter of fact, the drop has been felt in the three top European markets of origin: France (minus 4.4 percent), Spain (minus 7.0 percent), and the FRG (minus 6.8 percent).

The overall regression that has been observed at the level of European markets could be explained by the simultaneous occurrence of a number of factors that have also slowed down tourism activity in other receiving countries in the Mediterranean area, specifically:

- the good weather that prevailed in Europe all through the year;
- the organization of spectacular activities to commemorate the bicentennial of the French Revolution;
- the attitude of the British tourism organizations that kept away from Agadir because the hotel keepers of the region refused to submit to their conditions.<sup>1</sup>

This is why the overall increase in overnight stays recorded in ranked hotels over the first nine months (plus 4.6 percent) hides inequalities from one region to the next. Agadir, for example—which is the top tourist region—has experienced a drop of 5.3 percent in visitors. The figures for Marrakech (plus 7.4 percent), Rabat (plus 20.0 percent), and Casablanca (plus 25.5 percent) increased, unlike Tangiers (minus 6.4 percent).

The Rif, Saiss, and Oriental regions apparently benefited from massive arrivals of Algerians, both tourists and people who work in Europe and transit through Morocco: Al Hoceima (plus 36.2 percent), Chaouen (plus 21.6 percent), Nador (plus 29.5 percent), Fes (plus 12.5 percent), Meknes (plus 7.3 percent), Taza (plus 22.2 percent), and Pujda (plus 75.9 percent).

As a matter of fact, it is the arrival of Algerian tourists that, for the second consecutive year, explains the quantitative improvement of tourist activity in our country. Except for Algerians, this activity has for several years now experienced an unexplainable stagnation, and this in spite of the additional investments that have been made, specifically in the hotel infrastructure.

The following is a comparative table showing the evolution of arrivals by main markets.

Table 1

| Arrivals From                  | Jan-Sept    | Jan-Sept    | Evolution |
|--------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|
|                                | 1988        | 1989        | (Percent) |
| Europe                         | 1,049,411   | 1,003,200   | -4.4      |
| France                         | 396,547     | 378,905     | -4.4      |
| Spain                          | 253,071     | 235,216     | -7.0      |
| FRG                            | 131,314     | 122,279     | -6.8      |
| United Kingdom                 | 83,736      | 74,158      | -11.4     |
| America                        | 67,835      | 92,160      | +35.9     |
| USA                            | 49,219      | 67,598      | -37.3     |
| Maghreb                        | 327,036     | 792,616     | +142.3    |
| Algeria                        | 271,786     | 713,845     | +162.6    |
| Tunisia                        | 47,226      | 47,320      | -0.2      |
| Libya                          | 5,082       | 27,797      | -447.0    |
| Other Arab Countries           | 38,416      | 42,423      | +10.4     |
| Africa                         | 10,827      | 10,691      | -1.2      |
| Others (including USSR, Japan) | 32,477      | 39,373      | +22.4     |
| Total                          | 1,526,002   | 1,980,827   | +29.8     |
| Total except Algeria           | (1,254,216) | (1,266,982) | +1.0      |

Source: Ministry of Tourism

Receipts in foreign currency experienced an increase. The interim figures available show an increase of 9.5 percent, with receipts reaching 4,732.4 million dirhams.

#### Footnote

1. The situation of Tangiers would have been repeated if it had not been for the vigilance of the hotel owners of Agadir. The British tourist organizations wanted to shift the price war that is raging at home to Agadir.

#### SYRIA

##### Factors Contributing to Balance of Trade Surplus Analyzed

90OL0213A London AL-HAWADITH  
in Arabic 12 Jan 90 p 39

[Article: "Syria Eliminates Balance of Trade Deficit"]

[Text] Syria has experienced a significant economic development for the first time in more than a quarter

century. It has been able to achieve equilibrium in its balance of foreign trade. Rather, its exports have outweighed its imports and it is expected that it will achieve a surplus of nearly 10 billion Syrian pounds, or the equivalent of \$1 billion, in 1989.

According to the statistical indicators of Syria's foreign trade in the first eight months of 1989, the value of exports to Arab and foreign states amounted to nearly 20,447,000,000 Syrian pounds or the equivalent of \$1,826,000,000. It is expected that by year's end, the exports will amount to nearly 30 billion Syrian pounds (\$2,679,000,000). Meanwhile, imports in the same eight months amounted to 13,230,000,000 Syrian pounds or the equivalent of \$1,181,000,000.

The Syrian balance of trade has thus achieved a surplus and in the first eight months of 1989, exports have exceeded imports by nearly \$645 million (7,217,000,000 Syrian pounds). This surplus is expected to grow to nearly \$1 billion by year's end.

The economic leadership in Damascus is devoting special attention to this economic development and it considers it a distinguishing mark in the history of Syria's modern economy. This is the first time Syria has been able to eliminate its balance of payments deficit and achieve a big surplus in favor of its exports. For many years, the Syrian balance of trade has experienced a deficit as a result of low exports and a constant rise in the value of imports. Throughout the 1970's and 1980's, the imports value amounted to more than twice the exports value. The balance of trade deficit amounted to nearly 15 billion Syrian pounds in 1986, to 12 billions in 1987, and to 10 billions in 1988.

The development is made more significant, as the economists say, by the fact that this year's balance of trade surplus equals the deficit incurred in the preceding year (1988), and by the fact that it is coupled with a fiscal equilibrium manifested in the (1989) general state budget, considering that domestic revenues covered all sections of the budget's current and investment spending. Syria has thus achieved fiscal and economic balance in 1989. This confirms the validity and soundness of the economic measures implemented by the government and embodied in squeezing the administrative spending, curtailing waste, streamlining imports, expanding the export channels, encouraging the private and joint sectors to make major investments in the areas of industry, agriculture, and tourism, and other measures compatible with the self-reliance policy. President Hafiz al-Asad has underlined the adoption of economic programs compatible with this policy so that the economic activities may be adjusted in light of the local resources and capabilities exclusively, without reliance on any foreign aid or loans.

The factors contributing to the balance of payments surplus were the concerted efforts which focused on the

foreign trade sector, the successive steps taken by the government to streamline imports and to promote exports through a higher export committee and an import, export, and consumption committee. Syrian Prime Minister Mahmud al-Zu'bi was careful to head the meetings of this [higher export] committee which adopted a number of measures, the first part of which was directed at the public sector and which required every organization and company to adhere to a specific export plan and to designate production lines for export commodities. The other measures were aimed at the private sector's export activities. Steps were taken to deal with the obstacles facing this sector. The exchange rate for export commodities and the entire export pricing policy were reexamined. This sector's exporters were permitted to keep 50 percent, 75 percent, or 100 percent of the hard currency revenues generated by their exports so that they may use these revenues to pay the bills for their imports.

What is interesting is that Syrian exports have begun to find their way to the free world markets and are no longer confined to the agreement countries. According to the statistical indicators, 59 percent of the total exports were delivered to countries not bound to Syria by payment agreements.

As for the type of the exported goods and commodities, raw cotton, textiles, and cotton clothing led the exports, followed by phosphate, aromatics, vegetables, fruits, grains, sheep, canned food, furniture, and household effects.

A prominent Syrian economist has told AL-HAWADITH, "We are proud of the fiscal and economic balance we have achieved simultaneously this year because this is an accomplishment made two years after the termination of the Arab aid money allocated by the Baghdad summit. Consequently, the accomplishment reflects the dimensions of our country's material and human capabilities. It also reflects what can be realized if the objective conditions for the release of these capabilities are created. What makes us even more hopeful and optimistic is that 75 percent of our total exports were not oil exports but agricultural and industrial goods that are in demand in the Arab and other countries. The big surplus in our balance of trade is the result of leaps in various production areas. Consequently, the export volume has not affected the availability of goods in the domestic markets. An observer of the Syrian markets in the past year realizes how saturated these markets were with goods, commodities, and people's ordinary needs."

#### **Problems Facing Water Projects in al-Raqqah Described**

*90OL0235A Damascus TISHRIN  
in Arabic 20 Jan 90 p 4*

[Article by Sa'id Matar: "Condition of Water Projects in al-Raqqah Governorate; Proposals To Bolster Project

Capabilities; Supplying Water Authority With Rigs To Drill Deep Wells; Securing Submersible Pumps for River Projects"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Drinking water projects have not undergone major development since the mid-1970's, considering that the agencies concerned were given a special subsidy to expand water projects, especially in the countryside, to reorganize the existing urban water networks, and to enlarge the purification plants to make them compatible with society's population growth.

But with urban and rural expansion, the size of the water projects implemented by the country's water agencies has come to exceed the capacity, resources, requisites, and technical cadres of these agencies.

Al-Raqqah Governorate Public Drinking Water and Sewerage Authority is concerned with supplying clean potable water to all urban and rural parts of the governorate, especially since land reclamation projects and city, town, and village planning projects have covered vast parts of the governorate and since electricity has been supplied to all rural areas. Therefore, the services supplied to the citizens, wherever they may be, must be made complete.

#### **Al-Raqqah Governorate Drinking Water**

To learn about the real potable water conditions in al-Raqqah Governorate—which has seen development in its water purification plants and in the efforts to drill artesian and percolation wells and to build water networks for cities and population centers—and, at the same time, to find out about the problems that pose a threat to the continued supply of drinking water to the governorate, we have talked to Engineer 'Adil al-Qasim, general director of al-Raqqah Public Drinking Water and Sewerage Authority, who has said, "Al-Raqqah City Public Water Authority, created in accordance with decree No 2795 of 1975, began by managing and utilizing drinking water within the city and the neighboring villages. The purification plant, completed in 1974, supplied 14,400 cubic meters daily. This volume was enough to supply the city and 22 neighboring villages with clean drinking water through a network of eternite pipelines. But the plant then became unable to meet the city population's water needs, and this led to expanding the water authority's activities. In accordance with decree No 14 of 1984, this authority was transformed into the Public Drinking Water and Sewerage Authority. The authority's cadre was shifted from the technical services [department] to the Ministry of Housing and Utilities and the authority was given broad operational powers compatible with the dimensions of the drinking water projects. The authority began enlarging the purification plant and, in 1984, increased its total capacity to nearly 40,000 cubic meters daily. Prior to this expansion, the eternite network in the city's old quarters had been replaced by a network of flexible (font) piping. Because flexible font piping then became unavailable and because the work to plan the city's other quarters and to

build a sewerage network had not been completed, the authority had to stop building the remaining part of the network.

#### Increased Disposal Capacity

With the population growth and with development in the governorate, especially with the expansion of the reclamation projects and with the establishment of development projects which led to increased water consumption, the authority built (in 1988) a new percolation well to reinforce al-Raqqah purification plant with a daily production capacity of 17,000 cubic meters, thus securing the clean drinking water needs of the city population and of 24 neighboring villages.

#### Rural Projects

In the countryside, a large number of important projects have been completed to supply drinking water to all parts of the governorate. These projects total 55 in number and include 37 projects whose water is drawn from artesian wells that produce water fit for consumption and supply this water to 513 villages and population centers encompassing 83 percent of the rural population which totals 288,000 people. The network built for this purpose is 2,000 km long and has a daily capacity of 40,000 cubic meters.

#### Current Drinking Water Situation

But what is the current drinking water situation in the governorate, considering that bottlenecks are experienced in the continued flow of water because of urban and rural expansion? Even though no crisis has developed yet, the fear of such a crisis should be taken into account due to numerous factors, especially the drop in water level in the Euphrates River, the depletion of numerous artesian wells, and other factors.

Regarding the current drinking water situation, Engineer 'Adil has pointed out that: There are five projects whose water is drawn from Lake al-Asad and Lake al-Ba'th. These projects enjoy a degree of stability because of the constant water level in the two lakes.

A total of 13 projects whose water is drawn from the Euphrates River were affected in 1989 by the drop in the volume of the water they pump and by the change of their standards as a result of the drop in the river water level. The authority had to lower the piping through which water is drawn into al-Raqqah water purification plant pumps to a deeper level so that the plant may be able to operate at a disposal rate of nearly 100 cubic meters per second even though the plant's designed capacity is 250 cubic meters per second.

To deal with this problem, a battery of horizontal pumps had to be installed in al-Buhamat water project and four electrical suction pumps had to be installed in the river course to draw water to the inlets of al-'Ukayrishi, Hamrat Balasim, and Fatisah Bayram water projects.

A technical study has been conducted to secure pumps for the other projects that draw their water from the Euphrates, so as to solve the problem temporarily in case the water continues to drop below its present level, which allows for drawing 170 cubic meters per second. It is impossible to build new inlets because of their high cost and because of the unavailability of the necessary raw materials and appropriations.

#### Drying Wells

As for the projects which draw their drinking water from artesian wells, especially wells in the Turkish border area, some of these wells have either dried up or experienced a drop in their water level because the Turkish side has been arbitrarily pumping water from wells ranging from 400-500 meters in depth whereas the drilled wells belonging to the authority have a depth range of 100-200 meters only. With its drilling rig, the authority cannot drill wells with a depth of more than 300 meters.

#### Administrative and Technical Difficulties

In the face of this situation, the authority is experiencing administrative and technical difficulties with the resources available to it. The authority has a single 10-year old vertical rig for drilling artesian wells which is subject to frequent breakdowns that are difficult to repair because it is difficult to secure the needed replacement parts. This is in addition to the authority's lack of a skilled cadre capable of meeting the actual need. The authority's old personnel numbers are still in force and these numbers are incompatible with the increasing number of the authority's projects and activities, according to the general director's assertions. Moreover, public agencies have not paid their water bills for years, the Ministry of Finance has failed to move the accounts of the (indebted) official agencies, and the authority has not been able to collect the revenues from water consumption because it does not have enough financial cadres for the purpose. The local administrative agencies collect these revenues for their own benefit and this has caused the authority to develop a fiscal deficit which amounted to eight million pounds in 1989.

#### Signs of Approaching Crisis

Keeping in mind this condition of the water projects and purification plants in the city of al-Raqqah and of other plants and projects that draw their water from the river and from artesian wells, we will point out here a number of signs that indicate that the operation of these plants will worsen and that these projects will not be able to supply the governorate with enough drinking water in the future. Parts of the governorate's cities and villages have begun to feel some effects after a period of stability that has lasted 10 or more years. The most important signs are: Fluctuation in the river water level which has been dropping since 1989 below the designed level of the existing projects, and which has altered the qualities of water in percolation wells (keeping in mind that installing submersible pumps in the river course to

secure the constant flow of water to the inlets is uneconomical and does not always meet the consumption needs.)

Drying wells in the border area dictate that the Public Drinking Water Authority's capabilities be strengthened so that the authority may drill new and very deep wells. The authority should be supplied with the necessary rigs that can drill artesian wells with a depth of 600 meters.

To overcome these signs, the machinery, requisites, and resources needed to strengthen the drinking water projects must be provided. These projects do not merely require temporary solutions. They are very costly projects. Therefore, the necessary technical studies must be conducted with utmost speed and the appropriations needed to secure the (electrical suction) pumps must be provided so that the pumps may be installed in the river course and may pump water to the inlets of the existing water projects. It is preferable to replace the existing inlets by others compatible with the low river water level so as to supply the water and dispense with the electrical suction pumps which consume excessive amounts of electric power because of the current conditions of the Euphrates River.

#### **Raw Material Requisites Are Available But...**

This [replacement] requires providing all kinds of piping, the reinforcement steel needed for the water inlets and reservoirs, and the sheet iron needed to coat the piping used for the artesian wells. All this should pose no obstacle to completing the governorate's water projects because all these requisites are available to 'Umran [Development] Agency. These projects must be given priority, keeping in mind that large quantities of the sheet iron needed to coat the wells is available to 'Umran, but is not sold to the water authority on the pretext that 'Umran is instructed not to sell. To secure the sheet iron it needs, the water authority buys it from the private sector at very high prices. What instructions are these instructions that prohibit 'Umran from selling sheet iron to the public sector, especially since this type of iron is, according to government instructions, designated for coating water wells! It makes no difference if the wells are used for agriculture or for drinking water. Both are equally important.

To conclude, through his excellency the prime minister's visit to al-Raqqah Governorate and through the deputy prime minister's tour of the governorate in December 1989, the government stressed that the priority in providing required raw materials is given to the vital projects and to securing the rigs needed to drill very deep wells, especially in the border area. This demonstrates the government interest in securing drinking water and in providing the citizens with the fundamental services. Implementation of the government directives and instructions is coupled with the efforts of the governorate's local authorities to secure all the requirements, especially the drilling rigs and machinery needed to

obviate the approaching drinking water crisis, signs of which surfaced last summer.

## **TUNISIA**

#### **President's Typical Office Routine Described**

*90OA0251C Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE  
in French 4 Dec 89 p 2*

[Unattributed article: "The Way Ben Ali Works—AFRIQUE MAGAZINE at the Palace of Carthage"]

[Text] Since President Ben Ali's access to power, a great many things are really no longer what they used to be at the Carthage palace, the residence of the head of state in the northern suburb of Tunis. A change—modest though it may be—is even noticeable to ordinary passersby: the gates of the big portal, which used to provide a glimpse of the mystery of the gardens, have been lined with metal sheets in order to protect the palace from the indiscreet glances and cameras of the tourists. Also, perhaps, in order to better guarantee presidential security.

True, as in the time of Bourguiba, not everyone who would like to get inside those gates, but since this year not even the delegates are allowed to enter the palace at the wheels of their private cars. They are expected to park them outside and then continue on their way in an official car.

New president, new style. A minister of the current head of state, who was also a minister under Bourguiba, noted: "We are not experiencing a change, but rather a break. Psychological, cultural, ideological." This was his way of confiding that over a period of two years, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (who turned 53 on last September 3d) has found ample time to impose his working methods and his rhythm on all of his fellow workers, beginning with his ministers, whom he theoretically convenes in council twice a month.

Under Bourguiba it was the tradition for each of council participants—the council at the time was held weekly—to arrive at his own time and to take the time to talk at length in one or another of the palace's halls. The rule today: the council of ministers meets at 10 o'clock sharp, and they are requested to arrive no more than five or 10 minutes earlier. With drawn sword, the guards salute the excellencies who immediately enter the long rectangular hall with high ceilings, where they barely have time to exchange a few words, under the expressionless eyes of the busts of Hannibal, Jugurtha, Ibn Khaldoun, and Bourguiba. At 10 o'clock, the usher announces: "The President of the Republic!" and Ben Ali appears, followed by the prime minister—with whom he invariably converses prior to the council meeting—reporters from the official press agency and television cameramen.

Each minister salutes the president in turn and then sits down. Ben Ali gets an armchair, the excellencies chairs. In front of each minister lies a red Hermes portfolio, and

a card that lists his specific function—and not his name as was the case in the beginning.

#### 'Be Brief, I Beg You'

All the ministers know the agenda. It has been communicated to them a week earlier, together with the minutes of the previous week's meeting. The head of state, in turn, has been informed of the communications that will be made by the ministers. The latter have sent them well in advance to the secretary general of the government as well as to the president's adviser in charge of the sector involved in the communication. Consequently, the council meeting can start without any problems.

Ben Ali opens the meeting, formulates the first question on the agenda, and gives the floor to the appropriate minister.

On last September 20, a major first occurred within the council of ministers meeting with the introduction of transparencies and a projector. The new president feels that technical resources are there to be used. He prefers a minister to discuss data listed on a screen rather than to hear him talk about investments or growth rates with his nose hidden in his file.

"If it happens that Ben Ali does not know a file very well," one of those close to him specified, "he does not hide that fact. He asks many questions, asks for the meaning of this or that decision, prompts discussions until his mind is made up."

#### No Smoking Allowed at Council Meetings

The language spoken during council meetings is Arabic, but French is not excluded from the debates. Everyone takes notes in his own way: the secretary general of the presidency, Mohamed El Jeri, in a notary's record book so that he can record everything for the "boss," others in notebooks or on single sheets, others make note of the bill or of the communication that will be transmitted to the services for implementation and followup. But this latter method is not very much appreciated: to maintain secrecy is a vital rule for the president.

Following a communication, Ben Ali asks whether anyone has any comments to make. Hands are raised and he gives the floor in order of precedence. The shorter the speech, the more he appreciates it.

Naturally rather brusque, he tries never to show impatience. A "shorter, I beg you" is the only sign of annoyance expressed toward a minister who is being too talkative. And whether within a council meeting or elsewhere, Ben Ali does not like for anyone to return to the attack once he has made a decision. At such a time he says, "I am not convinced," and the matter is definitively closed.

This twice monthly council meeting may last more than three hours, but there is no smoking, and no tea or coffee or even water is served.

On the other hand, the CMRs—the limited ministerial councils—which meet at the request of the president or at the suggestion of a minister, are more relaxed and coffee is served. Here the elements of a problem are examined, it is opened up, and then the results are submitted for government approval.

One of the major characteristics of the Council of Ministers is that it is no longer the stage for a "one-man show" as it used to be, but the place where the country's policy is truly decided on, where, if one of the ministers is to be believed, "one provides a concrete content to one's convictions and one's hopes." Although it is necessary, in order to be appreciated, to show both enthusiasm and humility.

#### Note Cards as Memory Aids

It also appears that if a Tunisian minister wants to last it is in his interest never to forget that once he has set his timetable (usually for a period of two weeks), the one he depends on, demanding and methodical, will not allow a single grain of sand to disturb the mechanism.

Is Ben Ali fanatical? Some people are sometimes tempted to assert this. They stress that prior to an important meeting, for example with a head of state, the president asks his fellow workers to prepare 6 X 10 centimeter note cards on which they are supposed to write the significant points to be made. Add to this that he, himself, for 24 to 48 hours, concentrates absolutely on the event, leaving to others the task of disposing of the daily tasks.

On the specific day, it is the man in charge of presidential security who carries the files, the notes, and even the president's glasses. And this is how Ben Ali is able to start the meeting with empty hands and pockets, his mind completely free. Is this excessive? It is in any case very handy.

The head of state has apparently retained a lesson from his background as an education expert: the higher up you are, the more difficult it is to know precisely how the people live. Thus his method to better understand what living at the crest of the hill might well prevent him from seeing at the bottom of the valley: unexpected visits to one area or another in the depths of Tunisia. Only the security services, the protocol service, the presidential secretariat general (sometimes), and the head of state's personal physician (always) are informed of these kinds of commando operations. And if at such times Ben Ali discovers hidden truths, then the whole hierarchy gets a proper dressing down.

In Tunisia, as elsewhere, the president is seen as an intercessor with providence, and the government as responsible for all ills. This is why the mail handed to Ben Ali, after the most important letters have been sorted, primarily consists of requests for intervention. He responds to them, sending these to whomever is concerned and personally signing them, not in green ink as Bourguiba used to do, but using any kind of felt tip

pen or a ballpoint pen. He comments in the same manner to press clippings that he sends to one minister or another, or the reports on the minister's activities that he requests once or twice a month. A good method, obviously, to keep a close eye on what their excellencies are doing.

#### **Private Conversations in His Office**

Like all heads of state, Ben Ali has an official in charge of protocol at his disposal, but protocol is also his business. He sees to it in detail. Not to have forgotten anything concerning the preparations for a ceremony or a journey obviously brings him pleasure as he is convinced that it behooves him to give full measure to the solemnity of the state. The taking of the oath by government members before taking on their duties, is the result of one of those decisions as are the ceremonies of accreditation with reading of the statutory texts related to the tasks of heads of diplomatic missions.

When Ben Ali has a private conversation with his prime minister or a member of his government, this takes place in his office, but if a business manager or an upper level official is brought into the room, then the meeting ends in a meeting room. The corner of the lounge set aside for meetings with diplomats is not the same as the one to which leaders of national organizations, for example, are entitled.

Better yet: the president does not hesitate to concern himself with more domestic details of the palace: the reconversion of the lounges after he took power, and especially that of his work space gave migraines to more than one of his fellow workers. A "clear out this lot" from his lips, and everything had to go back to zero.

#### **His Preferred Color: Purple**

How is Zine El Abidine Ben Ali physically perceived in the country? He is no longer the "father," as Bourguiba was, but the "first one" or the "crack."

Since becoming head of state, Ben Ali, who is always well groomed, obviously has more uniformly black hair. On the occasion of the feast of Mouled, which commemorates the birth of the Prophet, the cooperation of patented craftsmen was required to design and manufacture the jebbah, the traditional garment he was to wear for the ceremony. Color, embroidery, length, width, nothing was left to chance.

Ben Ali dresses frugally, preferring Italian suits to clothes made of English cloth, and is fond of printed pocket handkerchiefs coordinated to his ties. As a result, identical pocket handkerchiefs have blossomed on all coats worn by the Tunisian political class. The president likes purple a lot, and if it had not been for the Islamists who adopted this color for the legislative elections, Ben Ali would have chosen it for the RCD [Constitutional Democratic Rally], his party.

Those who know the head of the Tunisian state very well assure us that vulgarity, lack of elegance, and casualness are among the things he cannot stand. He has been known, during his rare visits into the interior of the country, to curtly tell officials to shave more closely.

Ben Ali is one of those men who do not need a lot of sleep, and one of those, more rare, who, like Napoleon and Churchill, are able to fall asleep anywhere: in a car and even in a chair. Even though he begins his day at 7 o'clock, he no longer has time to engage as much in sports as he would like, but he is still as fascinated as ever with electronics, and he is capable of locking himself for hours on end into his "unofficial" office covered wall to wall with transceivers and ultrasophisticated gadgets, where a computer terminal connects him to the Ministries of the Interior and of Defense.

#### **On Mondays He Meets With the Prime Ministers**

Before removing Hedi Baccouche from the position of prime minister, Ben Ali met with him virtually every day, starting at 9 o'clock, often earlier. Hedi Baccouche also attended official audiences and remained with the president until lunch time, which they occasionally spent together.

This situation lasted until the ministerial reorganization of 11 April last. At that time, the period of time allotted to the prime minister was set at two hours every other day, except for Sundays. Finally, when the relationship between Ben Ali and his former prime minister began to cool, the latter came to see him only on Mondays and Thursdays. Today, Monday mornings are set aside to take stock of the situation with the new prime minister, Hamed Karoui, who took office on 27 September.

#### **No Back Stabbing in His Presence**

The majority of the ministers have counterparts at the palace, called "presidential advisers." The secretary general to the presidency, a real central figure, does not use his position to set himself up as a counter prime minister. For the time being, this avoids any tugging, backstabbing, traps, and obstacle courses to gain the favor of the prince. But Ben Ali uses this organization to tie up information, often preferring this technique to direct physical contact, at the risk of misjudging or ignoring the people.

"All through this period," say those who are close to him, "he has endeavored to put into place an instrument that would allow him to evaluate what is good for the Tunisians. What he wants above everything else is to be useful to his country." Some people may feel that two years of "rule" is too short a period to really judge the results, but nobody can doubt the desire displayed by the head of state.

### Drought Relief Assistance for Kef Region

90OA0251A Tunis *LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE*  
*in French 8 Dec 89 p 9*

[Article by Brahim Oueslati: "Agricultural Production—5.3 Million Dinars for the Farmers"]

[Text] For nearly three years now, the Kef region, which in the past produced one-fifth of the country's cereal production, has been exposed to difficulties, especially weather related. The drought has seriously affected this year's crop. But there is still hope, especially following the latest rains.

In the meantime, 6,500 farmers have gotten 5.3 million dinars in credits through the current year's production.

The latest rains that have watered the various regions of the country have given new hope to the farmers who were starting to fear a third year of drought. The precipitation levels recorded during the months of September and October have made it possible for agricultural production to start under good auspices. They have encouraged farmers to begin the cereal planting under normal conditions. In Beja and Jendouba, the rain levels were even higher than normal.

This is not the case in Siliana and the Kef region, where a rather significant deficit was recorded compared to the average over the past 50 years. In the Kef region, for example, the deficit during the two months of September and October reached 70 percent—as a matter of fact, only 19 millimeters was recorded—as against an average of 84.2 percent. The consequences of the drought that has prevailed over the last two years are beginning to be felt in terms of water reserves. "The situation is even worrisome," according to a high-level regional agricultural official. "The dams and ground water levels are currently suffering a serious deficit," he added.

### Drought Losses of Fodder

This situation, which has been going on for nearly three years, has had serious consequences for agricultural production. "The Kef region, which usually accounts for one-fifth of the country's cereal production, is having a hard time producing seed," stated a regional official.

Furthermore, in terms of figures, it is clear that the current crop does not shape up as very promising, unlike other regions such as Beja, Jendouba, and Bizerte. (All the better!) In terms of fodder, only about 50 percent of the expected 20,000 hectares were productive. Hence a drought loss of nearly half. Because you cannot go beyond the first two weeks of October for that crop.

As far as barley is concerned, the losses are low given that they hope to harvest 70 percent of the anticipated 80,000 hectares; as for wheat, in spite of the fact that only 20,000 hectares out of a total of 130,000 produced a crop, there is still hope. Because with the latest rains it will be possible to go to the end, knowing that for this crop the deadline of 15 January is fatal. There will also

be an opportunity to make up for it at the time nitrogen fertilizer is applied in February and the weeding takes place in March. But everything will depend on the rainfall over the next few months. In any case, as the agricultural engineer stressed, "we should focus our efforts on irrigation in order to ensure crops next year."

### Weather Conditions Have Disrupted Everything

The Kef region, which is primarily agricultural, has been anxious recently, in spite of the latest rains.

As a matter of fact, the weather conditions have disrupted everything. Even the farmers [with large holdings]—there are 332 of them farming more than 100 hectares—are less and less enthusiastic. Representing nearly 10 percent of the region's farmers, they farm nearly 80 percent of the arable land. But, due to the difficulties they have been faced with—as have the farmers with [small and medium holdings] as a matter of fact—they prefer to work parsimoniously. Those difficulties have a name: bank credits that are a heavy burden (5.3 million dinars for 6,500 beneficiaries this year), increasingly expensive agricultural equipment, "rudimentary" ways of thinking.... The latter point is determining to the extent that the use of appropriate techniques depends enormously on it. [as published]

The rate of illiteracy is still high, specifically in the rural areas. That is not something that will help the modernization of the sector. "Certain techniques, such as crop rotation, the appropriate use of fertilizers, weeding...are ignored by the small farmers," confirmed a regional official.

The land situation hinders the development of the sector. The method of indirect land development represents 35 percent. But this method presents a major inconvenience: overuse of the soil. That enormously alters the human rates. This rate, which should be higher than two percent, is only one percent in Tunisia. Hence, the risk of rendering the soil infertile is high.

The problems of agriculture are not solely cyclic in nature. They are also inherent in the policy conducted since independence, which relegated the sector to second place. The accumulation of difficulties of all kinds has caused the situation to become nearly irretrievable. If you add to that the fact that the "mental equipment" (to borrow the expression used by the economist Lucien Febre) is still rudimentary, you realize that this sector has much greater need for concrete actions rather than speeches. The head of state has understood this and has very recently decided on a number of measures to benefit agriculture.

### Transportation Solutions Planned for Cities

90OA0251B Tunis *LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE*  
*in French 20 Dec p 3*

[Article by N.O.: "What Is the Future of Public Transportation in the Large Cities?"]

21 February 1990

## NEAR EAST

[Text] The urban explosion experienced by the large cities and the proliferation of spontaneous housing in the peripheral areas insistently presents us with the problem of the future of urban transportation in the large cities.

What kind of urban transportation will there be in Tunisia in the year 2000?

With the urban explosion experienced by our large cities and the rapid growth of demand for transportation, the question deserves to be examined seriously by the public authorities in order to find practical solutions to this thorny problem.

The Tunisian-Canadian seminar organized recently by ENIT [Tunisian National School of Engineering] and the Polytechnic School of Montreal on "the instruments of regional planning in urban transportation" was, and rightly so, an occasion for more thorough reflection in this delicate field.

It should be noted that in 1989 the capital of Tunis had nearly 1.6 million inhabitants for an urban area of nearly 16,000 hectares. This urban growth, which has specifically bred the proliferation of spontaneous housing in the peripheral areas, has made it difficult for the transportation system to provide satisfactory service.

Hence, the appearance of a phenomenon that is paradoxical to say the least: the spectacular development of private car ownership (57 cars per 1,000 inhabitants in 1989) and a drop in the public transportation field. As a matter of fact, the number of buses per 100,000 inhabitants decreased from 56 in 1982 to only 48 in 1989.

This exceptional situation has resulted in a deterioration of the quality of service in bus transportation, an inadequacy between supply and demand; a saturation of the capacity of the highway network, specifically on access routes into the cities; and finally, a penalization of public bus transportation due to the congestion in city centers.

Due to the acuteness of the problem, which might result in alarming proportions by the year 2000, it is urgent to take effective action to deal with spontaneous housing development, to further a balanced development of the cities, and to improve the transportation conditions in the big cities.

A strategy has been decided on, which includes specifically the following points:

- The introduction of a new method of on-site transportation: a light subway will operate over a 30-kilometer-long network and connect the center of the capital with Ben Arous in the south, Ariana in the north, Den-Den in the west, and Ibn Khaldoun in the northeast. Once the construction is completed, it is expected that it will provide transportation for 100 million travelers (that is to say, one-quarter of the overall transportation demands).
- The pursuit of a program of renovation and modernization of the bus fleet of the SNT [National Transport Company].

- The electrification of the Southern suburb network of the SNCFT [Tunisian National Railroad Company].
- Diversification of the supply of means of transportation by the introduction of a new range of products (group cabs, minibuses) with intermediate capacities between normal cabs and standard buses. The districts of El Manar, El Menzah, La Marsa, and Zahrouri will be progressively served by a network of 30 minibuses administered by a private company. The objective of this pilot experiment is to prompt the users of private cars to use these new comfortable and rapid services.

Parallel with these actions, the new traffic plan was progressively put into place consistent with the progress being made in the subway construction. This new plan has given greater importance to the subway and buses as ways of access to the center. It has provided more space to pedestrians and has made possible better control of private car traffic. It also provides for:

- A strengthening of the capacity of the ring of boulevards (for example: the exchange under construction at Bab El Assel will make it possible to reduce congestion on Taieb Mehiri Avenue).
- The development of parking areas outside the city, near subway stations, and the generalization of paid parking in the center.

Generally speaking, the public authorities have decided to provide the cities with a high-quality system of public transportation that will make it possible to improve the functioning of the cities. The current studies of the main regional transportation plan for Tunis and Sfax will give us details on the priorities, the choices of methods to encourage, and the areas to be served by the year 2000.

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

## Increased Demand Expected To Benefit Oil, Gas Industries

90OL0196A *Dubayy AL-BAYAN* in Arabic 8 Dec 89 p 3

[Text] Because of its enormous reserves and high production capacity, the United Arab Emirates [UAE] is considered to be among the few oil producers that are candidates to benefit from the increase in world demand for oil in the 1990s. A large number of other producers, by contrast, will be compelled to reduce their production because of the smallness or depletion of their reserves. Large oil reserves will enable the UAE to produce oil for at least 100 more years.

As indicators began to point to a sharp increase in oil demand in January-September 1989, oil companies in the UAE began to activate plans to develop fields to meet the growing demands of the 1990s.

A report appearing in the authoritative MEED magazine states that Abu Dhabi, considered one of the richest areas of the world in terms of energy reserves (100 billion barrels of oil and more than 180,000 billion cubic feet of

gas), has encouraged a number of companies to locate in the region based on expectations of brisk activity in the oil and gas sector.

In May 1989, the al-Matyu'i Western Engineering and Trading Company was established by local and Pakistani investors to submit proposals to carry out works and maintenance in the oil, petrochemicals, and fertilizers sectors of the Gulf region. Months later, the British company, Kennedy and Dunkin, established a joint project with a local company for work in the petrochemicals sector.

Four main projects are currently being planned or have reached an advanced pricing stage. Last August, Andiya Engineers won a planning, engineering and supervision contract for a 150-km gas pipeline extending from al-Maqta' to al-'Ayn. Costing \$80-100 million, the new pipeline will run parallel to an existing pipeline for oil products completed in 1982.

The companies are also preparing to move toward qualifying for work in the Thamamah-3 field. The Italian Sanamber and Gitti Company is currently conducting a feasibility study on increasing the refining capacity of the Umm al-Nar Refinery to 85,000 barrels per day from its current level of 60,000 barrels per day. The fourth project includes the renovation of a sulphur production unit at the al-Ruways Refinery to permit the exploitation of the rich gas in sulphur produced at Das Island. The refinement capacity of the al-Ruways Refinery will also be increased.

Abu Dhabi also announced the second phase of the development of the upper Zaqqum field, which involves the installation of more than 100 operating wells and a water injection well to increase their production capacity from 350,000 barrels per day to 500,000 barrels per day in the next two years. This field, with reserves estimated at 20 billion barrels, is administered by ZADCO, and it is a joint project between the French Total oil company and ADNOC [Abu Dhabi National Oil Company].

Simultaneously, work is being implemented on installations at Umm al-Anbar, west of the Mubaraz oil field, on the coast, where production amounting to 8,000 barrels per day began last February.

This field was developed by the Mubaraz Oil Company, MOC, which is owned by ADNOC and three Japanese companies, which are the National Oil Company, the Nippon Mining Company, and Kuzmu Oil Company. This production will add to that of the Mubaraz-1 field, which totals 150,000 barrels per day. The UAE is facing the problem of OPEC-imposed production quotas, given that its large reserves enable it to produce more than its allotted share, which does not exceed 1.1 million barrels per day.

The UAE is considered the largest exporter of oil and gas to Japan, supplying it with 682,000 barrels per day. Tokyo also buys 66,000 barrels per day of refined products. In January-June 1989, Japanese oil purchases from the UAE totalled \$2.69 billion, which is slightly more compared to the same period in 1988. Sources at the Japanese embassy in Abu Dhabi stated that Japan wants to purchase more as well.

Abu Dhabi has noted the growing Japanese demand for gas in the 1990s, and has implemented plans to increase liquified natural gas production operations at Das Island, especially for the Japanese market.

Two Japanese oil companies have submitted applications for permits to establish offices in Abu Dhabi this year. Also, the Showa Oil Company established a liaison office last May, and the Nippon Oil Company, the largest of the Japanese companies, opened a similar office. Kuzmu Oil and Adimitsu also currently have a presence.

ADNOC, founded in 1971, is considered the main power in the oil sector in Abu Dhabi. It supervises two operations companies: The Abu Dhabi Company which operates in marine areas (ADMA), and the Abu Dhabi Company which operates on land (ADCO). Subordinate to the latter is the Zaqqum Development Company (ZADCO), and the Umm al-Dawkh Development Company (UDICO). These four companies are responsible for almost all crude production.

ADNOC is also the major shareholder in the Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Company (ADGAS), the only company supplying liquified natural gas in the Gulf and in Abu Dhabi to gas industries (GASCO). It has subsidiary companies active in drilling, chemicals, storage and distribution of refined products, tanker operation, and numerous other fields. ADNOC is also responsible for the UAE's two refineries at Umm al-Nar and al-Ruways.

## INDIA

**Muslim Countries' Stance on Babri Masjid Issue Criticized**

*90OI0110A Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA in Bengali 21 Nov 89 p 4*

[Editorial]

[Text] Benazir versus Rajiv

This is perhaps what is called a storm in a tea cup. Some remarks have been passed on behalf of Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia on the occasion of the foundation-stone-laying at the Ram Mandir in Ayodhya. In India, a serious uproar can be heard in reaction to these remarks just before the election, particularly, against the statement of Benazir Bhutto, the prime minister of neighboring Pakistan. In the beginning, Rajiv Gandhi assumed the role of a Benazir critic. According to him, Benazir's statement amounts to interfering in the internal affairs of India. The prime minister, in almost all of his speeches, refers to this issue, and as a result, a joust of protest against Benazir has started. BJP's [Bharatiya Janata Party] reaction is indeed obvious. Even Marxist Jyoti Basu has figured in this tilt. After they got the chance, everybody seems to be vociferous against the prime minister of Pakistan. But the question is whether this hoopla of statements and speeches is necessary at all! The point is worth pondering, because the issue of democratic values is involved in it.

In a sense, the world of today is an undivided entity. As a planet, the earth is one and the human race, as the inhabitants of this planet, are one too. The earth's ecosystem affects the people of all the countries. The events in one nation also touch other nations' peoples. For this reason, the Indian people shed their tears and protested against the killing of young people in Tiananmen Square. That is why the people of this country felt elated at the democratic changes in Eastern Europe. They were shaken by the images of the torture of the Tamil-speaking population in Sri Lanka. As a people who love democracy feel sorry at the ill-fated demise of democracy in any place, they get into dejection, in the same way, at people's death during a drought or a riot. Rajiv Gandhi, too, expresses his own opinion on multifarious issues of many countries of the world—sometimes at the session of the United Nations; at other times, at the Non-Aligned summits or at the conference of the Commonwealth heads of states. Again, he often airs his views at press meets. He has this freedom. In fact, the statesmen of this world obviously, in a sense every conscious individual, have this right. So why this storm of protest against Benazir Bhutto's statement! Benazir can express her opinion, not only about India, but also about any event under the sun. Under any scrutiny that will not be regarded as unauthorized meddling by Benazir Bhutto. Because, this practice is synonymous with human emancipation, democratic rights.

There was a time on this earth when might was right. There was no justice in that world. There was not an iota of human values in the sphere of state administration. One nation, flexing its muscles, used to rule and exploit another nation. The people of one country could sell the people of other countries like cows and sheep. That world is history now. The present world has not only "shrunk" but the human values also have now been clearly defined. Here, the contours of "internal affair" are particularly limited. In a sense, today, perhaps no incident can remain only the exclusive affair of a particular nation. The dumb Chinese Wall has forgotten its meaning today. Even the Berlin Wall, built during the modern era, has crumbled. This is the age of the destruction of walls. Walls not only demarcate national borders, they also hinder the flow of light and breeze from other nations and debar the longing for transmitting a nation's own thoughts and ideas abroad. In a world, where the inhabitants have come so close, the erection of walls on the plea of "internal affairs" is to indulge in the keenness of a closed mentality for returning to the Middle Ages. The people of this country want to create such a society where all these old, junk ideas and thoughts have no relevance. Even the generous expression of "the universe is mine" has found a place in Rajiv Gandhi's poll manifesto. The votaries of Indian nationalism—from Rammohan Roy to Mahatma Gandhi, Rabindranath, Jawaharlal Nehru—all of them, in fact, preached the concept of consanguinity of the universal man. Then—why this display of such tenuous sensitivity? Maybe, a sort of narrow religious sentiment seems to be active behind the utterances of Pakistan, Iran, or Saudi Arabia. Maybe, their humaneness and brotherly sentiments are threatened whenever any religious co-believers face any crisis. It is their deficiency if they fail to rise above their narrow-mindedness. Should the leaders of this country deviate from their liberal principles only because the ideas of some statesmen of those countries are constricted by religious precepts! In reality, we see that an irrelevant slogan is being echoed in different corners of this country. This unwanted development is indeed more dangerous than Benazir Bhutto's remarks, because this is also a sort of narrowness. But Rajiv Gandhi or Jyoti Basu promised tolerant liberal humanism!

**Jharkhand Movement Said Suffering Internal Dissension**

*90OI0126A New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 12 Dec 89 p 7*

[Article by Kavi Kumar: "Jharkhand People Ready to Face Leaders"]

[Text] Jharkhand's groups that have been negotiating with the central government are suffering from internal strife. Second string leaders and the Jharkhand people are calling the government talks as a fraud and a ploy to postpone problems until after the elections. In addition to that the district councils that had participated in the government talks have also revolted. The groups that want to get out of the talks with the government after

listening to the Jharkhand people have broken their promises to the government. The groups that strongly supported negotiations with the government are also angry at these parties. The JSU [Jharkhand Students Union] is prominent among such groups.

The JSU leadership has broken its promise made to Home Minister Buta Singh on 11 August in order to pacify their district level leaders. Prabhakar Tirki and Surya Singh Besra, president and secretary general of the JSU, had promised in writing to the Central government that they will not start any movement while the Jharkhand Committee established by the Central government worked to find a solution. Jharkhand groups were supposed to remain peaceful until this committee made its recommendations. The JSU broke this promise with its 120-hour strike beginning on 25 September. The Jharkhand Committee was reported to be upset about this decision and returned to Delhi from Ranchi, leaving its investigation incomplete. This development occurred because the Orissa government did not allow the committee to enter the state when the committee members were going to Orissa via Jamshedpur.

According to the investigators, the central committee leaders were forced to break their promise. The district level leaders of the JSU were so aggressive in a recent meeting that secretary general Surya Singh Besra was in tears. He just could not stand their questions. Why should the JSU, which wants nothing less than a separate Jharkhand state, hold any talks with a government that is not ready to discuss the concept of a separate state for Jharkhand? The central committee leaders of the JSU could not answer this question posed by the district level leaders. The JSU central committee leadership had to unwillingly go with the decision to strike for 120 hours on 25 September. Investigators recognize this fact. When the JSU leaders dragged their feet about the strike, the Singhbhum district committee of the JSU decided in a meeting held at Chainbasa to go ahead with strike plans in case the central JSU backed off. The central committee leaders were afraid of losing power when the district committees decided to rebel.

The central leadership was also nervous because the district level leadership had already demonstrated its clout on 16 August.

The JSU central committee had announced a 96-hour strike beginning on 16 August. The central committee later canceled this strike, however, the district level leadership carried out a very violent strike resulting in the loss of government property worth millions of rupees. Two bombs were thrown inside the Novamandi region's forest officer's house. One of them exploded destroying a wall. They also destroyed a truck going on Chainbasa-Chakradharpur road and badly beat its driver.

The JSU members become even more violent on 17 August. They burned four trucks going on Chainbasa-Hatghamaria road. They also burned the forest warehouse in Devrasai village in Hatghamaria region

resulting in a loss of property worth over 400,000 rupees. The railway line between Chainbasa and Singhporia was blown up, and the line between Talburu and Kaidposhi was blocked to rail traffic for hours.

The JSU central committee leaders have decided to join the district level leaders in this campaign.

Thus, the JSU decided to break its ties with the "Jharkhand Negotiation Committee" that supported talks with the government as well as the government backed Jharkhand Committee. The JSU will not participate in any negotiations with the government in the future. Surya Singh Besra, secretary general of the JSU, has said that the campaign becomes weak if they postpone it repeatedly and it also demoralizes the volunteers. It is said that Santosh Rana, Naxalite leader, is not happy with the JSU decision to go on strike.

The oldest Jharkhand party is also suffering from internal strife just like the JSU. The only difference is that the central leadership of Jhapa [Jharkhand Party] is undermining its district committees. It is expected that this would result in disbandment of Jharkhand Party. Anai Horo, president of Jhapa, supports talks with the government. Shaile Kumar Maithi, secretary of Jhapa's Singhbhum district branch, believes that the proposed negotiations are a Congress (I) government conspiracy to cheat Jharkhand leaders. Mr. Maithi thinks that the government will kill the campaign for a separate Jharkhand state by starting a few developmental plans. There is no mention of "Jharkhand state" in the agreement prepared after the talks with Home Minister Buta Singh. Bhutton Gorai, Jhapa's district coordinator, is openly opposing Anai Horo, the central committee president. He has even threatened to establish a parallel Jharkhand committee with the support of 20,000 members and second string leaders. This committee would oppose talks with the government and boycott elections. Mr. Gorai is talking about cooperating with JSU's Surya Singh Basera and Jharkhand Liberation Front's Shalakhan Murmu. According to political observers, Mr. Horo is a strong supporter of cooperating with the government and holding elections. He is trying unsuccessfully to calm the restlessness in his party. It is expected that the revolt that started in Singhbhum district will spread to other districts.

Jharkhand Mukti Morcha [Jhamumo] is always ready to change sides. It did not take part in government talks from the very beginning. When some of its leaders wanted to participate in the talks they got themselves invited by using the accusation of economic harassment against the government. The central committee leaders of Jhamumo took part in the talks held on 11 August. However, after reading the mood of the people in Jharkhand, these leaders withdrew from the talks saying that there was no mention of "Jharkhand state" in those talks. The Jhamumo, however, did not start any agitation as per its promise to let the government appointed committee finish its work. Political observers are expecting Jhamumo to start its activities now that this

committee has returned to Delhi leaving its work unfinished. Jhamumo, the party that usually cooperates with Congress (I) in elections, has started to talk with the Bhartiya Janata Party and the Janata Dal. These activities clearly show that Jhamumo is not going to cooperate with the Congress (I). The central committee leaders of the Jhamumo are also keeping a keen eye on two or three of its leaders who have sold out to the Congress (I).

### **Commentary Urges Continuation of Reservation Policy**

*90OJ0137A New Delhi NAVBHARAT TIMES  
in Hindi 22 Dec 89 p 5*

[Article by Shailesh: "It Is Not Time Yet To End Reservation"]

[Text] The 14.8 million people belonging to scheduled castes are still economically very backward. In spite of the 17th clause of our Constitution, which outlawed the caste system, the scheduled castes are still suffering from untouchability in various forms.

On one side is the 1988-89 report prepared by the Central Welfare Ministry and on the other side is a new campaign against reservation for the scheduled castes.

This anti-reservation campaign is spreading rapidly among the high caste students in urban and suburban areas of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan. A minor campaign of the supporters of reservation policy to counter it is also emerging. The new Janata governments in Uttar Pradesh and the center appear to be dazed and some Congress leaders, now sitting on the opposition benches, might be fanning the fire of the anti-reservation campaign. In this political chess game, there is the danger of misusing the students demonstrating for and against the reservation policy, as well as the fear of increasing caste hatred and resulting violence.

The anti-reservation group has emerged with very modern slogans this time. They are not opposing the reservation policy. Instead, they want reservation of quotas to be based on economic backwardness and not on affiliation to a caste. This demand may appear to be original on the surface, but its major goal is to push the social change back to the middle ages.

The caste system has been the root cause of social inequality in India for thousands of years. Even a poor Brahman holds a high position in society because of his caste, and the social position of a prosperous low-caste person is essentially very low. A great scholar like Raidas remained an untouchable because of the Brahman-controlled social structure, while a totally ignorant Brahman becomes venerable. We will find many such examples if we turn the pages of history books carefully. These will prove that the caste system has made our country weak.

The various castes of our country never thought of working together until the freedom struggle against the

British rule. We had left administration and defense of the country in the hands of the Brahmins and Kshatriyas. This resulted in our being defeated by every invader. The large backward segment of our population always slaved for local or foreign rulers. The reservation system guarantees the downtrodden to share equally. This system appears to be wrong to the agents of high caste people for this very reason.

The opponents of the caste-based reservation system have to respond to some questions. Isn't the job of temple priests reserved for Brahmins for centuries? Can a low caste person be selected as head priest of a prominent temple or have the privilege of being carried on Shankaracharya's back? The practical answer to these question would be "no." The caste system is still the main cause of social inequality. There is not even one incident of stopping the whole village of poor Kshatriyas or Brahmins from voting. However, those accused of stopping the whole subdivision of Harijans from going to polls make bold statements on television. It is obvious that the cause of social inequality is not poverty or prosperity. Its roots are deep down in our social structure. This clearly indicates the failure of our political system. We have not found a remedy for this social ill even after 40 years of independence.

The reservation system resulted from the Constitution of independent India for a special purpose. The British also had a reservation system. They started a special reservation system for the Muslim in 1892.

The purpose of that arrangement was pure political. The British, to continue their "divide and rule policy," had tried to keep the Muslims happy with this system. They provided special treatment to Christians in 1920 as part of a political ploy. Scheduled castes were included in this system for the first time in the 1935 Constitution. This was the first step in reducing social injustice, but this Constitution was dismissed two years later and the reservation system was ended.

There were three kind of arrangement for helping the backward castes in the Constitution of independent India: (1) Untouchability was made illegal (Clause 17). (2) Seats were reserved in the Lower and the Upper House for scheduled castes and tribes (Clause 330). (3) Government and semigovernment jobs were reserved for scheduled castes (Clause 334). This reservation system first was to be for only 10 years. The writers of the Constitution hoped that the government of independent India would improve the education of scheduled castes during the 10 years so much that there would not be any need for reservation of jobs. This 10-year period has been extended four times since then.

Economic improvement of the of low caste people is one of the areas in which the Congress government from Jawaharlal Nehru to Indira Gandhi to Rajiv Gandhi has failed miserably. Reports issued by the government clearly show that most of the claims about work done for improving the lot of low castes was only on paper. The

1988-89 report of the Social Welfare Ministry shows that the majority of the unskilled laborers belong to low castes. Low caste people still carry sewage on their heads. The majority of people who are below the poverty line belong to low castes. According to the 1981 census, the literacy rate in our country has risen to 41.30 percent. The literacy rate for the low caste people, however, is only 21.38 percent. Literacy among low caste women is only two percent in some regions. This report also tells that only 32 large and small cities in the country have underground sewage system. It is obvious that in the remaining urban and suburban areas the low caste persons carry human feces on their heads. All big promises by the government to give the lower caste people social equality do not change the reality that the low caste people are still being treated as untouchables.

It is estimated that there are about 5.3 million latrines in our country and 1.4 million sweepers take care of these. This great insult to humanity is caused partly by our social structure and partly by the government of independent India. According to an estimate, 15 billion rupees are needed to build sewers and septic tanks and put an end to the present latrine system. The Congress government which spent millions on decorating offices never gave priority to stop the latrine system. We are forced to live with this social evil.

Not only have the problems of the low caste people increased after the independence, but so have the crimes committed against them. Over 15,000 cases of atrocities against the low caste people were registered in 1986 even though there are special laws against persecuting the low caste people. The 1950 law about untouchables, the 1955 law to protect civil rights, and the 1989 law to stop persecution of scheduled castes and tribes are just decorating pages of law books. As the low caste people are awakening and starting to protest against unfair feudal-age laws, attacks against them are also increasing. Massacres of Harijans in Belchhi, Pipra, Banjhi, Dehuli, Sadhupur, Rampur, Kaphalta, Palajor, Indiravali, Gua, and Karshuan have proved government claims wrong. The previous Congress governments had used the Harijans as vote banks. This trick of the Congress party was not hidden for long. The Harijans' disillusionment with the Congress, the birth of a new Harijan leadership, and their joining the Janata and other parties are living proof of this tendency.

The anti-reservation campaign can push the Harijan back politically and it can also make them vengeful. Protection is not only a legal but a social right. All political parties are pledged to support this system. The scheduled castes and tribes make up 23 percent of the country's population and the reservation for them is proportionally much lower (15 percent for scheduled castes and six percent for scheduled tribes for central government jobs). Even the Congress government had promised to keep the reservation policy before the elections. No political party, except for Shiv Sena, is against the reservation system.

Reservation of jobs for the scheduled castes and tribes is not enough now to stop the political unrest. The middle castes have also been demanding reservation for them for many years now. The 1956 Kaka Kalekar Commission had recommended 2,399 scheduled castes for inclusion in the reservation system. These castes made up 40 percent of country's total population. Mr. Nehru had rejected this recommendation. The Janata government had formed a commission in 1979 under the chairmanship of B.P. Mandel to study the reservation issue. This commission presented its report in 1982 and recommended reserving 27 percent of government jobs for backward castes. The Janata government had promised satisfactory arrangement for backward classes before the elections and it would be very difficult for it to back off from this promise. It is also clear that the anti-reservation campaign cannot be stopped with the police's help alone. This campaign has brought forward the disillusionments of the new generation. Students in colleges and universities see their futures uncertain. There is no hope of getting employment. About five million youth were unemployed during the last five-year plan. This number has increased to over 50 million now. This unemployment problem is forcing the high caste students to think that they are not getting employment because of this reservation system. This is not true. The low caste people are also unemployed. They do not get many new employment opportunities and the old employment venues are also closing. The government cloth weaving policy has left hundreds of thousand handloom workers unemployed. This job had kept several generations employed in the past. There are not many opportunities for employment in the modern clothing industry. The real test for the Janata government will be on the employment front. The problem of unemployment will disappear if the government follows a strong economic and industrial policies to change the social structure. Everyone would be employed and the reservation system would become obsolete. If the anti-reservation people steer their campaign toward demanding employment as a constitutional right, we will have a historic victory. The Janata Dal government has no other choice but to make employment a constitutional right.

The Janata government can establish itself only if it provides jobs for the educated and the uneducated. The reservation system has to remain even when employment is made a constitutional right. This is the only way to provide equal opportunity to low caste people in every sphere of the government. The injustice of keeping the low caste people out of the government for centuries must be revoked now at any cost. The reservation system attacks the Brahman-controlled social system and it is imperative to break up the latter to provide fairness to all. Therefore, we cannot remove the reservation system.

## IRAN

### Defense Budget Up 30 Percent

90010155C Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 8 Jan 90 p 18

[Text] KEYHAN Political Service—Yesterday morning and afternoon the Majles convened under the chairmanship of Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Karrubi, and

Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Asadollah Bayat, deputy speaker.

During this session proposals from Majles commissions on the tables for current credit, development credit, fixed investment and foreign exchange resources and expenditures for the first five-year expansion plan were discussed and studied. Several proposed amendments from the Majles commissions were approved. On the completion of these proposals the task of studying the five-year economic expansion plan was completed, and tomorrow the Majles will approve Article One and all the notes and the tables from the plan.

Printed below is the report on the afternoon and morning Majles agendas.

After the pre-agenda speeches and readings from deputies memos to the nation's executive officials, the Majles began its agenda.

First Seyyed Mohammad Reza Vaeqefi's request to resign as Esfahan deputy was studied, and he submitted the following letter of resignation:

To the respected Majles speaker, Your Excellency Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Karrubi, greetings.

In view of the need for active presence in the period of national reconstruction, to fulfill the toiling government's responsibilities, and in view of the need for a comprehensive effort to achieve the goals of the government of His Excellency Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani's government's five-year plan, and in view of the duty that has been given to me as governor-general of Esfahan Province, I submit my resignation as deputy to the respected Majles.

For me almost six years of close cooperation and collaboration with the dear deputy brothers, who, in the words of our great late Imam, are the essence of the best of this nation, have been a great and unforgettable honor. Although separation from the great, believing and loyal society of my Majles colleagues is a loss to me, the always close and sincere relations between the legislative and executive powers can to a great extent repair my spiritual loss.

Then Mohammad Mo'ezzi and Taha'i spoke in support and Rezavi and Salehabadi spoke in opposition, each giving his views concerning Seyyed Reza Vaeqefi, who has been appointed governor-general of Esfahan Province.

Then the Esfahan deputy's resignation was put to a vote and approved by a majority.

#### **Proposals on Five-Year Plan Tables Studied**

Then proposals from the commissions on the general goals and policies of the nation's first five-year economic expansion plan were presented. The Agricultural and Rural Development Commission proposed the addition of the following paragraph:

To increase the level of the nation's production of meat and livestock products, the government will guarantee the purchase of surplus meat from livestock keepers and farmers at cooperative and appropriate prices, and it will make the utmost effort to meet the financial needs of the animal husbandry industry.

Then the chief of the Plan and Budget Organization gave explanations.

Then a vote was taken on the proposal and it was approved.

Then the tables were presented for the nation's first five-year economic expansion plan.

In Table Two concerning current credits, the Defense Affairs Commission proposed that 80 billion rials be deleted from the national domestic security row and be added to the defense affairs row.

This proposal, after talks for and against and explanations from the commission expert and the chief of the Plan and Budget Organization, was put to a vote and rejected.

After that the Defense Affairs Commission proposed that 100 billion rials be deleted from the commercial credit row and be added to the defense affairs row.

This proposal was put to a vote after explanations from the relevant commission expert and the chief of the Plan and Budget Organization. Since there was a difference among clerks on the vote count, a vote was taken by paper ballot, with results to be announced later.

At 10:40 AM the public Majles declared a recess.

At 11:20 AM yesterday the Majles convened again under the chairmanship of Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Karrubi, and Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Asadollah Bayat, deputy speaker.

First the results of the vote on adding 100 billion rials to the defense affairs budget were announced, as follows:

Of the 164 votes placed in the ballot boxes, 74 voted in favor, 77 against, and 13 abstained, and as a result the proposal from the Defense Affairs Commission was rejected.

Then the proposal from the commissions of defense affairs and education and training concerning increased credit for the current year was present. The Defense Affairs Commission proposed increasing the credit ceiling for health, treatment, and medical education by 120 billion rials, and after talks for and against the proposal and commentary from the appropriate commission and the chief of the Plan and Budget Organization, the proposal was put to a vote and rejected.

After that the Education and Training Commission proposed that 30 billion rials be added from the domestic borrowing budget to the education and training budget.

After talks for and against the proposal and commentary from the Plan and Budget Organization and the government's representative, the proposal was put to a vote and rejected.

At 12:15 yesterday's public Majles session took a recess.

#### Report on Afternoon Majles Session

At the afternoon session, the Majles convened again under the chairmanship of Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Asadollah Bayat, deputy speaker. Study and discussion continued on the deputies' proposals to amend the general government budget's summary tables for the first plan, current credits for the first plan, development credits for the first plan, fixed investment for the first plan, and the nation's foreign exchange sources and expenditures. Some amendments proposed by Majles commissions were approved, and with the completion of these studies the task of studying the five-year economic expansion plan was completed, and tomorrow the Majles will hold a public session to approve Article One, all the notes and the tables from the five-year plan.

Based on these proposals that were approved by the Majles, the ceiling on the government's foreign exchange and rial revenues must increase from the amount provided in notes one and 29 of the nation's first five-year economic expansion plan bill.

Based on Note One, the total credit the government will be authorized to receive from the banking system throughout the five-year plan will be \$4,483 billion.

Likewise Note 29 explains that the Central Bank will be authorized to pay or commit to a maximum of \$119 billion and \$142 billion in the framework of the figures in the tables of this law.

Likewise the defense budget ceiling in the five-year plan increased to 400 billion rials, and this sum will be obtained from general revenues.

Based on the aforementioned proposals, 18 billion rials are approved to be subtracted from the urban development budget with the same amount to be added to the rural development budget.

At the same time the proposal to raise the communications credit limit from \$1.928 billion to \$2.4 billion and to increase atomic energy foreign exchange credits from \$400 million to \$500 million was approved.

These funds will be obtained from industrial sector credits.

The proposal to subtract 36 billion rials from the current health, treatment, and medical education budget and add the same amount to this ministry's development budget was approved, and authorization was given for \$49 million of the Ministry of Health and Treatment's foreign exchange credits to be allocated for building a hospital.

Likewise, with the procurement of \$40 billion from oil revenue and \$40 billion from gas revenues, the proposal was made that \$80 million be provided to procure construction materials for social security hospitals, and this was approved.

Investment from non-government sectors for intelligence, mass communications, art, culture, and tourism was approved totaling 453.5 million rials.

At 5:20 PM yesterday's public Majles session ended and the next session was set for next Tuesday morning.

The Majles public relations announced the following names and electoral districts of deputies who signed the 217-deputy letter to the great position of the leadership which were not published previously in the newspapers:

- 1 - Seyyed Sajjad Hojjaji, Miyaneh
- 2 - Seyyed Mostafa Faregh, Dezful
- 3 - Mohammad Hoseyn Chahregani-Anzabi, Tabriz
- 4 - Yaghmur Qolizadeh, Mian Dasht
- 5 - Seyyed 'Abbas Hedayati, Faridan
- 6 - 'Ali Akbar Hamta'i, Niriz and Estahban
- 7 - Ahmad Kabiri, Marv Dasht
- 8 - Ahmad Bolukian, Kashmer

At the same time, the name of Seyyed Hoseyn Qazizadeh Hashemi, Faridan, Ahmadabad, and Sarkhas deputy was included in error, and is hereby corrected.

#### AL-DUSTUR Claims Envoy in Bangkok Intelligence Agent

45000081 London AL-DUSTUR  
in Arabic 22 Jan 90 p 3

[Text] The new Iranian ambassador to Thailand, Mohammad Hadi Sazkar [name as published], who took up his duties in Bangkok last week, began his working career as an official in the Revolutionary Guard's intelligence, managed "revolutionary" activities in southeast Asia for two years after he joined the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and participated in setting up terrorist cells for Tehran in Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia.

#### PAKISTAN

#### Government Efforts To Exert Control Over Press Denounced

90OJ0142A Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 2 Jan 90 p 3

[Editorial: "Calling Names and Advertisements"]

[Text] Mr. Ahmad Sayyed Aiwan, federal minister of information and broadcasting, addressing Rawalpindi's press club recently said, "Why should we advertise in newspapers that call us names? Why should we spend

money from our pockets to get cursed?" He was responding to the point made by the president of the Rawalpindi-Islamabad Union of Journalists that the Daily HURIAT fell prey to the unfair practice of allotting advertisements and that the government was not paying over 26 lakh [one hundred thousand] rupees it owed JASARAT.

Recently, when asked about the restrictions on government advertisements in JASARAT, Benazir Bhutto told an official that JASARAT always curses the Bhutto family. Now the respected federal minister has also made a similar statement. Neither of them can prove that JASARAT was cursing them. We would like to ask Sayyed Aiwan whether he objects to our cursing the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] or the government. If by the word "us" he means the government, then we would like to request him to please take a look at the government mouthpiece, the MUSAWAAT. This newspaper includes such abusive language against the Punjab government that no other newspaper can equal. A minor incident in Cheecho or Pindi Bhatian is used to blast the Punjab government and the chief minister. The Jamaat-i-Islami is also cursed in this context. Look at the articles or columns in the newspaper and see what kind of names are given to the state government. A government is a government whether it is state or federal. If Mr. Aiwan means that we are calling the PPP leaders' names and publishing the opposition leaders' statements, then he should know that the opposition leaders' statements are also broadcast by the government television and radio and the government is very proud of this. Why should they object to the publication of these very statements in the newspapers? As for cursing the PPP leadership, Ghulam Mustafa Khar is the champion in this area. The script of his Tajpura meeting, the press conference following it, and the statement made in the court are all on record. Furthermore, only a few months ago, the PPP chairperson, Nusrat Bhutto, stated that Mr. Khar could not be included in the PPP because he curses Mr. Bhutto. Now after all this, Mr. Khar has become the PPP's spokesman. He has changed the target of his curses. Following the example of his teacher, he calls someone "Kashmiri gonglu" [Kashmiri turnip—a derogatory term] sometimes and "iron thief" the other times. Mr. Ahmad Sayyed Aiwan must have not forgotten who holds the record for calling others' names in Pakistan. In the light of all this it is not fair to punish some newspapers for some imaginary crime by stopping their advertising revenue and awarding those who do not call the government names. Most of all, claiming to give exemplary freedom to the press and trying to kill newspapers by taking away their advertising quotas is not freedom.

Following the changes in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and the appointment of Mr. Aiwan in Mr. Jabbar's place, our hopes were raised that the newspapers would get a fair deal. The word "Aiwan" means helper and the tribe got this title because of its support for right against wrong. We are sorry to say that Ahmad Sayyed is not showing any "Aiwan" character

here. His statement also shows that the government considers advertisements its personal property and wants to use it as leverage for putting pressure. The money for these advertisements is taken from the taxes that come from the people's blood and sweat. The question is not about JASARAT but about principles. JASARAT is used to the lack of adherence to principles by governments, be they autocratic or democratic. This accusation of calling names, however, is new!

#### Official 'Litany' on Sindh Criticized

90010142B Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 3 Jan 90 p 3

[Editorial: "This Old Tape"]

[Text] A high level meeting chaired by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was held recently in Islamabad to review the situation in Sindh. The governor of Sindh and the home minister also participated in this meeting. Mr. Aiwan, the federal minister, later announced that the prime minister was greatly interested in bringing the situation in Sindh under control, and that she had issued instruction to law enforcement agencies to try their best to protect the people and their dignity. The prime minister has issued strict orders to deal very firmly with the elements responsible for disturbing the peace. This high level meeting was very important and timely, keeping in view the situation in Sindh. However, we ask what happened after this high level meeting and many other meetings that were called before this one? All they did was to issue instruction to deal firmly with the troublemakers. This instruction in itself is meaningless and ridiculous since there was no previous instruction to deal leniently with the troublemakers. First, these troublemakers are to be apprehended before any dealings with them. The instigators have not been caught either during martial law regimes or now during democracy. The present democratic government has repeatedly blamed this situation on the previous dictatorship. In other words, the government is satisfied after classifying it into a past file. This formula of "blaming the dictatorship" is used in every issue even in the National Assembly. The law enforcement agencies were instructed to protect the life, the property, and the dignity of the people. The "agencies" referred to are the armed forces. What is the difference between a martial law regime and a democratic government if this task is given to the army? The prime minister also meant the police, the CIA [Crime Investigation Agency], and the FIA [Federal Investigation Agency]. The inefficiency of the police and its involvement with the criminals is common knowledge. The federal home minister, who was present at this meeting, had already announced in Hyderabad recently the need to clarify a political strategy for establishing peace. Anyhow, no concrete or immediate results have come out of this high level meeting. It seems like we are playing an old tape.

Even more astonishing is the fact that concern was expressed on the situation in Punjab, not Sindh, in a cabinet meeting that very day. Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan, the

federal minister of internal affairs, was instructed to keep a close eye on the "deteriorating" situation in Punjab. It was also mentioned in the cabinet meeting that the Punjab government was targeting the pro-PPP members of the state and the national assemblies for revenge and that false cases were being registered against political opponents. It

was also said that a member of the state assembly was acting as superintendent of police. All these were blamed on the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad. We would like to say that we wish they had at least expressed concern over the situation in Sindh and blamed the government of this state for this situation just to give the feeling of fair treatment!